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Abstract
Legal Ontologies for Public Procurement Management
The thesis explores ways to formalize the legal knowledge concerning the public pro-
curement domain by means of ontological patterns suitable, on one hand, to support
awarding authorities in conducting procurement procedures and, on the other hand, to
help citizens and economic operators in accessing procurement’s notices and data.
Such an investigation on the making up of conceptual models for the public procure-
ment domain, in turn, inspires and motivates a reflection on the role of legal ontologies
nowadays, as in the past, retracing the steps of the “ontological legal thinking” from
Roman Law up to now. I try, at the same time, to forecast the impact, in terms of
benefits, challenges and critical issues, of the application of computational models of
Law in future e-Governance scenarios.
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1.1 Public procurement: an introduction
Drive along a highway, take a train, sit on a park bench, benefit health care from a
public hospital, read a book in a national library, attend a state university, admire the
panoramic view from the Constitution Bridge in Venice.
At first glance, these activities seem to have nothing in common, but actually, many
common, everyday actions, such as those listed, represent the way in which we enjoy of
public goods or public services. Furthermore, public works and many public services,
whose we are users, share another join-point: they are realized through the same process.
Our satisfaction in enjoying public goods and services, and therefore, quality in our every
day life, largely depends from how this process is managed. Much more than we realize.
The term public procurement refers precisely to this process whereby public authorities,
including entities operating in utilities sectors and those operating on the basis of special
and exclusive rights, acquire goods and services or commission works. The main step of
this process, is undoubtedly the stipulation of a contract, specifically a public contract.
However, unlike in private law, this step represents not just a matter of agreements be-
tween parties, but also, and above all, the result of a procedure, which is the cornerstone
of public procurement’s fundamental architecture. This procedure, established by law
for procuring public goods, services o works, is therefore no less important.
It worth stressing that such procedure exists because public entities have only limited
freedom of contract. In fact, contrary to private agents, which have a wide-range con-
tractual freedom, public bodies have to comply with much more strict rules, because
their contractual relationships must always be driven by the pursuit of public interest.
Actually, also the “contracts between private persons are not concluded in a preserve
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of unrestricted self-interest, and therefore even the ordinary civil law of contract of any
country necessarily includes rules which reflect a public interest in the objects and terms
of private contracts. The element of the public interest is, however, significantly more
prominent in the sphere of public contracting” [149]. This significance of public interest
in public contracting is due the fact that any act, which falls under the scope of admin-
istrative law, is finalized to pursue the utility of the group, of generality of citizens, in
other words, of the State.
Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei romanae spectat; privatum, quod ad
singolorum utilitatem pertinet.
(Ulpianus, Dig. 1.1.1.2)
This distinction is probably the most important one for understanding the public con-
tracts. A contract between private parties is, indeed, the mean whereby individuals or
an organizations pursue an interest for the benefit of oneself, of another person or orga-
nization, or of a limited group of persons; the public contract, instead, is stipulated for
ensuring an utility to generality of citizens. Thus, for example, a public contract for the
construction of a highway, a library or a bridge, is signed between a public authority and
one or more parties, but the public authority is only a bearer of citizens’ interests. For
example, the interests of those citizens that will be, one day, drivers on that highway,
readers in that library, tourists on that bridge.
The realization of citizens’ interest inspires public contracts, even when they are signed
for the needs of ordinary public machine’s function, i.e. to provide the goods and services
required for normal function of public entities. Of course, eﬃciency of public oﬃces is
instrumental to eﬃciency in achieving public interest.
Hence, public procurement procedures exist because each administrative action is driven
only by the pursuit of public interest, or more generally, of public function. Moreover,
the path to follow for accomplishing public function, is rigidly established by law, even to
meet transparency as well as economic and financial audit requirements. These are the
reasons why in every attempt to understand public procurement it is necessary to bear
in mind that the “why” (the achievement of public interest) and “how” (the compliance
with a procedure established by law that guarantees the correct achievement of public
interest) is as important as the “what” (the public acquisition of goods, services and
works; the public contract in itself). These aspects are so closely related that each of
them depends on the other.
The reason why so many interlinked issues aﬀect the public procurement field can be
properly understood only by overlapping the legal insight with a general public finance
2
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perspective: after all, public contracts represent one of the most relevant items of public
expenses. As shown by figure 1.1 which encloses the results of a survey by Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), general government expenditures
account for between 20% and 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) of major world
economies, and in particular, during 2009, government expenditures represented 46%
of GDP across OECD member countries. In the same year, government expenditures
of Denmark, Finland and France were equal to or above 56%, whereas Mexico, Chile,
Korea and Switzerland spent between 24% and 34% of GDP. Furthermore, as can be
noted, EU countries have generally a higher ratio than emerging national economies
with the notable exception of Brazil.
However, as properly observed by OECD, “the large variation in these ratios highlights
diﬀerent approaches to delivering public goods and services and providing social protec-
tion, not necessarily diﬀerences in resources spent”, because, “for instance, if support
is given via tax breaks rather than direct expenditures, expenditure/GDP ratios will
naturally be lower”. “In addition, it is important to note that the size of expenditures
does not reflect government eﬃciency or productivity” [103]. Indeed, public expenses
are also extremely sensitive to economic crisis, like the one that in 2009 was just started.
Figure 1.1: The figure shows the general government expenditures as a percentage of
GDP (2000, 2007 and 2009). Source: OECD publishing.
Anyway, according to economists [116], the government expenditures are of three types:
purchases of goods and services; transfers of income to people, businesses, or other
governments (for example, in order to pursue a welfare program, the government decides
to pay subsidies to farmers for the production of certain commodities); interest payments.
While taking into account this feature, the significance of public procurement as part of
public expenses is quite clear. In fact, as shown in figure 1.2 the size of public procure-
ment market (including state-owned utility) is measurable between 5 and 20 percent of
3
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GDP. Then, though some distinctions between diverse economic and legislative frame-
works are mandatory, it can reasonable stated that public procurement market accounts
for at least one third of major economies’ public expenses.
Figure 1.2: The figure shows the size of general government procurement as a per-
centage of GDP (2006 and 2008). Source: OECD publishing.
On the other side, opposite to expenditures, public revenues are derived primarily from
taxes. The taxing and spending activities of governments, as well as their influence
in resources allocation and redistribution of income is usually recognized as matter of
public finance, also known as economics of the public sector [140]. The economists
analyze public finance not only for its intrinsic significance, but also and above all,
in order to develop guidelines about economic governments’ activities. However, the
relation between revenues arising from taxes and their use in public expenditures, is
not only a matter of economic studies. Allocation choices of public resources reflect the
attempts to meet certain objectives, political and then social. In democratic societies,
both taxing and spending choices are made in a collective manner: they are made
by elected representatives to whom is delegated the power to decide about the use of
public resources, on behalf of citizens. Thus, public finance depends from public choices
and public choices are the substantial result of common values, beliefs, desires and goals
shared by majority of citizens. That is why, one of the most influential economist of 20th
4
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century said, “the public finances are one of the best starting point for an investigation
of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life” [129].
And that is why, even when we analyze public procurement from the perspective of
public finance, again, the resulting picture is an inextricable tangle between the “why”
(the public choice among various needs, desires, objectives of the society); the “how”
(how to provide economic resources to finance the achievement of public choice) and the
“what” (the purchase of goods, the provision of a service or the realization of a public
work for materializing public choices).
But, at the same time, superimposing the two paintings (the legal and the economic one),
it becomes also strikingly clear what we mean when we talk about public procurement
1.3.
Public finance layer 
















Figure 1.3: The figure shows the relationship between public choices, public interest,
and their materialization through resources allocation and legal procedures.
First of all: public procurement represents not only one of the most relevant voice of
governments expenditures and then, of public finance. Public procurement is also and,
above all, one of the most prominent link between public choices and their concrete
realization. Therefore, world of public procurement reflects the attempts to meet many
social and political objectives [142] but also “the ability of government to transform
taxes and other revenues into consumption by government institutions at federal, state
and local levels, ostensibly for the public good” [94].
This ability is realized only through the achievement of “value for money” [142] (public
money, taxpayers’ money), which must be also demonstrated or provable. The public
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procurement system in itself is designed by law just for ensuring this distinguishing fea-
ture, or for trying to achieve this goal. In this perspective, transparency, accountability,
and integrity (i.e. the basic principle of good governance) [30] are not empty words, but
the fulfillment of a complex architectural design, whose main aim is the guarantee of
citizens’ interest.
Such architecture, the public procurement system, is the context, the world where re-
search that I am going to tell you is placed.
1.2 Research scope: legal ontologies for public procure-
ment management
Despite the relevance of the field, public procurement has been recognized by many
scholars [145] as a neglected area of study and research. This because of many fac-
tors. Callender and Matthews [29] claim that “procurement seems to have a reputation
for being reactive, clerical, unimaginative” 1, essentially agreeing with Twyford [150],
and Stewart, who argues that procurement management is conducted by “unglamorous
individuals” 2 [139], whose only purpose is to accomplishing a complex accountability
process of government. Something tremendously boring, at a first glance.
The reasons of a such academical disregard are probably related to a cultural attitude
of the legal scholars, who consider this field as not enough theoretical for the research
investigation. It is indeed a very technical and practical domain. However, as emphasized
by [28] the public procurement domain is also a field which consists of many bodies of
knowledge (law, public finance, accounting, management’s issues, etc.)and this feature
makes it extremely interesting as subject matter of research investigation.
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the legal aspects of public procurement
and a precise area of ‘information science’, namely formal or computational ontologies.
This thesis work moves from an assumption: the need of legal ontologies for the public
procurement domain. As highlighted in the introduction, there are many arguments
which support such a claim.
The most evident one is arguably that, over recent years, the management of procedure





importance of the electronic procurement (e-procurement) 3 is nowadays largely empha-
sized by many Governments’ plans and strategic actions across the world.
In a recent Communication, the European Commission has stressed the strategic im-
portance of e-procurement for the European Union since it can contribute to addressing
“two of the main challenges the European economy is facing today: the need to maximise
the eﬃciency of public expenditure in a context of fiscal constraints and the need to find
new sources of economic growth”. 4 Furthermore, e-procurement “can significantly sim-
plify the way procurement is conducted, reduce waste and deliver better procurement
outcomes (lower price, better quality) by stimulating greater competition across the
Single Market”. 5 On the basis of these considerations, the e-procurement represents a
key factor for the sustainable growth objective of the EU 2020 Strategy 6 and for the
Digital Agenda for Europe and the e-Government Action Plan 2011 - 2015 7. Thus, a
series of strategic actions have been planned in order to support the transition towards
full e-procurement market place in the European Union.
The adoption of electronic communications and transaction processing by the public
sector organizations, although not full completed, is nowadays a well-established reality
in many phases of the procurement processes. Consider, for example, that the publi-
cation of contract notices (and of the others tender’s notices) for the European tenders
takes mainly place in the internet. The TED (Tenders Electronic Daily) website 8,
namely the online version of the “Supplement to the Oﬃcial Journal of the European
Union” dedicated to European public procurement, is updated five times a week with
approximately 1500 public procurement notices from the European Union, the European
Economic Area and beyond, providing free access to business opportunity for economic
operators interested in participating to tenders. Moreover, information about every
procurement document is published in the 23 oﬃcial EU languages, in that way guaran-
teeing the respect of the non-discrimination principle, which is one of the pillars of the
procurement domain.
Nevertheless, this huge amount of textual and unstructured data stored in large reposi-
tories, as well as on the Web, produced by institutions at all various levels (European,
national and local) in awarding public contracts requires ways of bringing order and han-
dle in the right way this unstructured information. The Semantic Web infrastructure
3E-procurement means alternatively “the use of online technology to assist with the procurement
function” [45] or “the use of electronic communications and transaction processing by public sector









and ontologies, legal ontologies, may provide the strategic solution to make eﬀective the
major need and challenge of our times.
The public procurements domain is a complex and very technical legal field but also a
strategic one, since it concerns a large number of stakeholders. These include: traders,
for whom it represent interesting opportunities, although sometimes not easy to grasp,
especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs); public authorities, for whom it is
crucial to choose the best contractor, by maximising information access and then com-
petition; communities of citizens, who may be interested in monitoring the management
of the res publica and of the operating expenses utilized on behalf of the public interest.
Since law, and public procurement as well, impacts and aﬀects the everyday life of all
individuals, representing legal knowledge in the Semantic Web scenario is both a timely
need and a challenge. Indeed, the e-Government sector is one of the major drivers in the
emergence of Open Linked Data and governments are making accessible a large amount
of datasets, about a wide range of topics, such as spending reports, administrative
staﬀ organizations, public healthcare, etc. Data on public contracts notices are open
data by their nature. By law, they must be accessible. However, without the right
interpretation, data are only raw data, which by themselves may not provide useful
information. Government Open Data are in many cases related to the legal domain and,
as a result, legal ontologies may play a key role uncovering the semantics of these data
and driving the integration of this information with other datasets. Thus, it would be
possible to build semantic e-Government applications, which may provide a significant
contribution in bridging the gap between citizens and institutions.
Nevertheless, as recently emphasized by some scholars, this consideration implies to
rethink the role and the utility of legal ontologies, “questioning the need for a highly
axiomatised and unified knowledge representation” and conceiving instead “a new way of
designing legal ontologies and of embedding them into architectures for legal information
systems and other web services”[33].
1.3 Objectives of research
Consistently with these needs and challenges, in this thesis I explore a novel path in
designing legal ontologies, trying to combine the representation of legal concepts with
the usability required for the description of data, while also taking into account the issues
arising from the integration of legal ontologies with other vocabularies and ontologies in
the Semantic Web world at large.
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In addition, I outline the theoretical foundations and an ontological pattern for describ-
ing public procurement procedures. Such an ontological framework could be useful to
support awarding authorities in conducting procurement procedures.
Such an investigation on the making up of conceptual models for the public procure-
ment domain, in turn, inspires and motivates a reflection on the role of legal ontologies
nowadays, as in the past, retracing the steps of the “ontological legal thinking” from
Roman Law up to now. I try, at the same time, to forecast the impact, in terms of
benefits, challenges and critical issues, of the application of computational models of







2.1 On the early history of Legal Ontology: how, when
and why Legal Ontology was born
Legal concepts are not necessarily dependent on the existence of normative texts. History
teaches us that social groups were able to generate laws, and then to create legal concepts,
even before written records.
More than 2.6 million years ago, hominids were certainly able to conceptualize a ‘stone
tool’ (type), by building new units (tokens) of that type and by replicating the use of
them. Indeed, as well emphasized by Lakoﬀ,
“Categorizing is a fundamental human activity.[...] there is nothing more
basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech.
Every time we see something as kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are
categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of things – chairs, nations,
illnesses, emotions, any kind of thing at all – we employ categories.[...] An
understanding of how we categorize is central to any understanding of how
we think and how we function, and therefore central to an understanding of
what makes us human.”[81]
There are no reasons to exclude law from the range of what is being categorized by
human mind. A primitive man was probably able to categorize also some basic norms
that ruled life in archaic societies (social norms). Indeed, as ancient Romans have taught
us
Ubi homo, ibi societas. Ubi societas, ibi jus. Ergo ubi homo, ibi jus.
11
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The law is a cornerstone of human societies and categorizing is a fundamental human
activity, therefore we can arguably merge the two aspects claiming that also ‘legal things’
had their place in the system of categories used by the human being, since its origins.
However, even if a primitive man was certainly able to conceptualize a stone, he was
probably not really aware of his ability to conceptualize ‘things’. Humanity must wait
for the birth of philosophy to reach the full consciousness of its ability to conceptualize
‘categories’, by explicitly wondering what entities exist (Ontology) and what they are
(Metaphysics).1 After all, as pointed out by Bielfeldt, “ontology is as old as philosophy
itself”[19].
A detailed presentation of the history of ontology is outside the scope of this thesis,
which concerns legal ontologies, instead of ontologies in a broad sense. Thus, what I am
interested in, is rather an investigation on the cognitive and conscious processes that
led to the rise of legal ontologies. Provided, of course, that there is something worth
investigating.
One could argue, indeed, there is nothing special to inquire regarding the emergence of
legal ontologies. They may have been simply the result of the human attitude to catego-
rize the business of law, at its various degree of evolving complexity, as any other human
business. And then, one may argue that humans have become aware of their ability to
categorize law, simply by borrowing from philosophy the methods of questioning about
the nature of ‘legal entia’, just as one of the many entities that exist.
Personally, regarding these conclusions, I want to retain my skepticism.
1On the distinction between Ontology and Metaphysics, Varzi states that “ontology is concerned
with the question of what entities exist (a task that is often identified with that of drafting a ‘complete
inventory’ of the universe) whereas metaphysics seeks to explain, of those entities, what they are (i.e., to
specify the ‘ultimate nature’ of the items included in the inventory).” [Therefore,] “a thesis to the eﬀect
that there are such things as colors or virtues would strictly speaking belong to ontology” [whereas] “it
would pertain to metaphysics proper to establish whether such entities are Platonic forms, immanent
universals, tropes, moments, or what have you”[161].
As Varzi emphasizes, this is a common way of dividing up the business of philosophy, made popular
by Quine[114].
Instead, for Loux, the distinction seems to be less apparent. He, indeed, states that “central to
metaphysics understood as a universal science is the delineation of what Aristotle calls categories. These
are the highest or most general kinds under which things fall. What the metaphysician is supposed to
do is to identify those highest kinds, to specify the features peculiar to each category, and to identify
the relations that tie the diﬀerent categories together; and by doing this, the metaphysician supposedly
provides us with a map of the structure of all that there is”[86].
An important issue to be underlined is that Aristotele himself did not know the word ‘metaphysics’
(nor the word ‘ontology’). The first term (metaphysica) was coined by the first century C.E. editor
who assembled the fourteen books by Aristotle that we currently think of as making up “Aristotle’s
Metaphysics”. The title ‘metaphysics’, indeed, means literally, ‘after the Physics’, to indicate the books
after the physical (books), namely, after the treatises dealing with nature (ta phusika)[37]. The origins
of the word “ontologia”, instead, are quite uncertain, however, as far as we know, the term appeared
for the first time approximately in 1606, on the frontispiece of Jacob Lorhard’s book Ogdoas scholastica.
The term “ontologia” was used by Lorhard synonymously with “metaphysica”[104].
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Just to begin, it may be particularly attractive for a legal scholar to discover that the
term ‘kategoria’ was used by ancient Greek to describe “what could be said against
someone in a court of law2, and indeed Aristotle uses what can be said of or in a sub-
ject as a route to distinguishing categories”[146]. This would suggest strong similarities
between earlier forms of judicial argumentation and Aristotelian method of investigation
on the ontological nature of entities, and, at the same time, this might led to the conclu-
sion that role of law was probably not so marginal in the emergence of the ‘ontological
thinking’. There must have been something more to categories in law than categories
of law.
Nevertheless, the historical process that turns an unaware attitude into a conscious abil-
ity to categorize legal concepts is far from being clear and plain. On my opinion, an
interesting and deep attempt in disclosing such a path, is provided by the work of Aldo
Schiavone, ius: L’Invenzione del Diritto in Occidente[127].3 Schiavone reassembles var-
ious and (only ostensibly) scattered pieces of Roman law’s history, from the monarchy
to the high-empire and Justinian’s codifications, under an unified and evolutionary per-
spective, and by doing that, he draws a striking genealogical glance on the processes
which determined the “invention of Law” in the West.
This ‘invention’ coincided with “the projection, by the jurists, of legal abstractions as
a comprehensive ontological schema, capable of subsequent rationalization on the basis
of internal principles alone (and thus capable of autopoiesis); and more importantly,
through this ontological projection, capable of claiming independence from other com-
peting realms of human interaction (such as politics). This achievement is, for Schiavone,
properly called ‘law’ (ius), and its historical genesis is in Rome”[27].4
2My emphasis
3An English translation of the book is also available:[128].
4My emphasis. Bryen (op. cit.), whilst reviews the work of Schiavone, skillfully uses the word
autopoiesis. In Greek ‘poiesis’ means ‘creation, production’, thus etymologically ‘autopoiesis’ means the
capacity to create or produce oneself. The term was introduced in 1972 by two biologysts, Maturana
and Varela[95, 159], in order to describe living organisms, such as cells. They coined that word to
explain, for example, how an eukaryotic cell, through an external flow of molecules and energy, produces
the components which, in turn, enable to maintain the organized bounded structure that gives rise to
these components, namely of the cell itself. Both Maturana and Varela provide several definitions of
autopoietic systems. The classical definition is:
“An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production
(transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components that
(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of
processes (relations) that produce them and
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the
topological domain of its realization as such a network”[157].
Maturana provides another more concise definition:
“A molecular autopoietic system is a closed network of molecular productions that recursively produce
the same network of molecular productions that produced them and specify its boundary remaining open
to the flow of matter through it” (source http://web.matriztica.org/1290/article-28335.html).
Finally, Varela defines the necessary conditions to recognize an autopoietic system:
“A system is autopoietic if: (a) it has a semi-permeable boundary, (b) the boundary is produced from
within the system, and (c) it encompasses reactions that regenerate the components of the system”[158].
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The title of Schiavone’s work, i.e. the Invention of Law, should not mislead. Of course,
the author is aware that arguments on the origins of law are unavoidably intertwined
with arguments about the origins of human beings, society and social institutions, and
indeed, exactly the Romans emphasized that ubi homo, ibi ius. So, the intention of
Schiavone should not be understood in the sense of a statement about the origins of
law, as such. Neither it should be understood as a preconception about the excellence
or the superiority of the Roman Law against other legal systems. There must have been
certainly other equally sophisticated and complex legal systems, prior to the Roman Law,
e.g. in ancient Greece, as well as in Egypt, to say nothing of Mesopotamia, but that,
exactly, is no longer the West and, above all, Schiavone is not interested in investigating
which of these legal systems (or Laws) was the first to born. Rather, he is interested
in analyzing and showing the process by which the Law becomes a ‘system’, i.e. the
evolution of Law, from its being a fait accompli of human interactions into its becoming
a systematic discourse.
Moreover, the Roman Law diﬀers from other legal systems of the past mainly for two
reasons, and Schiavone, as a shrewd scholar of Roman law, knows very well. First, no
other legal system has withstood so long, over the centuries: to be precise, thirteen
centuries from the founding of Rome (753 b.C.) until the end of Justinian’s Reign (565
a.d.). Second, no other legal system of the past has been so well chronicled, through the
witness and the documents of the past, as the Roman Law. The amount of evidences
and arguments for historiographical research is immense and invaluable, in a word, is
unique. Starting from this background, Schiavone discovers other important arguments
for claiming the uniqueness of Roman Law.
The author stands as an observer of this long period of time, traversed by deep institu-
tional changes (from Monarchy to Republic and then to Empire); ascents and declines
Apart from the biological domain, the concepts of ‘autopoiesis’ and ‘autopietic systems’ have raised
interest in a wide range of disciplines. In particular, the notion of autopoietic system has been applied in
cognitive science (also starting from this work:[160], by which derives the so called ‘Enactivism’ embodied
approach) and sociology (the most important work in this direction is arguably that of Luhmann [87]).
Precisely Luhmann[88, 89], but also Teubner[143, 144] (just to cite the most active in the field), have
pointed out that also the legal system is an autopoietic system. The idea, as realistic in its approach as
suggestive in its theoretical implications, is groundbreaking. Indeed, thinking at the legal system as an
autopoietic system helps to understand the essential features that distinguish it.
The legal system, as a ‘living’ organism, is an open system, continually traversed by a flux of energy
and matter that comes from society, i.e. from the social environment (social and economic demands, new
technologies and scientific progress issues, ethical issues, etc.). The legal system continuously adapts
to its environment and by adapting itself continuously changes. The intuition is surprisingly similar to
that of Levi, which defines the legal system as a “moving classification system”[83]. Nevertheless, at the
same time, the legal system is featured by a sort of closure: it recursively produces (and reproduces)
itself and, by reproducing itself, it is autonomous.
Bryen emphasizes that precisely the inherent logic of the legal system and of legal reasoning (as it has
been structured from the ‘invention of law’ by the Roman jurists until our days) allows this autonomy.
In this sense, the legal system is capable of autopoiesis.
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of charismatic political leaders; social and economic revolutions; destruction and recon-
struction of social and ethical values, due also the birth of a major monotheistic religion.
Nevertheless, such an observation is not only that of the classicist, rather is that of the
jurist, who searches for his origins, and while is searching for this, reconstructs what has
happened to Law. Therefore, what Schiavone talks about, is not the Law which exists
per se, but the Law that has been invented, invented by the jurists:
“Roman jurists were not only “sages”, “experts”, or “scholars” of the law.
For a considerable part of their history they were also its most important
“constructors” and “producers”. [...]
Roman law was unique among ancient systems of law not only because it was
elaborated “scientifically” but also because it was the only system in large
part produced by a class of experts “professionally” engaged in this task over
the centuries.”[126]
Precisely this scientific elaboration of law by the jurists, coincides and culminates with
the abstraction of the human empirical behaviors, along with laws regulating them,
under a series of ‘categories’, featured by intrinsic rational principles, and then capable
to be recognized following a logical path. As well explained by Bryen, this path was
carried out
“translating dung receipts into concepts of ‘contract’, donkeys and farms
into concepts of ‘property’; translating, in other words, “what they do” into
master concepts of “what their law is” and by so doing, making those master
concepts somehow real (that is, claiming that sale is an actual entity which
begins in this way and ends in that and activates a series of other concepts
in the process [...]).
Within these headings “what they do” could then be evaluated as sophisti-
cated or inconsistent, developed or developing, depending, e.g., on the degree
to which the principles reflected in the contract for transporting dung mir-
rored those in the contract for hire of donkeys, or whether a generalizable
reason might be found for why they did not. It was, for Schiavone, the
Roman jurists who invented this method whereby scholars define law by ref-
erence to such master concepts which subsume practice within a structure
capable of rationalization”.[27]
In other words, this path matches with the emergence of a legal ontological thinking, and
the method invented by the Roman jurists is the same we apply still today in recognizing
“what we do” and “what is our law”.
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Schiavone reconstructs that process, by designing sort of fictional axes representing the
forces generated by the major social, economic, institutional changes, which were fighting
with tradition. At the intersection of the equilibrium points among such forces, there is
the invention of Law by the jurists. That is to say that the Law was able to answer to
the enormous pressure of all those factors, by inventing itself.
The first little step asking for a ‘revolution’ in thinking the Law occurred during the
transition from the archaic Rome to the Republic. It is represented by the shift of the
prerogative to make ius from the college of pontifices to a group of republican aristocrats,
empowered to give responsa. The oldest nucleus of the ius of Rome has its origins in
a inextricable tangle between religion and law. The pontifices –literally “road makers”,
“those who open the way” (id.)– were the keepers of a “magic-sacral-religious knowledge”
(id.) expression of a divine or magic investiture. Along with the power to preserve the
mores (i.e the gens’ tradition of behaviors), this sacral investiture was the key factor for
their ritualistic pronouncements constituting the ius until, at least, the third century
b.C.
The responses of pontiﬀs were sort of oracular answers: the patres addressed to these
archaic priests their ius’ demands on landownership, patrilinearity, commercial or matri-
monial exchanges, etc. and they gave their guidance in such matters through authoritar-
ian, detailed and minute precepts. Nevertheless, the very important aspect to emphasize
is that the iuris dictio of pontiﬀs was
“intrinsically casuistic, ‘local’, and operating point by point, it oﬀered a
diﬀerent responsum for every demand. Cognition of the ius did not emerge
elsewhere, nor had the ius any meaning excerpt to resolve immediate and
concrete problems corresponding to the needs of the community” (ivi, p. 89)
Hence, the activity of pontifices was not susceptible to be checked, nor to being known in
advance by all the citizens, especially by the plebeians. Arguably because of the plebeian
intolerance against such a management of the ius, approximately around 450-451 b.C.,
occurred the production of the Twelve Tables. The Twelve Tables should not be intended
as a sort of Constitution of Rome. The classicists are quite sure that the Tables did not
include any norm regulating the institutional setting of the city. Rather, this written
source of the lex was comparable more to a set of definite rules governing particular
aspects of landownership, patrilinearity and commercial or matrimonial exchanges. In
other words, the same matters which were covered by the responsa of the pontifices.
And indeed, the aim of the revolutions following the end of the monarchy was precisely
that to obtain the certainty of the law for both the patricians and the plebeians.
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That is to say that starting from that “unexpected, mysterious, and traumatic episode”
(id.), another dimension joins the conflicting space of the Romans’ Law history: the
emerging novelty of legislative written records vs. the oral (unwritten) form of the
responsa authored by the pontifices. Even when the prerogative of iuris dicere in form of
responsa became an aristocratic privilege, expression of the patrician-plebeian hegemony
that prevailed since the third century b.C., i.e. by Tiberius Coruncanius onwards, the
resposa were still “consumed in their pronouncement; their duration was the time it took
to put them into eﬀects” (ivi, 91). They were not forgotten but their memory was then
kept by aristocratic families rather than by the college of pontiﬀs. And even though the
laic resposa of the nobles-sages (as opposed to the priest-sages) were more sophisticated
in their hermeneutic features, that judicial knowledge was still inadequate to solve the
complex cases which were emerging, as side eﬀects of the growth of the city that after a
couple of centuries would have become an empire.
The only two texts of Roman jurisprudence which appeared before the mid-century
b.C. (the De usurpationibus of Appius Claudius Caecus and, a hundred years later, the
Tripartita of Sextus Aelius Paetus Catus) were strongly connected with political issues
and, above all, with political strifes.
“Nonetheless, the presence of writing always betrays an intent to “popular-
ize” juridical knowledge, or at least an interest in moving it toward awareness
of it among a more general audience. The written word mitigated an exagger-
ated dependency on the aristocratic oral tradition. The closed and verifiable
space of the text, of the liber, of the tables, opposed the arbitrariness of
secret memory: this was what had already taken place with Twelve Tables.”
(ivi, p. 93)
The eﬀects powered by the use of the writing that, up to this point, were still opaque,
became more and more clear, from the development of the ius honorarium onwards. By
virtue of their functions, which included the ius edicendi (i.e. the power to issue edicts),
the praetores (i.e. elected magistrates), started to grant a new type of actio, that was
no longer based on the archaic rules of lege agere and on the rituals of certa verba, but
on words agreed together (per concepta verba) by the praetor and the litigants, for the
definition of the conflicting claims involved in the dispute. Those definitions were still
generated case by case, but now, the in iure ritual was not consumed immutably, by
mixing the sacred and the magic. The achievement of the new actio, instead, was a
sort of flexible agreement between the praetor and the parties, whose primary aim was
the search for a ‘formula’, a schema that would fit to the specific case. Afterwards, the
jurists referred to that new procedure exactly as per formulas procedure.
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It is not easy for a jurist of our time to understand the nature of that procedure,
since it, ultimately, included both procedural and substantive elements. By granting
the actio, indeed, the praetor, indirectly, created also those claims taken into account
by the procedure that would have been applied for their satisfaction. Such priority of
the procedure over the substance, of the form over the matter, is contrary to what we
think of that relationship nowadays. However, the reason why this new procedure was
conceived in that way should be understood. In fact, it represented a sort of compromise
between the traditional legis actiones of pontiﬀs, that formally still survived, and the
need to provide judicial rulings for the new issues arising from a cosmopolitan society
that was learning a new “Mediterranean mercantile cunning”(id.).
All things considered, the importance of the ius honorarium in the history of Romans
law is invaluable. This body of law constituted a gloss or a supplement to the main body
of civil law, the ius civile, in a manner comparable to the relationship between equity
and the English common law. In that way, “the ius honorarium infused Roman law with
new vigour and a fresh direction, transforming an introverted, parochial body of law into
an outward-looking, cosmopolitan system”[46]. The new praetorian juris dictio had to
deal with an increasing amount cases, characterized also by an increasing complexity.
Then, these aspects began to require more elaborate form of logic and rationality to
handle the proliferation of judicial demand, along with its evolving complexity.
Right now, during the thirties and forties of the second century b.C., there are all the
conditions to put in balance the disruptive forces capable of encouraging the invention of
the Law in the West. The introduction of the new way in handling the Law occurs with
the early attempts of Junius Brutus, Manius Manilius and Publius Mucius Scaevola. The
chronicles tell us that they founded the ius civilis.5Within the space of one generation,
Quintus Mucius Scaevola (his father was Publius Mucius) was the first that tried to
“establish” (constituere) the ius civilis per genera, by abstracting categories and dividing
up genus and species “that structured broad headings capita into which the responsa
of previous times were fit.”[27]. The last ‘hero’ of the scientific revolution was Marcus
Antistius Labeo, a famous jurist of the Augustan ages, who was one of the greatest
innovators of the ius. The path followed by those jurists, individually and independently
from each other, can be reconstructed through the words of Pomponius: fundare, primus
constituere, plurima innovare. Through these words, Pomponius tells us that this is the
century of the breakthrough.
5Please, note that some scholars of the Roman Law do not agree with Schiavone’s arguments on the
importance of these jurists regarding the work on the systematization of Law. For those who think that
the statement concerning the foundation of the ius civile lacks relevance, see[141].
18
Chapter 2. On legal ontologies
The history of those men tells us of “the laborious emergence of new conceptual param-
eters, of a ‘rational’ and ‘formal’ law for the first time conceived abstractly and in terms
of a true juridical ontology”[126].6
With his de oratore, written about forty years later the ius civile of Mucius, Cicero can
be considered as the most radical supporter of this change in conceiving the ius. In his
work, he imagined the project of a Hellenistic regeneration of the ius civile: it is here, at
this point in history, indeed, that Platonic-Aristotelian ideas become the reference point
for the ‘scientific revolution of the Law’. The project of Cicero was not realized mainly
because of the opposition of Servius Sulpicius Rufus and his disciples (Alfenus Varus and
Aulus Ofilius, among the others). The dialogue between these two remarkable jurists,
Cicero and Servius, sobering still today. Servius focuses his attention on the mechanism
of the responsum in a completely new way, probably unknown to the same Mucius.
Servius’ knowledge is largely a cognition of the specific cases and his attention is on to
detail, on the particular. Nevertheless, the specific cases do not find their rules and their
definitions in pre-defined abstract concept, rather is the analysis of the particular that
produces the formulation of a principle, a rule or a definition (for example on the fraud).
It seems that, at the end, Servius succeeded in convincing even Cicero on the value of
this approach.
On the other hand, the history of those men, –we can now refer to them as– the jurists,
tells us also of
“the progressive fragmentation, under the burden of the political crisis that
stuck the nobilitas, of the link between political primacy and juridical knowl-
edge, the symbol of all aristocratic jurisprudence. [...] this group [of jurists]
was of course still an expression of the dominant strata, but it was no longer
totally and unmediatedly identical with the groups that successively held
power.” (ivi, p.94-95)
The rest of the history will revolve almost exclusively on the relationship between law
and political power. The jurists become, at first, staunchest opponents of the imperial
legislation’s predominance: Labeo was a tenacious defender of –as Schiavone says–“the
“jurisprudentiality” of Roman law against any tendency on the part of the regime to
shift the ancient balance in a “legislative” direction (an idea that may have entered
the mind of the last of the Caesars)” (ivi, 96). Afterwards, the role of the jurists was
increasingly consolidated: they started to become friends and then jurists-counselors of
the Princeps, but then this ‘collaboration’ marks the end of the jurisprudentiality of
6My emphasis
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Roman law and the beginning of the imperial chancellery’s primacy in the production
of law. Julianus is the most luminous example of that “jurist-counselor” (id.) figure.
Ulpianus, instead, was the prototype of “jurist-high-functionary” (id.) and it is no
coincidence that I have decided to recall in the introductory part of this thesis, exactly
a sentence of Ulpianus. In some sense, he is the founder of the administrative law to
which the public procurement law belongs. So, here, the circle closes.
2.2 The evolving space of legal ontology
The history of Roman Law shows how controversial has been the history of the moves
made, many centuries ago, for equipping the legal knowledge of an autonomous ratio-
nality, of its own logic. The process that led to that result is basically a ceaseless search
for an intrinsic systematic coherency of Law. The Romans have invented the method
for conducting this search, and then, the application of that method has stayed alive
down the centuries. This is the most valuable heritage of the Roman Law, namely the
method to analyze the categories of Law.
The summae divisiones that Gaius makes for each of the three parts in which his work is
divided (namely personae, res, obligationes) reveal, primarily, that the Plato’s method
of definition, the dihairesis, had been fully adopted also by the Roman jurists of that
time.7 The whole method and arrangement of the Gaius’ work formed the basis of
the Digest and of the Institutiones of Justinian, which were part of the Corpus Juris
Civilis: in those two books indeed are contained many quotations of the Gaius’ textbook.
Furthermore, the platonic method of the division of a genus into its parts, was very
popular in the Middle Ages to illustrate consanguinity and aﬃnity according to family
law, servitudes, types of interdiction or of exceptions and also of jurisdiction (an example
of Arbor Servitutum is shown in the figure 2.1).8
Nevertheless, the work of the Roman jurists has been so vast and excellent that its
influence has been deep in history of legal ontology, even beyond the invention of that
method. The contemporary jurists belonging to civil law systems are used to recall
the conceptual systematization and classifications of Law which have been developed by
Gaius. In fact, we remember the Institutiones of Gaius mainly because of the way in
7The Institutiones (from the Latin instituere, i.e. “to establish”) of Gaius, written about 161 a.d., is
the only classical law book that has survived nearly complete and unchanged from the time of Justinian.
The Institutiones comprise four books. The first concerns the legal status of personae ( ius quod ad
personas pertinet); the second and third, property rights, including inheritance (ius quod ad res pertinet);
and the fourth, the obligationes and the form of actio per legal actiones (ius quod ad obligationes
pertinet). The text was lost until 1816, when a manuscript, probably of the fifth century, was discovered
at Verona, Italy.
8You may find more information about the arbores also here http://mosaico.cirsfid.unibo.it/.
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Figure 2.1: Arbor Servitutum in Digestum vetus, seu Pandectarum iuris civilis tomus
primus (Venetiis: Apud Iuntas, 1592). For this and other legal trees see: Legal Trees -
Yale Law Library
which that work organizes the legal categories of civil law. Strikingly, those categories
of the ius civilis make sense still today. Every textbook of private law employed in the
universities of countries belonging to the civil law system’s tradition reproduces in its
summary that division expounded by Gaius about two thousand years ago: the legal
status of persons and their rights; the property rights and inheritance issues, and then
the obligations. In addition, and above all, that division is reproduced also by several
current Codes regulating the matter of private law. For instance, the Italian Codice
Civile is organized, precisely, according to the Gaius’ summary.
However, obviously, the Law Gaius refers to, is no longer the same of today. For in-
stance, the main division of persons that Gaius makes, namely that all men are either
free or slaves (quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi), reflects no longer our cat-
egorization. Thus, the nowadays commonly adoption of the Gaius’ legal categories is,
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largely, an expression of our cultural heritage and of our historical acceptance of the
categories arising from the Roman Law9. For the remainder, it is mandatory to take
into account that, just as the legal systems change and evolve, so the legal categories
and the legal concepts change and evolve.
That major consideration, in my opinion, marks the most distinguishing feature of Legal
Ontology. Indeed, the inventory that has to be drafted for answering the question con-
cerning “what legal entities exist”, contains a list of categories which are not immutable,
rather, they are placed in the continuously evolving space of Law and the legal systems.
Legal concepts evolve in such a way that it is almost impossible to recognize, define and
categorize them once and for all, as well as once and for anyone. Let it be clear. I am
not referring to categories very popular in legal theory, such as “legal agent”, or “law”
understood as “social object” or “document” or “legal text”. Those categories are so
general and, let me say, so foundational, that one could reasonably claim that they are
largely shared in –and independently from– any type of legal system. I obviously agree
with that claim. The categories I am referring to are, instead, those which are peculiar,
unique and relevant only to the legal domain, i.e. those categories which make up the
cultural background and the Law’s awareness employed everyday by the jurist. This is,
at the end, for me, the ‘universe’ that legal ontology aims to recognize.
Then, metaphysical inquiry on the ‘ultimate nature’ of those peculiar “legal entities” is
largely a discovery of the space-and-time-dependent rules defining what they are. Those
rules are not absolute, nor ‘intrinsically written’ in rerum natura, because the Law is
a social phenomena and as a consequence, legal categories are predominantly rooted in
the so called social reality. Ultimately, we must admit that social reality changes and
then, legal categories change as well.
In general, legal systems discard old rules and adopt new ones by recognizing the exis-
tence of social needs that current laws do not satisfy. Hence, the Law changes to improve
its social adequacy and this change may be more or less apparent[167]. Normally the
change is deliberate and entirely clear, other times it is almost imperceptible, even for
the ‘law-implementers’. As Levi emphasized in his seminal paper An Introduction to Le-
gal Reasoning, the change process of Law is like a “wonderful mystery possibly reflecting
an higher law, by which the law can remain the same and yet change. The law forum is
the most explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for a moving classification
9Alan Watson, in his The making of the civil law argues that the basic division between civil law and
common law systems, along with the changes that have characterized diﬀerently the two systems across
the centuries, derives primarily by the tradition. He states, indeed, that “[the]basic diﬀerence between
civil law and common law systems are explained in terms of the legal traditions themselves; that is, the
diﬀerences result from legal history rather than from social, economic, or political history. Above all, the
acceptance of Justinian’s Corpus Juris civilis, in whole or in part, as authoritative or at least as directly
highly persuasive determined the future of civil law systems and made them so distinctive.”[166]
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system”[84]. It is true that the Law changes also for other reasons. Being an autopoietic
system, indeed, a legal system is governed by its inner rules, that must be connected to
each other in such a way to preserve coherence. So, it could happen that a change is
needed to harmonize rules among each other, even regarding formal aspects of the Law.
However, the changes brought about by coherence among formal rules may aﬀect also
the substance. In some cases, it could happen that reasons about formal consistency
are juxtaposed as expedients, or means, to foster changes of a substantive nature. In
that way, the substantial change appears as justifiable, because required by the legal
technicality.
2.2.1 The Blackstone’s Commentaries and the world of ‘thinkable
thoughts’
Regardless of (the reason) why and (the means) how the legal systems change, legal
ontology keeps track of the change. The evolving space of legal system is unavoidably
the evolving space of legal ontology. But this dependency not necessarily is one-way (i.e.
from legal system to legal ontology), it could be also a mutual dependence.10 In some
cases, it may happen that legal ontology drives the changes of legal system and vice
versa. It might sound strange, but this happens more frequently than expected. Just
think of the Gaius’ categorization of Law. It could be argued that such a systematic
organization of the Law impacted, in turn, the authoritative production of Law and,
indeed, Gaius’ work formed largely the basis of the Digest and of the Institutiones of
10Even Ferna´ndez-Barrera and Sartor argue that changes in the legal systems aﬀect change in legal
ontology. They, indeed, state that “legal change may question the validity of conceptual hierarchies.
As the law evolves, new inferential links are introduced –by the legislator, by precedents, by custom–
newly associating a legal concept to a certain condition or a certain eﬀect, or dissociating the concept
from one of its pre-existing conditions or eﬀects. In introducing such new inferential links, conflicts
with existing conceptual structures, as resulting from definition and from taxonomic inheritance, are
inevitable, and inevitably legal evolution is to prevail over static conceptual hierarchies.”([48], p.22).
They also argue that “legal concepts are [dependent] on legal norms since they may be expressly defined
by legal norms, or since they may be implicitly defined by them”, but then, they identify this dependence
as a mutual dependence, recognizing the crucial role of the legal doctrine in the interpretation of norms.
They, indeed, state that“legal semantics is determined (among other things) by legal doctrine, to the
extent that doctrine determines, identifies or constructs legal norms on the basis of the sources of law.
The discussion concerning the meaning of a legal concept in a legal system concerns establishing what
norms –leading to, or departing from, the term expressing the concept– hold in that system. Since the
inferential links holding in a legal system represent, or are derivable from, norms of such a system, this
discussion is inseparable from the doctrinal issues concerning what legal norms belong to a legal system
(given the available legal material, such as legislation, precedent, custom, and so on) and consequently
constitute correct premises of legal reasoning with regard to that system” (ivi, p.20).
Obviously, I agree with authors’ arguments on the role of legal doctrine. Nevertheless, what I would like
to emphasize in the discourse I am expounding, is the mutual dependency between broad classifications
of Law and the legal systems, while I suspect that Ferna´ndez-Barrera and Sartor refer mostly to the
interpretation of specific norms and particular legal concepts by the legal doctrine, and the acceptance
of that interpretation by judges and legal practitioners. In other words, the type of dependence they
refer to is immediately recognizable, instead the type of mutual dependence I am referring to, is subtle
and not immediately recognizable, or, at least, not in the short run.
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Justinian, namely of the real sources of Roman Law. Not surprisingly, at that time, the
Roman jurists were also counselors of the Princeps.
Nevertheless, the most interesting demonstration of the mutual dependance between
legal ontology and legal system, comes probably from the Common Law’s history, and
concerns one of the most celebrated works of the Anglo-American legal tradition, namely
the William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England [21]. I can not (and,
rather, I do not want) disguise the fact that what I am going to tell you is not a novelty.
The influence that the Blackstone’s Commentaries have had in the development of both
English and American legal systems is a well-known fact.
The Commentaries were composed between 1765 and 1769 by Sir William Blackstone, an
English jurist, judge, Tory politician and first Vinerian Professor of English Law. Born
in London, in a family belonging both to the middle class (his father was a merchant)
and to the landed gentry (his mother’s family was the Biggs of Wiltshire), Blackstone
received the typical education that was given to the people of his status: he, indeed,
attended the Charterhouse and Pembroke College in Oxford. After switching to and
completing a Bachelor of Civil Law degree, he was made a Fellow of All Souls, Oxford
on 2 November 1743, admitted to Middle Temple, and called to the Bar there in 1746.
On 3 July 1753 he formally gave up his practise as a barrister and embarked on a series
of lectures on English law, the first of their kind, at the Oxford University.
Those lectures were not part of the regular course about Roman and Civil law then
taught at Oxford. They were, instead, lessons on the common law as practiced in Eng-
land, mainly directed to young aristocracy and gentry, which needed to know the basic
notions of common law for understanding how to administer their property well. Hence,
the lectures of Blackstone had the purpose to provide a sort of knowledge tool to laymen,
rather than to specialists. Strangely enough, indeed, the common law was practiced in
the courts, but not studied in the Academia. There was, in short, a divergence between
the Law as practiced and the Law as taught by the scholars. Furthermore, Blackstone
was Professor at Oxford during a period traversed by significant social tensions. The
middle class was consolidating its economic power and so, it was becoming increasingly
pretentious towards the England’s ruling elite. Despite his mixed origins, but mainly
because of the education he received, Blackstone was openly sided with the aristocracy’s
interests. He was convinced that political power should remain in the hands of those
who possessed property. He tried to defend these interests in Parliament, but “the ul-
timate tool for Blackstone was the law, and the Commentaries became his principal
forum for teaching the elite of England how they should use the law to safeguard their
positions”[76]. His aim was “not to make all of these people practicing lawyers. Rather,
by educating these men in at least ‘a few leading principles’ of law, he sought to protect
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them from ‘inferior agents’ and ‘gross and notorious imposition’. Blackstone’s aim was
to give the nonlawyer ruling classes of England suﬃcient legal training to protect their
economic and political power base –their possession of property”(ivi, p.45). Is it there-
fore, not surprising that the cornerstone of the Commentaries is the supremacy of the
right to property.
The Blackstone’s work, divided into four volumes (on the rights of persons, the rights
of things, of private wrongs and of public wrongs), was de facto the first systematic,
methodical and comprehensive treatise on the common law. No attempt to do so, had
been made until this, and for the remainder of Middle Ages. Blackstone “took messy
smorgasbord of common law doctrine and practice and organized it into a comprehensible
series of propositions”[17].
“He supplied a structure of categories and concepts that fit the existing data.
Just as important, his explanation of how things worked was clear and easy
to understand. [...] Blackstone organized and systematized the common
law so that it could be logically approached. [...] Now the system made
sense.”(ivi, p.308)11
Blackstone’s Commentaries met a need: since the common law was based on precedents
more than on the statute or on the codifications, the search for an organization of the
Law was much more complicated than in the civil law, already developed by the Romans.
The Commentaries became more than a treatise of the common law, they were not a
code, nor a source of Law, but surprisingly, once their authority was accepted, “for
most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law”[24]. They became the “bible
of American legal institutions”(ivi, p.XV). One could argue, by using the words of
Schiavone, that Blackstone invented the common law. As Boorstin emphasizes in his
essay on Blackstone’s Commentaries, this acceptance of the Commentaries as the Law,
makes the Science of Law somewhat mysterious. Nevertheless, Berring argues that the
acceptance of Blackstone’s Commentaries as the Law, is not all that mysterious. Rather,
this acceptance might be intimately connected with the importance of classification, that
is, with categorization and its consequences.
When the law was obscure, Blackstone sought to make it seem rational and logical;
when a legal issue was regulated through a messy amount of precedents, he sought to
make order. Finally, he achieved his purpose so well that the resulting categorization
of Law appeared to be inevitable, the only possible one. The original decisions made to
reconcile competing claims in the Commentaries’s construction became almost invisible
to its users. The resulting acceptance was an expression of the determinative power
11My emphasis
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of classification. As Star and Bowker point out in their seminal work titled Sorting
Things Out, indeed, “Good, usable systems disappear almost by definition. The easier
they are to use, the harder they are to see”[138]. Therefore, those who use a good,
usable system tend “to conceptualize in terms of the system and as [the] system ma-
tures, it becomes authoritative, the classification system simply describes the universe.
Researchers mature using it, organize their thoughts around it, and it then defines the
world of “thinkable thought”[17].
Today, technology has not only invaded the world of legal information. Technology is
putting more and more under pressure the Law. The legal knowledge has been almost
entirely outsourced on the web, while it was remaining apparently the same. The textual
information of the legal sources is becoming more and more a ‘legal data’; the messy
amount of authoritative and not-authoritative legal information’s sources is determining
information overload and reliability’s issues; the real, democratic opening of the Law to
all the (non-lawyers) citizens has been not yet achieved. We can not delude ourselves
thinking that these major changes do not require solutions to re-invent once again the
Law.
Because of that pressure, Berring, in his provocative and outstanding paper, argues that
“[w]e need a new Blackstone. We need someone, or more likely, a group of
someones, who can reconceptualize the structure of legal information.(ivi,
p.315)
[...] the crucial point is that the legal information system needs a new set
of definitive authorities. We need authorities that can create a new world
of thinkable thoughts. It need not to be a perfect model, but it has to be
one that meets the characteristics of a good classification systems. This is
especially urgent because there are other possibilities(ivi, p.316).
[...] This is a call to arms.[Sic! ] The legal profession must seize control of
its own information destiny. The time is now [and] the stakes are enor-
mous.”(ivi, p.308)12
The year of Berring’s paper was 2000. You would be forgiven for wondering:
have we succeeded over the last thirteen years?
The rest of this Chapter is nothing but an attempt to give an answer to this question.
12My emphasis
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2.3 Early conceptualizations of the legal domain in com-
puter science
With the advent of computer science and automation in the 70s, the idea that computers
could have process the Law to determine legal solutions, slowly took foot, giving rise
to an autonomous field of research, namely Artificial Intelligence and Law (AI&Law).
The representation of norms through logic theories and languages adequate at being
processed by a machine, has attracted the computer scientists long before the jurists.
The Law became a subject of experiments to test the potential of automated computa-
tion in legal problem solving and the idea that computers would enable the solution of
legal cases, the application of the norms, replicating the way of thinking of a lawyer or
a judge, started to fascinate generations of computer scientists, long before the jurists
would realize these possibilities. Arguably, for the first time in the history of Law, the
legal knowledge management is not more an exclusive prerogative of its specialists. This,
in itself, is already something revolutionary.
Because of norms’ recurring formulation in terms of if-then statements, it is natural to
expect that the earliest and most obvious computer’s applications in the management of
the legal knowledge, have appeared in terms of logic programming and in the construc-
tion of the so called ‘legal expert systems’. Notable examples of systems based on a for-
malization of the relevant written law are the formalization of the British Nationality Act
in the programming language PROLOG by Sergot, Kowalsky and colleagues[131], and
the formalization of supplementary benefit legislation by Bench-Capon and others[13].
In practice, these formalizations were entirely based on a one-to-one correspondence of
the programming rules to the legal source texts (isomorphism principle)[11], i.e. to the
written legislation they formalized.
Although that correspondence to the legal sources represented a guarantee for faith-
fulness in the formalization, such a way of representing legal knowledge shared almost
immediately its limits, because the Law, as argued by the authors, is ‘silent’ in cer-
tain crucial issue of its application and because norms, sometimes, are far from being
clear and plain. Rather, they include also “obscure terms and terms redolent with
vagueness”[10] in their formulation. So, these considerations led into conclusion that
“systems which simply execute rules derived from legislation and case law operate at a
syntactic level, and the kind of reasoning required here will often depend crucially on
the semantic features of the terms involved”(ivi, p.41).
More or less, the same consideration emerged also by the experience gained by McCarty
in a project that is another classical piece of AI & Law literature, namely TAXMAN
[97], whose goal was capturing legal reasoning in the corporate reorganization taxation
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domain (as regulated by the 1954 US Internal Revenue Code). To achieve this goal,
McCarty defended the need of rendering explicit the structure of relevant legal concepts
by means of “deep conceptual models” [98] to properly address the issue of the co called
‘open textured concepts’, literally, of concepts apparently “too open” to be properly
defined, because indicated through words of extremely vague meaning.13
Therefore, in 1989, McCarthy introduced a knowledge representation language which
would have faithful mirrored “the common sense categories underlying the represen-
tation of a legal problem domain: space, time, mass, action, permission, obligation,
causation, purpose, intention, knowledge, belief, and so on”. In other words, according
to McCarty’s claim, the categories typically required to develop a legal application. The
language was called Language for Legal Discourse (LLD). LLD was a formal language,
featured by a compositional syntax, a precise semantics and a well-defined inference
mechanism. The semantic interpretation was conceived to generate exactly those en-
tailments that ordinary people (“and ordinary lawyers!”) generate in similar situations,
while the inference mechanism was complete and robust, though certain compromises
were needed to enable the computational tractability. The language was implemented in
Common LISP. An interesting aspect of that work, was that in LLD every relationship
such as ‘ownership 01’ was treated as an individual object (either a constant or a vari-
able). The technique is well-known as reification. McCarty claimed that the reification
of relationships was particularly useful to reach a correspondence with common language
linguistic practice; to represent changes in states and, in general, to represent events,
actions, obligations, beliefs, etc. Though with some distinctions, the technique of reifi-
cation was adopted later also by some foundational ontologies (for example DOLCE).
Another interesting aspect was that the deontic statements were formed by the com-
bination of a name, a modal operator, a condition, and an action. The nature of the
McCarty’s product is controversial: Visser and Bench-Capon, though being aware that
McCarty would have rejected the description of LLD as an ontology, include it in their
comparison of four ontologies[163]. Valente and Breuker refers to LLD as an ontology
too[152]. it is indeed described as a language for representing the legal domain, not as
13The discussion around the ‘open texture’ of language in general, an then specifically in the legal lan-
guage, starts with the seminal work of H. L. A. Hart The Concept of Law [68], which, in turn comes from
the work of Friedrich Waismann[165]. In a chapter of his book called ‘Formalism and Rule Scepticism’,
Hart argued that legal rules generally have a core of plain meaning, “the general terms seem to need no
interpretation [...] the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or ‘automatic’, [...] there is a gen-
eral agreement in judgement as to the applicability of the classifying terms” (ivi, p.123). Nevertheless,
there are also cases of “penumbra” of the term’s meaning, which determine uncertainness in defining
whether the rule expressed in the legal source should be apply or not. In those cases, the problem is that
there are reasons “both for and against our use of the general term, and no firm convention or general
agreement dictates its use”(ivi, p.124). This tendency of rules to have “a fringe of vagueness”, such
that their application become indeterminate, was defined “open texture” of legal rules. That feature of
Law not necessarily is a disadvantage in its application, rather, for Hart, it should be considered and
advantage, because “it allows rules to be reasonably interpreted when they are applied to situations and
to types of problems that their authors did not foresee or could not have foreseen”.[20]
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a representation of the legal domain in itself. Nevertheless, the semantic’s richness of
that language is quite impressive, also by an ontological point of view.
Afterwards, in an interesting paper titled The Role of Semantics in Legal Expert Systems
and Legal Reasoning, Stamper claimed that “so-called ‘legal expert systems’ that fail
to handle the problems of interpretation do not deserve the epithet ‘expert’. At best
they can be called ‘bureaucratic expert systems,’ which is not to deny their potential
value, only to recognise honestly their limitations.”[137] Therefore, Stamper aﬃrmed
the need to “examine the extent to which expert systems can handle meanings, the root
of all problems of interpretation [and] to uncover the semantics of the system, those
principles, tacit or explicitly stated, that link the elements of a knowledge-base or the
text of a body of rules to the features of the world they signify” (ivi, p.220). In the
same work, Stamper oﬀered an overview on propositional logic and first order logic to
specify the semantics of legal concepts, criticizing their use for the representation of
legal knowledge because of some important semantic problems. Briefly, Stamper argued
that, relying on symbolic representations and on notions such as truth, individuality,
and identity, traditional logics have only a very weak connection to the real-world con-
cepts they intend to denote. As a consequence, the author claimed that expressing legal
knowledge in the form of rules results in an over simplification of what legal knowl-
edge is about. To overcome these problems, in 1991, Stamper proposed a language,
based on the perception of invariants, namely on the basic assumptions that there is
no knowledge without a knower, and that the knowledge of a knower depends on its
behavior. The new language, called NORMA, was defined “a logic of norms and aﬀor-
dances”, specifically conceived as a specification language for legal systems. The novelty
claimed by Stamper, was that in NORMA the entities in the world were described by
their behavior, rather than by assigning them an individuality and truth values. The
main ontological concepts taken into account for the NORMA’s semantic specification,
were agents, behavioral invariants and realizations. The basic assumption was, in other
words, that agents realize situations by performing actions and that the realization of a
situation was specified as the combination of an agent and a behavioral invariant[136].
Though the insights inspiring the NORMA work were originals and interesting, in my
opinion, the Stamper’s critiques to the use of first order logic for representing the legal
knowledge were a bit exaggerated. Researchers, indeed, use still today predicate logic
to express legal knowledge. Besides, the same considerations regarding McCarty’s LLD,
could be carried out also for NORMA’s Stamper. NORMA, indeed was presented as a
language for representing the legal domain, not as a representation of the legal domain
in itself. The strange convergence of ontological assumptions with the structure of the
language does not allow a broader generalization of the represented knowledge.
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Paradoxically, one of the oldest piece of the AI&Law literature, at least in its intentions,
is also the work that comes closest to the idea of legal ontology, until the 1990s. This
work is well-known as the Hafner’s Semantic Network of Legal Concepts. Hafner em-
phasized that the role of ‘expert systems’ should not be focused “on ‘solving problems
by computers, but rather on helping a human problem solver organise and apply a com-
plex body of knowldege”[67].14 Therefore, her research’s goal was “to characterize the
semantic of information retrieval requests, and to develop methods for representing and
using subject area knowledge” in a ‘expert’ document retrieval system, which she called
the Legal Research System (LRS). LRS was a knowledge-based computer retrieval sys-
tem,“intended to be used by lawyers and legal assistants to retrieve information about
court decisions (cases) and laws passed by legislatures (statutes)” (ivi, 2). The subject
of knowledge was the Negotiable Instruments Law, an area of Commercial Law dealing
with cheques and promissory notes. In LRS were represented four kinds of knowledge
about legal concepts and their relationships, namely functional knowledge, structural
knowledge, semantic knowledge and factual knowledge. The semantic knowledge was
described as a semantic network model of Negotiable Instruments Law used to make
inferences about the meanings of queries, in terms of “a collection of nodes defining
subject area concepts, such as holder, forged and endorsement, connected by links rep-
resenting a small set of semantic structures, such as classification and attribution”. On
the other hand the network contained six basic concepts, namely party, legal instru-
ment, liability, legal action (case), account and amount of money. The work of Hafner,
is strikingly similar to that of an ontology as it is currently conceived. The path towards
the computational legal ontologies has only just begun.
2.4 Legal ontologies in computer science
Presumably, the term ‘ontology’ was introduced in AI literature by John McCarthy,
in 1980 15. In his paper on Circumscription[96], McCarthy uses the term discussing
about what kinds of information should be included in our understanding of the world.
Nevertheless, the most frequently cited earlier definition of ‘ontology’ is probably that
of Gruber: an ontology is a “specification of a conceptualization”[63].
Afterwards, the definition of Gruber was discussed by Guarino and Giaretta, arguing
that, in order for it to have some sense, “a diﬀerent, intensional account of the notion of
conceptualization has to be introduced”[65]. Briefly, Guarino and Giaretta criticized the
14My emphasis
15Therefore, the same year of the Hafner’s Semantic Network of Legal Concepts and before the works
of Thorne McCarthy –not to be confused with this McCarthy, John McCarthy!– and Stamper’s NORMA.
They, indeed, speak of “deep conceptual models” or “semantic networks”, not yet of “ontologies”.
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confusion between state of aﬀairs and conceptualizations, as it emerged by the classical
AI literature (precisely in the work of Genesereth and Nilsson[56]). Rather, according to
Montague’s semantics, they argued that the formal structure used for a conceptualization
should account for the meanings of the terms used to denote the relevant (intensional)
relations between entities. These meanings typically remain the same, also if the actual
extensions of those relations change, due to diﬀerent states of aﬀairs.
Then, Guarino further expounded these notions, making definitively clear the relation-
ship between an ontology, its intended models and conceptualization, introducing, in
addition, the notion of ontological commitment, in a seminal work about ontologies,
namely Formal Ontologies in Information Systems[64].16
As shown in the figure 2.2, “the intended models of a logical language reflect its commit-
ment to a conceptualization. An ontology indirectly reflects this commitment (and the
underlying conceptualization) by approximating this set of intended models”(ivi, p.5).
That is, a language L commits to an ontology O, if it commits to some conceptualization
C such that O agrees on C.
Figure 2.2: The relationships between vocabulary, conceptualization, ontological com-
mitment and ontology by Guarino (id)
16The previous version of the paper appeared in the Proceedings of the first Formal Ontology in
Information System Conference, FOIS, founded exactly by Nicola Guarino, which took place in Trento,
Italy, 6-8 June 1998.
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Hence, Guarino define an ontology as
“a logical theory accounting for the intended meaning of a formal vocabu-
lary, i.e. its ontological commitment to a particular conceptualization of the
world. The intended models of a logical language using such a vocabulary are
constrained by its ontological commitment. An ontology indirectly reflects
this commitment (and the underlying conceptualization) by approximating
these intended models.”(id)
A couple of years later, Sowa, who already in 1984, mentioned ontology in connection
with knowledge engineering[134], suggested the following definition:
“The subject of ontology is the study of the categories of things that exist or
may exist in some domain. The product of the study, called “an ontology”,
is a catalog of the types of things that are assumed to exist in a domain of
interest, D, from the perspective of a person who uses language L for the
purpose of talking about D.”[135]
For an exhaustive list of the other definitions of ontology provided so far by the scholars,
organized in a tabular summary, see: Nuria Casellas, Legal Ontology Engineering.
2.4.1 What is a legal ontology?
Within the scope of our investigation, the majority of legal ontology’s definitions are
merely adaptations of the general definition of ontology to the legal domain. For in-
stance, for Visser and Bench-Capon, a legal ontology is a “conceptualisation of the legal
domain”[163]; similarly for Schweighofer a legal ontology is “an explicit specification of
a conceptualization of a legal domain”[130].
In addition, the authors, most of the times, do not perceive a need for defining precisely
what is a legal ontology. They limit their self, recalling the general definitions, as
those listed above. Strangely enough, no emphasis is placed on defining explicitly legal
ontology neither in the book of Casellas Legal Ontology Engineering, nor in the book
titled Approaches to Legal Ontologies, whose subject is exactly legal ontology.
The only attempt I find in this latter book, is that of Ferna´ndez-Barrera and Sar-
tor. The authors, by relying on the the definition provided by Antoniou and Van
Harmelen[5], state that “legal ontologies can be considered the formal description of
a domain discourse”[48]. Consequently, the problem there is to decide “what counts as
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legal discourse”, due the diﬃculty to identify one single legal discourse. As highlighted
by Tiscornia, indeed, we can identify diﬀerent levels of legal language such as, (i) the
discourse of the legislator; (ii) the discourse of the judges; (iii) the discourse of the
doctrine; (iv) the discourse of legal theory[147].
A certain emphasis on the legal discourse is also reflected in one of the most interesting
definitions of legal ontology. Namely, that of Valente & Breuker, who argue that
“[a legal ontology] is an ontology of the domain of law, i.e. of legal phe-
nomena. As such, every ontology of law contains an account of what legal
phenomena is, and a perspective to see it”[153]
The authors, then argument that
“because legal knowledge is closely associated to the formal sources of law
(statutes, jurisprudence, etc.), ontologies of law may adopt (and frequently
do so) as a phenomena not the legal phenomena in legal practice but these
sources. An alternative perspective would be to describe law as the phenom-
ena of “what is decided in court”, a thesis known in Legal Theory as legal
realism. The ontological focus on legal sources seems to be a characteristic of
positivism. Yet another alternative is to describe law as the legal discourse,
i.e. the language used by legal practitioners.”(id)
The paper of Valente and Breuker is well-known in the literature about legal ontologies,
also because there the authors claimed that the missing link between Legal Theory and
Artificial Intelligence and Law can be provided exactly by the specification of ontologies.
The definition of Valente and Breuker reveals two important things. First: the per-
spective assumed in representing the legal phenomena inevitably aﬀects the resulting
representation, in a recursive manner. Second: two basic perspective can be adopted in
viewing at the legal phenomena. Namely: the analytical (or positivistic) perspective,
which grounds on the formal sources of law as the unique and indisputable instrument to
know the legal phenomena, or the socio-empirical (or realistic) approach, which grounds
on the observation of the legal reality as it is. Of course, it is diﬃcult to admit that the
legal reality as it is, could be something totally diﬀerent from the legal phenomena as it
is described and regulated by the Law. Rather, there may be some diﬀerences more or
less important, or more or less evident.
My attempt to define a legal ontology is closed to that of Valente and Breuker, but also
to that of Guarino:
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by ‘legal ontology’ I mean a set of highly-structured natural language assertions (whose
basic features can be summarized also through a taxonomic hierarchy), a logical theory or
an engineering artifact (included a diagram or a drawing), describing a reality pertaining
to a legal system or to a system of laws, made up by following, alternatively or jointly, a
philosophical or legal theoretic investigation, a socio-cultural observation, or an analytic
study of the sources of Law. A legal ontology would be therefore committed in drafting
a finite catalogue of entities and concepts pertaining to that legal system or to that
system of laws, plus a set of explicit assumptions regarding the description of those
entities and concepts, as they are understood and accepted by a community of users,
or as they ought to be according to the interpretation of the sources of Law. In both
the cases, such a description could be so explicit that it would represent the concrete
application or the ideal application of that legal system or of that system of laws, in
terms of a definition of legal assets or states, or of an adjudication, by rendering clear
certain rational assumptions at the basis of legal security, and as they result by applying
the legal reasoning.
2.4.2 Framing the boundaries of legal ontology
It is not an easy task to define what is a ‘legal ontology’, the boundaries of what ought
to be or has to be ‘legal’ under an ontological perspective, and of what ought to be or
has to be considered an ‘ontologic assumption’ in the description of ‘the legal universe’,
are quite diﬃcult to determine. Any attempt to delineate these boundaries is thrown
in crisis by many issues, pertaining proper to the legal domain. Without claiming to be
thorough, I delineate here some of these issues.
Legal Ontology vs legal ontologies
As well known, in the traditional philosophical perspective, (the capital ‘O’) Ontology
is constructed as one singular system of categories. In the works of Aristotele, Lorhard,
etc. the term Ontology is understood as an attempt to describe the reality as it actually
is. Therefore, the systems of thought constructed by the philosophers have the same
subject matter and, because of this, they are also quite stable and easily comparable
among each others. In computer science, instead, since an ontology is understood as a
fragmented description of a domain (eventually used for certain specific purposes), we
are allowed to use the plural to indicate the ontologies (the little ‘o’ ontology). That
is, in the AI and knowledge representation perspective, ontologies are mostly conceived
as information tools, and attempts in describing the particular domains, not necessarily
claiming a degree of truth outside of the perspective adopted according to the need for
which they are designed.
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In the previous part of this Chapter, I have used the capital ‘O’ Ontology to define the
systems of categories developed by the Roman jurists (and also Schiavone uses the word
‘ontology’ instead of ‘ontologies’ to indicate them). I think, indeed, that these kind of
ontologies share the same assumption of the Ontologies as understood in philosophy, but,
limiting to the legal domain. The legal Ontology indeed is understood as an intended
attempt to describe the legal reality as it actually is. Today, one would argue that
this kind of Ontology relies mostly on legal theory, and, since it concerns only the legal
reality, it can be conceived as a domain ontology, because it deals with a subset of the
whole reality as it is. On my opinion, the legal ontologies, are not only typical of the
computer science. Rather, I think that ontologies as ‘information tools’ are used by the
jurists, also in their everyday business, to organize and structure the legal knowledge
pertaining to a specific area of the Law.
Finally, both the legal Ontology and the legal ontologies are inevitably subject to change,
since, as said the Law continuously evolves.
Ontology and Epistemology in legal domain
In general it is important to avoid the confusion between ontology and epistemology.
The first, as pointed out by Varzi and as recalled in the previous pages of this chapter,
concerns with the question of ‘what entities exist’ and, under a metaphysical perspec-
tive -which seems that adopted in the so called ‘applied ontology’- seeks to explain, of
those entities, ‘what they are’. Epistemology, instead, concerns with the diﬀerent kinds
of knowledge which exist, and with the way in which knowledge can be acquired or,
with the extent to which any given subject or entity can be known. Therefore, the legal
ontology would concern with concepts like: legal object, legal process, legal event, legal
state, legal quality and so on. On the other side, legal epistemology would concern with
the definition of concepts like: belief, intention, assertion, wrong knowledge, case knowl-
edge (revision of knowledge, uncertain knowledge, factual knowledge) and so on. The
distinction between ontology and epistemology covers issues which are of the outmost
importance in the legal domain[101].
The Law usually refers to the epistemological dimension. Consider, for instance, the
importance of errors (e.g. error in personae), or intentions (e.g. to propose a contract),
or declarations (e.g. the tax declaration). Consider also, that in the legal realm, the
jurists are used to refer to facts. Are we sure that the facts share the same ontological
nature of events or states? The ontological status of facts is quite debated in philosophy
and, for instance, a precedence relationship between two events is a fact, but does not
correspond to an event itself. In addition, case law’s knowledge relies mostly on a
processual revealed truth, rather than on an objective truth. Indeed, it can happen
that the epistemological reconstruction of an event by a court of Law, can be revised by
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another court. An adjudication is, in some sense, the expression of what a court of Law
can say about a certain event or a certain state, but not the ultimate truth on that event
or on that state. Is, therefore, needed to keep trace also of these issues in an ontological
description of the Law? Does make sense to represent reality as it is, without taking into
account the way in which this reality is known? Are the ontological and epistemological
perspective reconcilable?
In my opinion, to a certain extent, yes. It is, indeed, possible to represent ontologically
what a concept pertaining to epistemology is. For instance, we can say that a belief,
or an intention are kinds of abstract objects, with some properties, some qualities, etc.
On the other hand, the epistemological view can help us to define ontologically the
types of knowledge belonging to the legal domain (e.g. factual knowledge vs. normative
knowledge). Some of the legal ontologies I am going to illustrate, deal exactly with these
kind of issues.
Inferential nodes vs Ontological categories
The legal knowledge, as everyone can observe, is largely defined according to an if(condition)
- then(consequences) schema. In fact, normally, the Law defines a concept by means of
a definition, but also by means of the consequences which are attached to the recogni-
tion of the concept according to its existential (definitional) conditions. Therefore, an
ontological representation of the legal concepts grounded only on their existential con-
ditions would be quite restrictive, and not really attractive from an inferential point of
view. The issue has been investigated by Sartor[124], who, mostly relying on the Ross’
theory[117] concerning the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts (but
also on the theories of Ramsey and Carnap), compares two views of legal concepts: as
nodes in inferential nets and as categories. He discusses the nature of the legal concepts,
questioning about their representation as ontological categories. He argues, indeed, that
the legal concepts’ nature is rather that of inferential nodes. Consequently, any onto-
logical representation of the Law, based only on taxonomical hierarchies and conceptual
definitions would be quite poor and not meaningful. Furthermore, according to Sartor,
since the Law evolves, the changes may question the validity of conceptual hierarchies,
and, in addition, the value-oriented or teleological aspect of legal reasoning determines
further diﬃculties in the ontological definition of legal components.
In a certain sense, therefore, these issues (but also others) require for a sort of compro-
mise between the real nature of the legal concepts and their ontological representation.
Certain strategic solutions, in terms of design decisions and ontological approaches, are
also needed to mitigate the problem of the frequent changes in the conceptualization of
the Law.
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Law and language
When one relies on the sources of Law to determine the semantics of the legal categories,
the issues concerning the language are particularly relevant. Since Law is closely related
to language, the interpretation of Law depends, first, by the interpretation of language.
As thought in every course of Law, the first type of legal sources’ interpretation that a
jurist has to do, is that related to the lexical and syntactic dependencies, namely on the
legal terms and the relations among the sentences (so called vox iuris).17 Therefore, not
surprisingly, the discourse on legal ontologies is intertwined with linguistics and with
natural language processing (NLP) techniques. Nevertheless, the relationship between
the language and the Law, shows also another important feature of legal ontologies,
namely that “Contrary to e.g. a biological taxonomy, a legal ontology is not language
and country independent”[85].
Some of these issues have generated, in a sense, a branch of computational and formal
legal ontologies. Indeed, so called “core legal ontologies” aim at represent the legal
reality as it is, mostly relying on the legal theory. This kind of ontologies has dominated
the trend in legal ontology engineering in the 1990s and in 2000s. I think that today this
trend is in crisis, because, at the state of the art, there are many core legal ontologies
which are also quite accepted by the community. One may certainly argue that they
could be not perfect. However, there must be a good reason, today, to defend the need
for another core legal ontology. On the other hand, the Linked Data paradigm, which
is ruling the scene, and the current evolution of the Semantic Web, are questioning the
need for such kind of ontologies. I discuss this latter issue in the Chapter 5.
In contrast, the number of legal domain ontologies, namely ontologies describing a par-
ticular piece of the legal reality is increasing. For instance, you may note that, even the
work I am describing in this thesis, concerns a particular legal domain, namely public
procurement.
Linguistic ontologies are another branch of legal ontologies. These ontologies are devel-
oped hand in hand with the advancements of NLP techniques. Therefore, the trend is
quite stable.
17For instance, during my first year at the faculty of Law, I have learned that, according to the art. 12
of the so called Preleggi al Codice Civile, literally the laws before the (Italian) Civil Code, Nell’applicare
la legge non si puo’ ad essa attribuire altro senso che quello fatto palese dal significato proprio delle
parole secondo la connessione di esse. This means that, when you apply the Law, you are not allowed
to interpret it diﬀerently from the plain meaning of its words, as it results from the connections among
terms.
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2.4.3 Legal ontologies in the 1990s
Basically two relevant legal ontologies appear in the 1990s, namely the The Frame-Based
Ontology of Law (FBO) by van Kralingen et al. (1993) and the Functional Ontology of
Law (FOLaw) by Valente and Breuker (1994).
The Frame-Based Ontology of Law
The Frame-Based Ontology of Law [156] is a semi-formal18 legal ontology aimed at rep-
resenting “the conceptual primitives used to model the legal domain”. It relies largely
on the classical pieces of the legal theory (Kelsen, Ross, Aarnio, von Wright, and many
others) and has, therefore, a strong theoretic background. In a sense, it summarize in
sorts of tabular structures the most relevant insights of the legal theory, called “frame
structures” (defined as a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation). Basi-
cally, three frame structures are defined by the Frame-Based Ontology, namely the norm
frame, the act frame and the concept-description frame.
Regarding the norm frame, the FBO’s authors identify a set primary and auxiliary
elements which characterize a norm, namely: the ‘deontic modality’, the ‘deontic op-
erator’, the ‘norm character’, the ‘function of a norm’, the ‘directive operator’ or the
‘legal modality’. Regarding the act they identify also its ‘theme’, the ‘act-identifier’.In
addition to the afore-mentioned elements of a norm, Van Kralinger and his colleagues,
recognize also the existence of ‘conditions of application’ or ‘norm conditions’. The
resulting frame structure is shown in the figure 2.3
Figure 2.3: A norm frame in the Frame-Based Ontology of Law
18The authors, indeed, state that “little attention is spent on the development of legal-knowledge
systems in general, the description of legal-reasoning tasks, a formal version of the ontology, comparisons
of ontologies, etc.”
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In order to represent the action frame, the authors, declare that an act has the following
aspects: an agent; an act type; a modality, divided into a modality of means; and a
modality of manner; a setting, divided into a temporal aspect; a spatial aspect; and a
circumstantial aspect; a rationale, divided into a cause; an aim; an intentionality and a
final state.
Particularly interesting in the FBO is the description of the type of concepts (not to
be confused with the description of the concepts) that the authors identify. Concept
types in FBO are four: legal definitions, deeming provisions, factors, and meta concepts.
“Deeming provisions are used to introduce legal fictions. Deeming provisions allow things
which are not true to be treated as if they were, and things which are true to be treated
as if they were not. The concept type ‘factor’ is used when we are not dealing with
necessary and suﬃcient conditions. A factor merely contributes to the applicability of a
concept; it assigns a weight factor to properties that play a role in the determination of
the meaning of a concept. Factors can be positive or negative. A positive factor increases
the likelihood of applicability of a concept, a negative factor decreases the likelihood of
applicability. Finally, meta concepts are used to deal with textual constructions such
as application provisions and (some types of) exceptions. Application provisions make
provisions operative, or render others inoperative”(ivi, p.20).
I think that this distinction is really interesting. The notion of factor, for instance, is
widely adopted in the argumentation theory (for all see:[111]). Furthermore, the notion
of meta concept, I believe is particularly useful for the purposes of ontological analysis.
I recall this notion in the description of the LOTED2 ontology. Nevertheless, the rest
of the ontology is not particularly interesting to me. The description of actions, in
particular, is quite basic and not really focused on the notion of legal action. They use
also the term ‘promulgation’ in the action-frame, but I do not agree with the use of this
term, which pertains to norms, for describing actions.
Functional Ontology of Law
The Functional Ontology of Law [47] was developed in 1994 with the declared intention
to open up the domain of AI and Law for the concerns of ontological investigation.
Even the FOLaw, as FBO, is related to central issues in legal theory. As the name
suggests, FOLaw “is based upon a functional perspective on legal knowledge”. The
basic assumption on which FOLaw relies is that the “legal system as a whole exists to
accomplish a certain function and that the main function of a legal system is basically
to react to social behavior.[154]. The authors distinguish several primitive “categories of
knowledge, based upon the role they play in law”: normative knowledge, world knowl-
edge, responsibility knowledge, reactive knowledge, creative knowledge, and meta-level
knowledge. Normative knowledge is the type of knowledge which has the function to
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prescribe behavior and to define a standard of comparison for the social reality. The
Meta-level knowledge is the knowledge required to solve conflicts between norms. The
World knowledge, instead, comprises two type of knowledge: the definitional knowledge
(used by normative knowledge) and the causal knowledge (which pertain to responsibil-
ity knowledge). Responsibility knowledge had the function of assigning or limiting the
responsibility of an agent over certain state of aﬀairs. The Reactive knowledge specified
which action ought to be taken and how. These diverse types of knowledge interact in
the operation of the legal system as shown in the figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Functional roles of legal knowledge in the operation of the legal system
in FOLaw
FOLaw is one of the best example of the confusion between epistemology and ontology
in Law. Nevertheless, I think that FOLaw is one of the most interesting models of the
functioning of a legal system. It, indeed, captures almost all the basic features of the
legal system into operation by mean of a drawing. For the purpose of my research, I
think that this ontology shows also how a legal system converts inputs in output. That
is exactly the functionof the procurement system.
A legal ontology by Kurematsu and Yamaguchi Another legal ontology of the
1990s is the one which appears in a paper of Kurematsu and Yamaguchi[80]. The
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ontology is not listed into the tables of Breuker (which are shown also here: [33] and
here: [35]), but is listed as ‘legal ontology’ by Poli[110]. The disregard for this ontology
is probably due the fact that the authors do not describe the ontology in their paper,
which is, indeed, focused not on the ontology, but on the refinement process of a given
initial legal ontology. Nevertheless, the ontology is very articulated and not at all trivial.
It is intended to describe the field of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, but
it represents also many relevant general legal concepts. As shown in the fig. 2.5, the
ontology is an articulated taxonomy representing legal facts, acts, events, states, corporal
things and also the concepts pertaining the process of contract formation (proposal, oﬀer,
counteroﬀer, acceptance). It is, therefore, interesting for the scope of my research.
2.4.4 Legal ontologies in the 2000s
The 2000s are the ‘golden ages’ of computational legal ontologies. The word ‘ontology’
takes on a diﬀerent meaning from the traditional philosophical one, and, indeed, exactly
from this time begins the ‘true’ history of computational ontologies. This major change
is due, in particular, to the publication of the seminal paper by Berners Lee, Hendler
and Lasila, The Semantic Web[16]. The Semantic Web, as envisioned by its three
authors twelve years ago, is conceived an evolution of the (still) current Web, capable
to enable machines to “understand” and respond to complex human requests on the
basis of their meanings. To foster that vision, the authors outline a set of formats and
languages, which combined together in a composite architecture, would have enabled
the structuring of the information sources’ semantics. As shown in the figure 2.6, at the
heart of this architecture there are ontologies.
Tim Berners-Lee expounded the original vision of the Semantic Web with these words
which are nowadays widely known:
“I have a dream for the Web [in which computers] become capable of analyz-
ing all the data on the Web the content, links, and transactions between peo-
ple and computers. A “Semantic Web”, which makes this possible, has yet to
emerge, but when it does, the day-to-day mechanisms of trade, bureaucracy
and our daily lives will be handled by machines talking to machines. The
“intelligent agents” people have touted for ages will finally materialize.”[15]
This ‘dream’ impacted on legal ontologies (as well as on many other field or domains, e.g.
the medical domain) in such a way that, starting from this time, the way of conceiving
legal ontologies radically changed. I will expand the discussion about the relationship
between legal ontologies and the Semantic Web in the Chapter ?? and, there, I will
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Figure 2.6: The Semantic Web Stack, also known as Semantic Web Cake or Semantic
Web Layer Cake, illustrates the architecture of the Semantic Web by Tim Berners Lee
argue that this change has not yet completed. For now, suﬃce it to say that most of the
legal ontologies developed in the 2000s have been conceived as “legal ontologies for the
Semantic Web”, therefore they have been written according to the languages of the Se-
mantic Web, specifically (but not exclusively), in OWL, the Ontology Web Language. A
discussion concerning this language and its expressivity for the legal domain is provided
in the Chapter ??, as well.
Starting from 2001, the number of legal ontologies has exponentially increased (for an
exhaustive overview of - I believe - all the existing computational legal ontologies see,
once again, Casellas Legal Ontology Engineering). Hereafter, I will describe to the most
relevant computational legal ontologies, especially, those which have been (or could have
been) a source of meaningful inputs for my research objective, namely the development
of ontologies for the public procurement domain.
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Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE)
Before going into detail of legal domain’s ontologies, I would spend here some words in
describing the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering, DOLCE.
Part of the study carried out in this thesis, indeed, will rely on DOLCE, an already
existing foundational ontology that has been developed at the Laboratory for Applied
Ontology (LOA) of the Institute for Cognitive Sciences and Technology of the Italian
Research National Council (see [93]). DOLCE is a descriptive ontology aimed at cap-
turing “the ontological stands that shape natural language and human cognition. It
is based on the assumption that the surface structure of natural language and the so-
called commonsense have ontological relevance. As a consequence, the categories refer
to cognitive artifacts more or less depending on human perception, cultural imprints
and social conventions”(ivi, p.13).
DOLCE was developed under theWonderWeb (library of foundational ontologies) project.
The authors motivated the importance to have a library of foundational ontologies (re-
flecting diﬀerent commitments and purposes) on the assumption that “the most impor-
tant challenge for the Semantic Web is not so much the agreement on a monolithic set
of ontological categories, but rather the careful isolation of the fundamental ontological
options and their formal relationships”(ivi, p.3). Therefore, in the author’s view, each
module of the library was conceived basically in terms of such fundamental options.
Since its first development, DOLCE was not intended “as a candidate for a “univer-
sal” standard ontology, but rather as a reference module, to be adopted as a starting
point for comparing and elucidating the relationships with other future modules of the
library”(ivi, p.5).
The basic notions of DOLCE are based on the traditional philosophical insights. Among
the others, the most basic are two: endurant and perdurant. Endurants (also called
continuants) are “entities that are in time, [because] they are wholly present (all their
proper parts are present) at any time of their existence”(ivi, p.17). On the other hand,
perdurants (also called occurrents) are entities that happen in time, [because] they extend
in time by accumulating diﬀerent temporal parts, so that, at any time t at which they
exist, only their temporal parts at t are present” (ibidem).19 For example, the PhD
thesis you are holding now can be considered an endurant because (now) it is wholly
present, while your reading of this PhD thesis is a perdurant because, your “reading” of
the previous section is not present now. According to DOLCE, both states and events
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Figure 2.7: Examples of “leaf” basic categories in DOLCE
With respect to social objects, they are -I believe- intended by the authors as objects
(endurants) produced by communities (generally the society), in the sense that they
depend, for their existence, on intentional agents that conventionally create them and
accept them. In DOLCE they are divided in agentive or non agentive on the basis of
their possession of intentionality. Therefore, as you can note in the fig. 2.7, a legal
person is a ‘social agent’ and a law is a non agentive social object. DOLCE has proven
very useful in addressing various problems and the paper is part of a collection of works
aimed at extending DOLCE as to make it suitable for many distinct specific domains.
DOLCE has been described using a full first-order logic with modality; then part of the
axiomatization was converted in OWL and the remaining part was expressed through
the KIF comments attached to the OWL concepts.
Over the years, DOLCE has been extended and used in several ways. DOLCE+ is an
extension of DOLCE with a theory on descriptions and situations (D&S)[52]. D&S is
an ontology of contexts, “which provides a principled approach to context reification
through a clear separation of states-of-aﬀairs and their interpretation based on a non-
physical context, called a description” (ivi, p.II). The ontology of descriptions also oﬀers
a situtation-description template and reification rules for the principal categories of
DOLCE.
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Figure 2.8: Taxonomy of DOLCE basic categories
Core Legal Ontology (CLO)
CLO, the Core Legal Ontology[55] is an extension of DOLCE+ for the definition of
core legal concepts. The authors define it a constructive ontology, because “it allows to
reason over the contextual constraints that can be intentionally adopted by a cognitive
agent when recognizing or classifying a state of aﬀairs” (ivi, p.98). The ontology, indeed,
was designed to support three kinds of legal tasks in the Civil Law countries, namely:
conformity checking, legal advice and norm comparison. In the context of CLO, the D&S
distinction became legal description or conceptualisation –which encompass norms, reg-
ulations, crime types, etc.– vs situation or legal facts or cases –which encompass legal
state of aﬀairs, non-legal states of aﬀairs that are relevant to the Law, and purely juridi-
cal states of aﬀairs.– The authors state that the ontology enables to build a complex,
functional representation of the Law and of its facts. Every legal description classifies
and constrains a state of aﬀairs. More precisely, a legal description is the reification of
a theory that formalizes the content of a norm, or a bundle of norms. A legal case is
the reification of a state of aﬀairs that is a logical model of that theory. A description
is satisfied by a situation when at least some entity in the situation is classified by at
least some concept in the description.
Hoekstra and colleagues are quite negative in their review of CLO. In fact they say:
“Classification in CLO is [...] not DL classification, and it is unclear as to what extent
the two interpretations are compatible. Viewing the legal system as description, or
rather prescription, of reality is not new [...]. However, the CLO distinction between
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descriptions and situations is rather one dimensional in that it does not commit to an
ontological view of the kinds of descriptions involved. [...] Although it introduces new
levels of abstraction by reification, it does not provide ontological categories that can
be used to describe the knowledge at these levels. In a language that itself can be
conceived as providing the means to construct descriptions of reality (situations), such
as OWL DL, it is unclear what the epistemological status of the classes ‘description’
and ‘situation’ themselves is. For instance, what is the diﬀerence between an individual
description being classified-in-the-OWL-sense as some description class, and a situation
class being classified-in-the-CLO-sense by that same description?”[1]
Moreover, they argue that “lack of ontological commitment at the level of descriptions
undermines its suitability for knowledge acquisition support in a legal setting as well.
Although for sure a norm can be described as some description of a situation, it is not
the norm-as-description that uniquely characterises what a norm is”.
To a large extent, I agree with these claims. First, it is true that a norm is a description
of reality or of certain state of aﬀairs. However, if you take in account only this view,
I wonder how are you able to explain that the law constitutes also the ’things’, the
reality, the state of aﬀairs which “describes”. I believe that there are certain type of
norms which could be considered as description, while other types, i.e. the so called
‘constitutive norms’ are not simply description. Of course, you may say that this is only
a terminological issue. Nevertheless, we are discussing not only terminological issues,
but rather on the ontological nature of norms. So, in my opinion, from an ontological
point of view, a norm could not considered a mere legal description. Consider also
another aspect. Is an adjudication a legal description as well? Is an interpretation of a
fact described e.g. in a writ of summons written by a lawyer a legal description as well?
If yes, what is the distinguishes feature of a norm intended as a legal description from
other kinds of legal descriptions? It could be interesting, instead, to interpret the notion
of legal description as an interpretation of the norm. That is, a norm could have diﬀerent
interpretations, which are essentially diﬀerent descriptions of its content. However, it is
not clear if in CLO this class could be intended also in this way. Furthermore, I think
that too much modeling eﬀorts are required to represent both the content of the norm
and the situation that the norm describes and, to a large extent, I suspect that the result
would be a mere duplication.
Moreover, an interesting attempt has been made in comparing the normative structure
of EC and national texts (implementations) through CLO. Selected sets of norms have
been conceptualized in two domain ontologies, as represented in fig. 2.9: EC directives
and national laws are represented in separate ontologies with CLO; the ontology of the
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content domain (social world) addressed by the directives is also based on the founda-
tional ontology used to build CLO. “The national implementation of directives should
inherit both from EC directives and from the national laws, without being inconsistent.
Rules of conduct and codes of practice typical of the directives domain should inherit
from (and to be consistent with) the national implementation of the directive. Any
compliant application ontology will inherit from all those ontologies, besides the basic
service and task ontologies addressed by the application”(ivi, p.118).
Figure 2.9: An ontology library for EC Directives and applications (arrows mean
“inherits from”)
It is necessary to recall also the Jur-Wordnet (Jur-IWN) project[118], whose outcome was
an ontology-based extension to the legal domain of the Italian version of EuroWordNet.
Jur-IWordnet ontology is both a linguistic ontology (terms are linked to each other
throughout lexical relation) and a content description model because “the concepts are
organised according to stronger assumptions about the ontological nature of entities
that populate the legal domain, and about their relationship”[54] using the DOLCE
framework and CLO.
Other examples of linguistic legal ontologies are those developed under the DALOS[50]
and the LOIS projects[109, 148]. Jur-IWN work was taken into account also by the
LOIS project. It is worthwhile to stress that “legal linguistic ontologies” are large
scale lexical resources that cover words of a language with regard to the legal domain,
aimed at represent the linguistic relations between legal terms. Therefore, linguistic
legal ontologies mainly diﬀer from formal and proper “legal content” ontologies, since
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their scope and purposes are focused at the legal lexicon level more than at the inquiry
on the ontological nature of the legal concepts expressed through legal terms. As a
consequence, linguistic legal ontologies are very large but ‘lightweight’.
LKIF Core Ontology
The LKIF Core Ontology[72] is a legal core ontology developed in the Estrella project as
part of the Legal Knowledge Interchange Format: a knowledge representation formalism
that enables the translation of legal knowledge bases written in diﬀerent representation
formats and formalisms. LKIF combines two diﬀerent knowledge representation for-
malisms, namely OWL 2 DL, and LKIF Rules[58, 59]. The LKIF Core Ontology, which
has been conceived as “an ontology that can be used as central knowledge component
for legal knowledge systems”, is therefore, written in OWL 2 DL. As stated by the au-
thors, the aim of LKIF- Core is to represent the basic concepts of the legal knowledge.
The ontology is directed at supporting legal inference, knowledge acquisition, knowledge
exchange and semantic annotation. The approach followed to build the ontology is a
sort of middle out, as that outlined by Uschold and Gruninger in a seminal paper[151].
The authors decided to follow this approach because they recognize that basically there
are three group of users of the legal knowledge: citizens, legal professionals and legal
scholars. Because of this, the identification of the basic concepts (and terms denoting
those concepts) which a core legal ontology should cover, is not at all easy. The authors
indeed, recognize that: “although legal professionals use the legal vocabulary in a far
more precise and careful way than laymen, for most of these terms there exists a suf-
ficient common understanding to treat them more or less as similar [...]. Nonetheless,
a number of basic terms have a specific legal-technical meaning, such as ‘liability’ and
‘legal fact’ ”[1].
Therefore, the Estrella consortium decided to include representatives of these three kinds
of experts. Each partner was asked to supply their ‘top-20’ of legal concepts. Combined
with terms collected from literature (jurisprudence and legal text-books) the authors
obtained a list of about 250 terms. Then they asked partners to assess each term from
this list on five scales: level of abstraction, relevance for the legal domain, the degree
to which a term is legal rather than common-sense, the degree to which a term is a
common legal term (as opposed to a term that is specific for some sub-domain of law),
and the degree to which the expert thinks this term should be included in the ontology.
According to the relative position with respect to these scales, they, finally, included a
set of terms in the basic clusters.
The ontology has a modularity structure and the sets of modules are intended to repre-
sent diﬀerent layers. The modules and their dependency are shown in the fig. 2.10. The
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layers are three: the top level, the intentional level and the legal level. The first bor-
rows most classes from another core legal ontology, namely LRI-Core[26]; the Intentional
Level includes concepts and relations which describe behavior of rational agents that can
be eﬀectively influenced by the law; and Legal Level includes legal agents, actions rights
and powers.
Figure 2.10: Dependencies between LKIF Core modules[1]
The ontology is highly axiomatized and, on my opinion, is not at all easy to use. On the
other hand, at the state of the art is probably one of the most complete existing legal
ontology. It is largely based on the legal theory and its ontological commitments (the
representation of basic concepts of Law) are translated in a consistent, well-structured
categorization of the most relevant legal categories. LKIF Core is also widely accepted
by the community of scholars, and is used in many applications and by some important
institutions (e.g. the UK Parliament). Not surprising, therefore, part of this thesis’
work is aimed at extending LKIF-Core ontology, as to make it suitable also for the
public procurement domain. Nevertheless, such a purpose has revealed also that the
integration of legal core ontologies (and in particular of LKIF Core ontology) with other
ontologies (especially non legal ontologies) is not at all an easy task. In the rest of this








Ontological approaches to the
procurement system
3.1 The public procurement system: a conceptual frame-
work
It is not a simple task to define what is the exact meaning of the expression public
procurement system. In general, the word “system” indicates the existence of a certain
number of inter-dependent elements, connected in such a way as to form an unitary
and well identifiable set. Typically, we argue that a composite set of elements has
a systematic nature only when we are able to recognize the existence of some close
relationships among those elements, according to the well defined ideological approach we
adopt in the observation of such relations. Not necessarily this ideological approach has
to be a theory; it can be also just an unifying principle from which depends every single
part of the system, in the sense that it inspires, in a continuous, the inner ‘laws’ governing
the connections between those parts. The existence of such an unifying principle implies,
as a consequence, also the recognition of a logical coherence in the constitution of all
the parts of the system and in their interaction under the same framework.
The notion of “system” is very common in the legal domain and for long time, the
diverse schools of legal theorists have proposed their re-construction of the legal system
according to the theoretical approaches they were defending. 1
1This is not the place for summarizing such an historical excursus, which certainly deserves much
more attention. My intention is rather to emphasize that the notion of legal system during the century
has been created and modified in several ways, depending on the legal theory that ruled the trend
during the diﬀerent historical periods. Consider how many diﬀerent notions of the legal system have
been formulated by legal theorists according once to the Jus Naturalism approach, once to the Historical
School of Law, once to the Pure Theory of Law and once to the Legal Positivism school, just to name
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Usually legal scholars define also the whole body of normative knowledge in term of the
normative system, emphasizing not only that any single norm is part of a system, but
also that norms can be grouped in many clusters or sets at various levels of granularity
depending on the matter, the field, the specific domain they regulate. Furthermore, a
norm belongs to a system in the sense that it is involved in several relations with all
the others norms of the system, according to specific legal rules (namely norms about
norms) which regulate how a single norm interacts with each other on the basis of the
general principles of completeness, non-contradiction and coherence of the normative
system. Such kind of rules are for example those solving the antinomies. 2
Apart from the general notions of legal system and normative system, the idea that some
areas of law govern other sorts of systems is fairly common. Consider, for example, the
notion of “fiscal system”, by which is usually indicated the body of laws governing the
fiscal domain (as a subset of the normative system at large) but also, more generally,
the way in which norms, taxes, taxpayers and the treasury are connected in a web of
relationships.
Such a notion of “system”, as it is adopted in defining both the legal or the norma-
tive domain at large and some specific legal domains (such as the fiscal domain or the
procurement domain), suggests not only the idea of a combination among the elements
belonging to those domains.
It suggests also the existence of a sort of environment in which some definite elements
(including norms) interact with each others in order to achieve a certain goal or to
produce a specific outcome. Second, the notion of system evokes an idea of dynamism
which is, from a certain point of view, an intrinsic feature of the legal domain.
The public procurement system is a striking, radical example of a system featured by
all these aspects. In his seminal work on the re-examination of the public procurement
knowledge after years (probably centuries) of scarce consideration by academics and
legal scholars in investigating the matter, Thai [145] emphasizes persistently the sys-
tematic nature of procurement. The author distinguishes, in this respect, between the
institutional approach used to examine elements of public procurement and the procure-
ment system in action, i.e. the public procurement as a dynamic process. In his paper
a few. For an exhaustive summary of the diverse concepts of the legal system in the history please see
[82].
2Antinomies are contradictions among legal rules. Since the normative systems are composed by
an huge amount of norms, which are produced at diﬀerent times, it can happen (and it happens very
frequently) that two (or more) norms regulate the same issue in diﬀerent ways. In order to solve these
contradictions in the normative knowledge, there are some general rules which govern the relationship
among norms on the basis of the hierarchical criterion (lex superior derogat inferiori), the temporal
criterion (lex posterior derogat anteriori) and the criterion of speciality (lex specialis derogat generali).
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entitled Public Procurement re-examined he explain in a clear way this dual nature of
public procurements system.
He argues:
Traditionally, a system is defined as ‘an assembly or set of related elements’ []
or ‘institution’. But systems, particularly the public procurement system, are
so dynamic that they cannot be understood just in terms of their elements
or parts that make up an institution. Checkland and Scholes [...] stated:
“The vehicular potential of a bicycle is an emergent property [...] of the
combined parts of a bicycle when they are assembled in a particular way to
make the structured whole. Likened to a bicycle, public procurement should
be defined by its emergent property, namely system in action. According to
this systems view, a system in action be it business process, public policy
process, procurement process, or budgetary process can be operationally
defined as an abstract paradigm that represents the conversion of inputs
into outputs. (ivi, p.16)
In fact, part of this normative system defines the static aspects of public procurements.
Notion such as contract notice, or contracting authority or eligible economic operator
are indeed created and defined by the law: they are ‘constituted’ by law. These ‘things’
do not exist without the law that defines them and recognizes their existence upon
the occurrence of certain facts or conditions. However, the static knowledge is not a
standing alone knowledge; it is involved in a dynamic scenario that concerns processes
( procedures) devoted to achieve the goals for which the public procurement normative
system has been created. Procedures are an important aspect of the legal domain
and are a very important aspect of the procurement system. Nevertheless, I believe
that there is a lack of research on the ontological analysis and representation of legal
procedures. Indeed, is not at all easy to understand how the issue can be approached
from an ontological point of view.
3.2 The dynamic face of legal system: on procedures and
their relevance
The procurement system, as we have seen before, includes both a dynamic and a static
setting. This is not an exclusive feature of the public procurement domain. Rather, in
the public procurement domain this distinction is really evident, but in general we can
observe that, more or less, dinamicity characterizes many others legal domains and, in
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some sense, the legal system itself at large. In fact, besides those norms defining first
what is the law itself and, secondary, what are legal agents, legal documents and in
general legal objects (in other words, the things that Thai defines “elements”), the legal
system regulates also the way in which these kinds of entities are combined together
dynamically in order to achieve proper legal outcomes, the institutional socio-material
eﬀects of the legal system.
The area of the legal system I am referring to is the one that regulates procedures.
Procedures are the explicit specifications of legal proceedings. They are explanations
and descriptions of the actions to be done, of the events that must happen in order to
produce a certain institutional goal, defined by the law. This is the dynamic face of the
normative system, namely the legal system in operation.
Every lawyer (or legal professional) is aware of the importance of procedures in the legal
system, because usually he or she knows very well how a single misstep, albeit minimal
(for example, the time expiration for bringing an action) could aﬀect irretrievably the
substance of things. Rights, powers as well as a duties are mostly vacuous and useless if
they don’t match to the right proceeding needed for their existence, or are not followed
by precise commitments in the form of actions required for their implementation. It is
not about primacy of the so called formal law on the substantial law, there is rather a
sort of interdependence between the two bodies of knowledge.
A very relevant part of the legal system is made of norms governing procedures. Proce-
dures are, indeed, descriptions of the institutional path to follow for obtaining a certain
legal result or eﬀect. And ultimately, the legal system exists properly to create its eﬀects.
These eﬀects can be either material (actual changes in the natural reality, empirically
recognizable) or abstract and social (actual changes at social reality layer, recognizable
among agents at pure abstract level). But what is important to notice is that those
eﬀects are obtained only if one acts according to a procedure which can take various
forms depending on their legal description (the area of law, the context in which they
are placed) and on the type of objectives that the legal system intends to produce.
In my opinion, there are four main types of legal procedures which are the behavior pat-
terns that the legal system requires for producing legitimate results, or clusters of legal
eﬀects. I argue that we can recognize the existence of three main types of procedures:
• the first type of procedures is the one which defines the legal system’s reaction to
contra legem acts or facts, as well as the legal compulsion to comply with duties
and obligations;
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• the second type of procedures regulates how intentional objectives of the political
institutions can be materialized, even, but not exclusively, through the actions of
the administrative action;
• the third type of procedures regulate behavior patterns of the administrative en-
tities, i.e. the way in which they operate and act;
• finally, another type of procedure regulate how legal states of aﬀairs or legal posi-
tions (rights, duties, etc.) are recognized (but also created, generated), or have to
be recognized by the legal system. I am referring here to a wide catalogue of pro-
cedures and legal eﬀects, such as the generation of a contract (or of a contractual
state of aﬀairs) and in general of an obligation, or the acquisition of rights, such
as the right to property. Of course, in these cases, the term procedure is intended
in a broader sense, i.e. not necessarily defined in every details.
The most noticeable expression of the legal system’s dinamism is, on my opinion, the
whole area of law regulating the judicial processes, namely the ‘procedural law’, also
known as ‘adjective law’. Procedural law deals with the practical, operative, technical
aspects of the law enforcement and prescribes how civil or criminal lawsuits are con-
ducted. In contrast, substantive law creates the legal categories rooted in the so called
‘social reality’, such as the category of legal person, of contract and so on. Since, ac-
cording to Ross [117] and Sartor [123] theory, legal categories are inferential nodes more
than pure ontological categories, also those norms which prescribe duties or liabilities, as
well as those recognizing rights, belong to the substantive part of the normative system.
Substantive law and procedural law are not completely disjoint. Rather the procedural
law serves to make concrete and eﬀective the consequences of the recognition of a certain
legal category. It is the way in which the commitments defined and promised in sub-
stantive law’s rules are kept. Legal procedure provides the means by which substantive
legal rules are ultimately enforced by declaring and certifying binding and institutional
legal facts, or by constituting and creating the socio-material eﬀects legally prescribed.
The Functional Ontology of Law is probably the only one legal ontology which takes
into account the dynamic aspect of the legal system, mostly related to the this type of
procedural law, the adjective law. The eﬀects obtained according to a procedure are in
the FOL called legal reaction. The legal reaction, for the FOL authors, is a function
that takes as inputs the classified situations and the responsible agents (according to
both the normative and responsibility knowledge) and pours in the society-layer world
the results of the legal system enforcement.
However, adjective law does not regulate only the legal reaction upon the occurrence of
an anti-legal fact or act, or the enforcement of responsibility situations. It regulates also
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Figure 3.1: The figure shows the relationship between normative knowledge, respon-
sibility knowledge and the reactive knowledge
the way in which the legal system certifies and declares some states or facts, which are
not related to any sort of responsibility. Simply these states or facts are doubtful and a
judge response is needed to make them clear and legally truthful. Consider for example
the resolution of boundary disputes between neighbors or lawsuits to declare a marriage
or a contract void, but also inheritance lawsuits or cases of not-litigious proceedings
(voluntary jurisdiction).
Procedures are not only those governing the conduct of lawsuit (e.g. litigations). Even
the way in which laws are made is a matter of procedures which constitute the legislative
process. In fact, the law itself (usually the Constitutional law for statutory laws in civil
tradition countries) prescribes how the lawmaking process has to be conducted and
defines the steps through which the source of an idea for a legislative proposal becomes
a statute. The result of the lawmaking process, namely the law, does not depend by the
reactive knowledge of the legal system. It rather depends on the society that, by means
of its representatives, feels the need to regulate a certain matter or to change a given
legislative text. The lawmaking process belongs to that type of procedures regulating
how intentional objectives of the political institutions can be materialized.
Administrative procedures are in many cases related to political objectives. The public
procurement system is a good example for explaining this link, because usually political
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Figure 3.2: The figure shows the steps of the legislative process in the USA (by a
collaboration of Wirth M. and Guasco S. M.) Source: http://www.mikewirthart.com
bodies deliberate to acquire a certain good or to make a certain public work, but then
the ‘operational harm’ which implements the practical eﬀects of this political decision
becomes the public administration.
Even the public administrations have to do always with procedures. As emphasized
in the introduction of this thesis, public procurement procedures exist because each
administrative action is driven only by the pursuit of public interest, or more generally,
of public function. In general, the path to follow for accomplishing public function,
is rigidly established by law, to meet compliance with values and factors of the legal
system, as well as transparency, and security of law.
For instance, even the normative knowledge on taxes can be examined from a dynamic
vs a static approach perspective. There are indeed norms aimed at define certain types
of fiscal documents (such as tax declaration or invoice); certain types of taxable entities
(such as economic operators or simply natural persons), or certain types of events which
are considered as relevant events for the purposes of a specific tax (for example the
supply of goods or services by economic operators in the case of the Value Added Tax).
On the other hand, even the concept of a tax in itself can be considered as a “static
concept” by focusing only on its constitutive aspects which are defined by means of
both the constitutive norms and the regulative norms. This is what Sartor calls the Q’s
inferential meaning constituted by the links between Q-conditioning and Q-conditioned
legal facts.
Looking at the fiscal domain, one can not ignore that the tax collection process is a
very relevant aspect of tax law. In fact, besides those norms defining what is a taxable
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person, what is a chargeable fact and, more generally, what is a specific type of tax, the
legal system needs to regulate also the way in which practically the tax is eﬀectively
payed by the taxpayer and then collected by the Inland Revenue.
3.3 The ontological representation of procedures in the AI
& Law literature
In the literature on legal ontologies, the ontological description and representation of
legal procedures is mostly a non-addressed issue. Despite the importance of legal proce-
dures and the fact that norms about procedures are a relevant part of normative systems,
the ontological analysis, description and representation of such knowledge is a neglected
field of research in the AI & Law literature. In their paper on the comparison between
four legal ontologies, Visser and Bench-Capon, observe that:
“None of the ontologies appears to have an adequate solution for norms that
describe legal procedures (e.g., procedural norms of competence). Possibly,
the researchers have not addressed this kind of legal knowledge in their on-
tologies because there was no role for such knowledge in the legal sources
that were used in the construction of their ontologies. Possible, they did not
address legal procedures because there are severe problems with the (declar-
ative) specification of procedural knowledge. One of the diﬃculties is to find
a language to express procedural knowledge in a declarative way. Related to
this diﬃculty is the question whether legal procedures should be regarded as
control knowledge or as domain knowledge” [162, 163]
I largely agree with Visser and Bench-Capon’s assessments of the issue. I think that,
arguably, the researchers do not address this kind of knowledge in legal ontological
modeling. While, I think that many legal domains deal with procedures, not only the
public procurement domain or, in general, legal domain belonging to the administrative
domain. So, I suspect that the researchers do not address this kind of legal knowledge
because they have the idea that an ontological representation is not adequate to represent
this kind of knowledge.
The other words I want to quote are those of Casellas. The sentence of Casellas is neither
an assessment, nor an evaluation. Is a question, that question:
How may we formalize legal concepts and procedures in a machine-understandable
form? 3
3Source: the Nuria Casellas’ Blog, available here: http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/author/nuriacasellas/.
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3.4 Some general comments concerning ontological pat-
terns for procedures
A tender could be considered as a complex event, composed by a series of atomic events,
whose existence and dependence among each others, is determined by the law. More
specifically, the whole tender’s event takes place according to a procedure which is the
legal specification of the way in which the procurement system, dynamically converts
inputs into outputs.
Henceforth I will refer to the European rules on procurement to clarify my assertions.
According to the European Directive 2004/18/EC there are types of procedures govern-
ing European tenders. These are: open procedures, restricted procedures, competitive
dialogue, negotiated procedures and design contests.
Open procedures means those procedures whereby any interested economic operator may
submit a tender.
Restricted procedures means those procedures in which any economic operator may re-
quest to participate and whereby only those economic operators invited by the contract-
ing authority may submit a tender.
Competitive dialogue is a procedure in which any economic operator may request to par-
ticipate and whereby the contracting authority conducts a dialogue with the candidates
admitted to that procedure, with the aim of developing one or more suitable alternatives
capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which the candidates chosen
are invited to tender.
Negotiated procedures means those procedures whereby the contracting authorities con-
sult the economic operators of their choice and negotiate the terms of contract with one
or more of these.
Design contests means those procedures which enable the contracting authority to ac-
quire, mainly in the fields of town and country planning, architecture and engineering or
data processing, a plan or design selected by a jury after being put out to competition
with or without the award of prizes.
Through the analysis of the whole content of the Directive, we can draw the following
conclusions:
1) The first point that deserves to be emphasized is that a procedure dictates the course
of events.
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2) The second point is that the application of diﬀerent procedures generates a diﬀerent
course of events.
3) Each single event depends by the course of events as described and regulated by the
Law.
4) Each single event depends exactly by one and only one course of event
5) Finally each single event, depending on only one course of events, is disjoint by other
events which depend on other courses of events.
The concept of event is intended according to the DOLCE ontology. In other words, it
is a perdurant. This analysis is summarized in the fig. 3.3
Figure 3.3: The figure shows the representation of the invitation to oﬀer event in
Crow’s foot notation
3.5 On the ontological nature of tender’s events
In his paper on Ontological requirements for analogical, teleological, and hypothetical
legal reasoning, Kevin Ashley pints out an interesting issue:
“A primary task of the ontology is to enable the system to distinguish from
the context between the factual and the legal senses of apparently identical
terms. In law, as is well known, one needs to coordinate the ordinary and
legal institutional descriptions of events. Some intermediate legal concepts
may look identical to general factual concepts, but, in the legal domain, they
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are technical concepts whose meaning are subject to argument. For instance,
“causing ” has both an ordinary sense in the case facts and a technical legal
sense in the context of a rule-like justification for deciding a case.” [6]4
I substantially agree with the assertion of Ashley and I argue that, for the definition of
the ontological nature of tender’s events, we need to capture their real nature according
to their meaning in the context of the Law. In my opinion, tender events are basically
relations that hold between a public administration and economic operators.
For instance, in the open procedures, this relation holds:
- at the first stage (time 1), between the public administration which issues a contract
notice and the entire set of economic operators, namely with all the economic operators;
- at a second stage (time 2) - intermediate stage- between the public administration
(contracting authority) and a limited number of economic operators (i.e. the economic
operators, which have submitted an oﬀer);
- at a third stage (time 3), between the public administration and with only one economic
operator (i.e. the economic operator which has submitted the best oﬀer, namely the
successful tenderer).
Consider for an example a world where there are no more economic operators and then
consider the case of an invitation to oﬀer (a call for tenders) made by a public authority.
Does such particular event of invitation to tender make sense? It is still an invitation
to tender without the participants to whom the invitation is directed? What is the
existential reason of such an event?
The insight that legal events (but also states) could be considered as relations holding
between agents, namely personae, and between an agent, or more than one, and an
economic resource, namely a res, or more than one, is not new. It comes largely from
our Roman Law’s background. Regarding this, Samuel states:
“The codifications are all framed around institutions which [...] [act] as the
starting point of what is called the ‘institutional system’. Law is about
persona, res and actiones. Res can loosely be translated as ‘thing’ [...] and,
like persona, represents another focal point around which legal propositions
can be grouped. That is to say, things, like people, exist both in the real
world and in the legal world and thus res acts as a bridge between social
fact and legal conceptualization. ‘Things’ [...] also act as a counterpoint to
‘person’ and, accordingly, the law of things cannot be understood divorced
4My emphasis
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from persons. Persona and res represent a legal structure upon which almost
the whole of substantive law is founded”[119]
Another author who, in my opinion, considers events or states as relations is Ramsey.
Sartor recalls the work of Ramsey to substantiate the theory of Ross, about the role of
terms and legal concepts as intermediate nodes. According to Ramsey, indeed, theoret-
ical terms can be replaced by means of variables. Basically, according to Ramsey[115],
“given a theory (which for simplicity we can assume to consist of inferential links of
the kind described above) containing a certain theoretical term, we can substitute that
term with an existentially quantified variable. This substitution makes the assumption
explicit that there exists some predicate that, substituted for the variable, yields true
or valid propositions”[122]
For instance, a ‘Ramseyfied’ inferential theory concerning the concept of ownership
consist in the claim that there exist a category Z which is a relation characterized by
certain inferential links, as shown in the fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The Ramseyfication of ownership by Sartor
3.6 An ontological pattern for modeling tender’s events
Therefore, according to these insights grounded in the Legal theory, I consider the ten-
der’s events as relations which hold among participant to a single event. Participants
(in the sense of DOLCE) can be either natural persons, legal persons, things or social
objects, in other words, endurants.
The conception of tender events as relations between public administrations and eco-
nomic operators is quite similar to the Kim’s conception of events[78]. In a previous work
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with Guarino and Masolo[44]5 concerning the ontological modeling of personal income
tax, we represent states which are relevant for the fiscal law, as DOLCE perdurants, in
the same sense of the Kim’s theory. For Kim, an event is the exemplification of a prop-
Figure 3.5: The figure shows the representation of the invitation to oﬀer event in
Crow’s foot notation
erty P (a relation R) by a ‘substance’ s (several substances s1, . . . , sn) at a given time t
and it is noted [s, P, t]. For instance, in “the collision of the Titanic with the iceberg”,
s1 = Titanic, s2 = the iceberg, R = colliding with. An event [s, P, t] exists if and only
if ‘s has P at t’, i.e. in a logical perspective, if and only if P (s, t). The events [x, P, t]
and [y,Q, t￿] are identical if and only if x = y, P = Q, and t = t￿. From the logical
perspective this implies that we need to specify the identity condition of predicates. In
general one assumes logical equivalence, but more intensional identity criteria could also
been considered. It is possible to represent in DOLCE the events as conceived by Kim,
by ‘simulating’ the identity criterion of events through the following constraint, where S
is a leaf subclass of states (of the DOLCE class ST ) and pc is the standard (non-total)
participation relation of DOLCE:
S(s1) ∧ S(s2) ∧ ∀xt(PC(x, s1, t)↔ PC(x, s2, t))→ s1 = s2
As shown in the fig. 3.5, therefore, an event which is, under a legal perspective, an
invitation to oﬀer, is a perdurant. Participants in this events are (all the) economic
5Please note that the logical axiomatization in the paper is due mainly to the eﬀorts of Masolo and
Guarino.
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operators, which play the thematic role of addresses of the proposal, a public adminis-
tration, and a theme (of the invitation to oﬀer) which is basically the commitment to
provide a good, a service or a work.
In turn, the theme of the oﬀering is an economic resource, namely, a resource which could
have an economic value. That resource is what the public administration is seeking.
With the work I have outlined here, I have the intention to provide only some theoretical
foundations for modeling public procurement procedure. The work, indeed, can be
extended to model all the other events (relations) which there are at the subsequent
steps of the procedure. An ontological model of procedure could be very useful for
managing the public procurement processes and could serve also as a basis for checking
the compliance of the conduct of the tender according to statutory law.
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LOTED2: an Ontology of
European Public Procurement
Notices
4.1 Premise: the Semantic Web for the legal domain and
legal ontologies for the Semantic Web
Up to now, this thesis work have been focused on the ontological representation of tender
events based on a foundational approach. It seems to me, that this ontological approach
is precisely what is needed to represent the events which occur in the procurement
processes (procedures) together with their participants and the roles they can play in
each stage of a tender, on the basis of their respective initial/previous role and of their
intrinsic features. However, this is certainly only one of the possible approaches you can
adopt in legal knowledge representation. In addition, it is also true that the goodness
of a modeling choice depends also on what the ontology is meant to be used for.
Years of advancements in Artificial Intelligence & Law have revealed how challenging
and diﬃcult is the task of representing legal knowledge in a computable manner and,
above all, have shown that there is not the right way to make the task better or easier.
Nevertheless, the huge amounts of textual and unstructured data produced today by
legislative institutions at all various levels (European, national and local), by public
administrations, courts, etc. stored in large repositories, as well as on the Web – in
the latter case and for specific types of those documents, with a particular care, due
the respect of fundamental personal rights, privacy issues, trade marks protection, and
so on – requires ways of bringing order and handle in the right way this unstructured
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information. The Semantic Web seems to provide the strategic solution to make eﬀective
this major challenge of our times.
The legal domain is inherently a ‘documental domain’, or indeed, it is the ‘realm of
documents’ and therefore the transition from the ‘web of documents’ into the ‘web
of data’ assumes a very peculiar sense when it means also the switch from the ‘legal
documents’ to the ‘legal data’. The Semantic Web infrastructure seems definitely fit to
accommodate also legal knowledge into the Web of Data because its standards find their
precise raison d’eˆtre even for the legal domain, at its various degree of “structural” and
“substantial” semantics.
Essentially for this reason, the “one web” vision expounded twelve years ago in the semi-
nal work by Tim Berners Lee, Jim Hendler and Ora Lassila[16] has been widely accepted
by legal scholars and recognized as suitable to generate a simultaneous “one legal-web
vision”, namely a vision where “everyone on any kind of device will be able to obtain
reliable legal information, and where legal information will be enriched with machine-
processable data, so that accessing information and performing legal transactions are
facilitated by computer support.”[125].
In the Legal Semantic Web vision by Sartor[125](fig. 4.1) 1, indeed:
• the general standards for identifying univocally resources in the web (URIs naming
convention) provide solutions for identifying legal resources (especially, but not
exclusively, legislative documents);
• XML is specialized into Legal Markup Languages to define specific tags for mapping
the structure of legal documents along with metadata models which enable the
inclusion of further information in the same documents;
• ontologies provide the way for enabling computers to represent (statements –RDF–
and) the conceptual information contained in the legal texts, namely legal concepts,
at the same time allowing reasoning and inferences capabilities;
• specific logic languages, such as those belonging to defeasible logic, permits us to
handle non-monotonic reasoning which intrinsically features the legal knowledge
base, because it includes exceptions, exclusions, legal antinomies, etc.;
• finally we can use the logical information of the previous levels to derive infer-
ences and arguments about specific legal information (proof ), while the trust layer
1For a similar picture but more centered on the defeasible logic, on arguments and cases cfr. also [59];
instead cfr. [105] for a representation of legal knowledge modeling layers compliant with the Semantic
Web stack.
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Figure 4.1: Levels of the Legal Semantic Web by G. Sartor[125]
guarantees confidentiality (such as that needed for information concerning per-
sonal data), authenticity (to ensure, for instance, the provenance of data from the
competent authority or from the eﬀective contracting party), integrity (assurance
regarding the non-corruption and the non-manipulation of data by third parties)
as well as reliability (in large part obtainable through the previous aspects).
Up to now, several XML legal document standards have been proposed for the specifi-
cation of legislative documents and for their interchange between institutions, enabling
at the same time better access to legislation by citizens. Among the others2, Akoma
Ntoso[9, 164] will become arguably the most popular Legal XML standard since, at
the precise time I am writing this thesis, it is following the process for becoming an
OASIS3 standard under the name of LegalDocumentML (LegalDocML)4; it is widely
and oﬃcially adopted by several Institutions across the world (the European Parliament
for marking up the amendments of the proposals coming from the European Commis-
sion, the Senate of Italy for the bills and also the Library of Congress of Chile for the
debates, just to name a few); it provides a common legal document standard for legisla-
tive documents as well as for other various types of legal documentation (e.g. gazette,
parliamentary documentation, judgments, case-laws) and aims to provide a format for
long-term storage and preservation of legal resources.
2Just to name a few: CEN MetaLex[22], NormeInRete[90], LexDania, CHLexML, eLaw, LegalXML,
SDU BWB (for all these see[91]).
3OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) is a non-profit
consortium that drives the development, convergence and adoption of open standards for the global
information society. For further information see: OASIS Open ORG
4LegalDocML OASIS Commitee
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Moreover, several Web rule interchange languages such as RuleML[23], SWIRL[74] or
RIF[77] have been adopted in legal knowledge modeling (legal rules), as well as languages
specifically designed for the legal domain according to its requirements[60], such as LKIF-
rule[58] or LegalRuleML[7, 106] 5 and some of them have proved their eﬀectiveness in
solving relevant legal problems.6
Strangely enough, looking at the explosion of the field in the 2000s, the legal ontologies
are still seeking their precise and concrete role at the intermediate level of the Semantic
Web overall picture. However, to tell you the truth, this is not at all strange. No matter
how many legal ontologies have been developed so far, they are still not enough for the
needs of our time. Furthermore, legal ontologies for the Semantic Web are still, and
from many points of view, an unexplored field of research, since we (as jurists, lawyers,
legal practitioners, etc.) are not prepared enough for a so radical change in categorizing
legal knowledge, as the Semantic Web is asking us to do, and also in predicting risks
and opportunities that such a switch of paradigm implies. Anyway, let us try to recap.
Up to now, legal informatics scholars have focused their attention and eﬀorts in trying
to provide a shared and suitable conceptualization of the fundamental legal categories
and of specific legal domain knowledge through ontologies (see the rich catalogue of
both legal core and domain ontologies developed at the state of the art in Chapter
3). The aim of core legal ontologies is to provide an interoperability framework from
which other legal ontologies could inherit general categories, and in that way trying
to overcome also comparative and multilingualism issues, among diverse legal systems.
Instead, legal domain ontologies are built with a specific application-perspective in mind,
usually grounded in closed systems.
The experience gained so far shows that to deal with the complexity of legal knowl-
edge through ontologies requires an intensive design process because legal ontology en-
gineering has its own peculiarities [35], requiring particular conceptual structures for
the representation of legal concepts, including notions of legal rules, preconditions, legal
consequences, etc.[121]. For this reason, legal ontologies are usually made of a significant
amount of axioms and restrictions upon classes, which represent legal concepts. In a
certain sense, a legal system can be considered as the whole of all the relations among
these concepts.
Moreover, the legal knowledge is based on legal sources (statutory and codified laws
in the civil law legal systems and judge-made decisional laws –judicial precedents– in
5LegalRuleML is now following the process for becoming an OASIS standard in the same way of Legal-
DocML. I made a first attempt in combining ontologies and rules formalized through the LegalRuleML
language, to represent the public procurement domain here:[43].
6Just to name a few, rules interchange languages have been used to represent business contracts[61], to
check compliance in business processes[62], in monitoring and executing Service Level Agreements[107],
in applying administrative rules to real cases[113], etc.
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the common law systems) rather than on a “common sense” state of mind and so,
the definitional dependence of legal concepts from the legal texts requires particular
care, which, in turn, results in precise methodological choices, design decisions and
approaches. In addition, legal knowledge is country and language-specific dependent[85]
and therefore the task of representing in an unified paradigm and unique conceptual
model the fundamental legal categories has proved particularly diﬃcult.
As a consequence of all those aspects, though some distinctions are mandatory7, legal
ontologies are typically large and highly axiomatized; furthermore, they are not easily
comparable, nor to each other, nor to the non-legal ontologies. These aspects make
tasks requiring interoperability quite diﬃcult and the usage of legal ontologies more fit
to local systems than to large scale systems such as the Web.
Besides these considerations that strictly relate to the legal domain, others equally rel-
evant, concerning the actual trends of the Semantic Web at large, deserve to be taken
into account.
As a matter of fact, the Linked Data trend is today the prominent one and its pragmatics
is putting even more in question the need of highly axiomatized ontologies, as the legal
ontologies are. Furthermore, Semantic Web research appears to be virtually locked at the
lower levels of the stack: lack of concrete experiences in the eﬀective and integrated use
of reasoning, unifying logics and proof solutions are generating a decrease of confidence
in the full realization (at the state of the art) of the original Semantic Web vision.
Both the Linked Data trend and the emergence of Second Generation Semantic Web
[39] (now Next Generation Semantic Web) applications are emphasizing the significance
of intelligence arising from the integration of disperse and heterogeneous data from
many sources, rather than from closed knowledge based systems capable of “applying
sophisticated logical reasoning to tackle complex real-world tasks”8. As a side eﬀect, in
these new semantic web systems, logical reasoning, compared to other technologies (e.g.
statistics and NLP), has not a primary importance (fig. 4.29) because these systems use
7Generalizations are always dangerous and often partly wrong. As highlighted in the Chapter 2,
many diverse types of ontologies are usually included in the broad catalogue of the “legal ontologies”
and so, it is necessary to specify at which of those types of ontologies I am referring to. The subject of
the analysis I am going to explaining in this Chapter are legal ontologies which define legal concepts,
namely: the fundamental categories of the legal knowledge which are at the basis of (arguably) any
legal system (core legal ontologies), or the particular set of concepts pertaining to a specific domain and
described by determined legal sources (domain ontologies). I obviously include the legal ontologies for
public procurement in the latter group. There are others ‘legal ontologies’ which diﬀer substantially
from those I have just described. For example, the so called “legal linguistic ontologies” which are large
scale lexical resources that cover words of a language with regard to the legal domain, aimed at represent
the linguistic relations between legal terms.
8The words and the table are an excerpt of the talk “What does it mean to be semantics? (On the
role of semantics in the Semantic Web)” held by Prof. Enrico Motta at the European Semantic Web
Conference, 2013 in Montpellier (FR).
9Ivi
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semantics “as an analytical tool to identify distinctions and give meaning to regularities
in the data to support problem-solving, sense-making or decision-making”.10
Figure 4.2: Major shift in the type of reasoning between Classical Knowledge Based
Systems and the Next Generation Semantic Web Systems by E. Motta
It seems to me that these three purposes of NGSW are not at all diﬀerent from the classi-
cal AI&Law systems: legal problem-solving support and legal decision-making assistance
(indirectly by making sense of legal concepts) are, coincidentally, just the purposes of
prototypical automated legal systems. However, legal systems mainly diﬀer from NGSW
because they are not ‘open’ nor scalable: they impose semantics only on a set of con-
trolled data, known in advance. In addition, they focus primarily on complex reasoning
performances rather than on a “knowledge-acquisition-from-outside” perspective. Basi-
cally, AI legal systems diﬀer from NGSW systems in their way of thinking at what does
it mean to be “an intelligent system”. Furthermore, the majority of legal ontologies up
to now developed aims to define fundamental legal concepts, which are very useful in a
perspective of large scale data integration, but are not exactly what is useful to support
problem-solving or decision-making.
Given these considerations, is a change needed in the design of legal ontologies? And
why?
Today, the e-Government sector is one of the major drivers in the emergence of Open
Linked Data (fig. 4.3) and governments are making accessible a large amount of datasets,
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Figure 4.3: Instance linkages within the Linking Open Data datasets at 2011 (Source:
Wikipedia). The aquamarine color bubbles on the left side indicate the datasets released
by governments.
Government Open Data are in many cases related to the legal domain and, as a result,
legal ontologies may play a key role uncovering the semantics of these data and driving
the integration of this information with other datasets. Without the right interpretation,
indeed, data are only raw data, which by themselves may not provide useful information.
In the majority of cases, the right interpretation, the semantics of Open Government
Data (i.e. what they really mean) is a matter of legal knowledge.
Thus, disclosing the semantics of these data through legal ontologies, it would be possible
to build semantic e-Government applications, which may provide a significant contribu-
tion in bridging the gap between citizens and institutions [57]. This is in line with the
three challenges for “the development of Law and the Semantic Web” identified by [32],
namely: “(i) the relationship between the Social Web (Web 2.0) and the Web of Data
(Web 3.0); (ii) evolving legal ontologies [...], (iii) and the construction of Semantic Legal
Web Services11 (SWLS)”. In other words, since law impacts and aﬀects the everyday
life of all individuals, representing legal knowledge in the Semantic Web scenario is both
a timely need and a challenge.
11My emphasis
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Nevertheless, as recently emphasized by some scholars, this consideration implies to
re-think the role and the nature of legal ontologies, “questioning the need for a highly
axiomatised and unified knowledge representation” and conceiving instead “a new way of
designing legal ontologies and of embedding them into architectures for legal information
systems and other web services”[33], because for such architectures there is a need for
flexible and modular ontologies, which can be easily integrated to discover non trivial
connections between data.
4.1.1 Finding a place for legal ontologies into the Web of data
While observing the Linked Open Data picture, you may notice that so called ‘lightweight’
(and relatively simple) ontologies like FOAF12 seems to rule the scene. And therefore,
given their complexity, there seems to be no room for legal ontologies in the Linked Data
scenario; they seem to be destined to dedicated and closed systems, performing complex
tasks, but not integrating themselves into the web of data.
The main diﬀerence between ontologies widely used by the Linked Data community
(like for example FOAF or GeoNames13) and legal ontologies, is that the first type of
ontologies is based on propositional logic. Instead, legal ontologies need (at least) first
order logic, even though some authors have invoked the use of propositional logic for
representing legal texts, such as[2], in order to avoid syntactical ambiguities.14 There are
various reasons why powerful representation languages are needed for legal ontologies.
First of all, legal knowledge cannot be bridled into propositional structures (atomic
propositions and propositional connectives): the truth preservation in law does not make
sense, because categories of true or false cannot be applied to normative propositions.
Secondly, only a small part of legal knowledge may be expressed through propositional
logic, which is not adequate to support legal reasoning[120]. The reason is that the first
step of legal reasoning is to identify a legal concept and the utility of ontological legal
concept representation is precisely to provide a way to classify individuals.
Thirdly, the conclusions that we reach (namely the classification of individuals, also
known as ‘instances’) in law are typically not preserved. In FOL, we could only reject
an earlier conclusion if we reject the truth of the set of premises, as well as its extensions
12http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/
13http://www.geonames.org/ontology/ontologyv3.1.rdf
14As is known, First-Order Logic (FOL) is widely used as the basis for knowledge representation
and also for theorem proving in Artificial Intelligence. The widespread use of FOL arises from its
expressiveness: indeed, FOL allows users to formalize a wide range of expressions concerning any domain,
including law. In addition, first-order logic has strong logical properties which guarantee that consistency
(which is a syntactic notion) is equivalent to the existence of a satisfying interpretation (which is a
semantic notion).
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according to every interpretation on which all sentences of the premises are true. This
type of reasoning is called monotonic reasoning. Instead legal reasoning is intrinsically
non–monotonic [102] because it draws conclusions tentatively, reserving to retract them
in the light of further assertions which identify other concepts (other rules) as defeaters
of the previous conclusions.
Now, taking everything into account, is there a place for legal ontologies in the Linked
Data trend? If yes, how can we switch from a rigid axiomatic representation of legal
knowledge to a “ready-to-use” legal knowledge ontological representation? Is Ontology
Web Language (OWL) adequate to fit the complexity of legal knowledge? To what
extent legal ontologies are compatible to Linked Data paradigm? And to what extent
they can be integrated with other (even non-legal) ontologies?
As known, from a logical perspective, Ontology Web Language (OWL)[99] (which is
an ontology language specifically fit for the Semantic Web), is basically an expressive
Description Logic. Description Logics are subsets of FOL, less expressive than FOL but
full decidable. Thus, on one hand, they are not enough expressive for representing the
legal knowledge; but on the other hand, their use allows some logical inferences which
are useful in the legal domain.
In DL systems, information is stored in a knowledge base, which is a set of axioms. It is
divided in (at least) two parts: TBox (terminology) and ABox (assertions). The ABox
contains assertions about objects and relates objects (constants in FOL) to concepts
(unary predicates in FOL) and roles (binary predicates in FOL). The TBox describes
the terminology by relating concepts and roles.15
Through the use of appropriate reasoners such as Hermit[132] or Pellet[133] (which are
designed to support even the new OWL 2.0)16 individuals populating the ABox are
classified according to the TBox specifications.17
15Note that the Web Ontology Language (OWL) mostly uses FOL terminology, in spite of being an
implementation of a description logic.
16http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/
17OWL2.0 is compatible with the Description Logic SROIQ[73], more accurately, it is equivalent to
the SROIQ(D) DL). SROIQ is an extension of ALC [8] Description Logic, which can be considered
the basic DL of OWL. ALC enables individual and property assignments in the ABox, as well as
• SubClass relationship (￿),




• and property restrictions (existential ∃ or universal ∀) in the TBox.
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So, the reasoning capabilities that today can be applied to OWL languages may be very
useful because these capabilities may ‘simulate’ a very basic, but useful, legal reasoning
on legal knowledge ontologically represented.
However, OWL does not meet also the other need required in modeling legal knowledge
(and therefore legal reasoning), namely its defeasibility. As well known, the Semantic
Web paradigm diﬀers substantially from the one featuring classical systems such as
databases. In the Semantic Web environment, data are incomplete and partial; they
can be also not known in advance, but not known data are not considered as false, they
are just unknown. Instead, databases work on the assumption that all the facts related
to their domain-subject are contained in their models and that everything not contained
in their models (i.e. unknown) is assumed to be false. The latter paradigm is known as
Closed World Assumption, which is contrary to the Open World Assumption paradigm
that features the knowledge bases builded through the Semantic Web ontology language,
namely OWL. OWL reasoning follows the assumption that contradictory facts are not
also each other inconsistent. Therefore, OWL language (and therefore the reasoners
which work by means of its syntax and semantics) is based just on the opposite paradigm
to the way in which legal reasoning applies to legal knowledge.
However, rules interchange languages compatible with the Semantic Web stack, such
as RuleML[23] can provide solutions for solving this problem. Moreover, the new
LegalRuleML[7, 106] emerging standard, which adds to RuleML the requirements needed
to represent legal rules, looks promising. This last language, indeed, allows to meet the
requirements of isomorphism[12] (i.e. the one-to-one correspondence between the atomic
rule and the fragment of natural language text in which the rule is expressed), the spec-
ification of normative eﬀects (such as deontic, qualificatory or potestative, just to name
The Description Logic SROIQ extends the ALC logic with many useful features, such as roles (prop-
erties) hierarchies, nominals (closed classes), qualified cardinality restrictions and also others. All of
these new features are very relevant for legal knowledge representation, but the most relevant one, on
my opinion is the role chains feature – Role Inclusion Axiom – (resulting in SR), also known as “prop-
erty chains”. Property chains are very important for legal knowledge modeling, since they can be used
to express rules and so also (very basic but useful)legal rules. Property chains basically enable the
representation of this sort of FOL axioms:
• (a) ∀x,y,z.R(x,y)∧S(y,z)→T(x,z).
So, for example, the following FOL axiom, which express the fact that through a contract notice is
announced a tender and that, since a tender is made for the award of a (proposed) public contract, then
through a contract notice is announced a tender for the award of a public contract, is compatible with
SROIQ and then with OWL2.0:
• (b) ContractNotice(x )∧Tender(y)∧ProposedContract(z )∧throughWhichIsAnnounced(x,y)
∧forAward(y,z )→throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardOf(x,z ).
In the work I am going to present in this Chapter, namely the ontology for the Semantic Web LOTED2,
I make large use of this feature of OWL2.0 (see the formal description of LOTED2 ontology in Appendix
?? for others DL axioms examples of property chains) and I am convinced that it represents a (little
but) significant improvement of the expressivity of OWL, which can be of great utility in legal ontologies
modeling from now on.
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a few) and the reification of legal rules (rules are like objects with relevant properties,
such as jurisdiction, authority and temporal constraints).
So, going back to the questions, the typical features of legal ontologies (high axiomati-
zation and emphasis on legal rules to produce consequences–inferences) not necessarily
are incompatible with the Linked Data requirements.
On the one hand, the representation of legal concepts and relations among them is useful
to verify and fix the correctness of Linked Data statement on legal content, through the
use of the reasoners. On the other hand, the new triples generated, i.e. inferred or
materialized, can be written back into the RDF model, adding a new level of granularity
in the data. This type of information is just what is useful to drive the integration of
ontologies with other related ontologies and datasets and to produce an “added legal
value” for the Linked Data scenario.
Finally, an emerging rule standard will be soon available and it will provide a contri-
bution towards taming the complexity of legal knowledge representation. Hence, within
certain limits, we can integrate also legal data into the web of data.
However, we will able to switch from a rigid axiomatic approach, to a ready-to-use legal
knowledge ontological representation only if we will be able to find “a compromise” in
balancing a rigorous (and unified legal) representation of legal content with the concrete
needs required by the dynamic and open scenario of the Semantic Web. In other words,
this major change implies that not necessarily we must aim at defining legal data by
inheriting their complete ontological representation (and then their semantics) from
fundamental legal concepts, such as those constituting core legal ontologies. Maybe, in
that way, we will lose a few pieces of legal knowledge in our ontological representation,
but we will be able to serve the purpose of making more accessible the legal knowledge.
4.2 Introducing the LOTED2 ontology
4.2.1 Procurement Data as Open Government Data
Data on public contracts notices are Open Government Data18 by their nature.
18According to the so called 8 Principles of Open Government Data, Government data shall be con-
sidered open if the data are made public in a way that complies with the principles below:
1. Data Must Be Complete All public data are made available. Data are electronically stored in-
formation or recordings, including but not limited to documents, databases, transcripts, and audio/visual
recordings. Public data are data that are not subject to valid privacy, security or privilege limitations,
as governed by other statutes.
2. Data Must Be Primary Data are published as collected at the source, with the finest possible
level of granularity, not in aggregate or modified forms.
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By law, they must be accessible, because the whole public procurement process should
be based on transparency and the advertising of contract notices is an essential step
of the public procurement transparent procedure. Indeed, public administrations must
aim to get ‘value for money’ (public money, taxpayers’ money) by choosing, through
transparent procedures, the best oﬀer among the largest possible number of candidates.
Therefore, any contract notice is issued with the intention to reach the largest number
of potential candidates, because more economic operators take part in the tender, more
competition increases. And we all know that when competition increases, there are more
likely to get better products and services.
Today, public institutions at all various level (regional, national or supranational) publish
their procurement notices first and foremost on the web. In the vast majority of cases, the
advertisement on the institutional web-sites is an essential, required by law, condition for
the conduct of tenders. In the European Union, tender notices for the award of public
contracts ‘above the EU threshold’19 are published on the TED (Tenders Electronic
3. Data Must Be Timely Data are made available as quickly as necessary to preserve the value of
the data.
4. Data Must Be Accessible Data are available to the widest range of users for the widest range
of purposes.
5. Data Must Be Machine processable Data are reasonably structured to allow automated
processing of it.
6. Access Must Be Non-Discriminatory Data are available to anyone, with no requirement of
registration.
7. Data Formats Must Be Non-Proprietary Data are available in a format over which no entity
has exclusive control.
8. Data Must Be License-free Data are not subject to any copyright, patent, trademark or trade
secret regulation. Reasonable privacy, security and privilege restrictions may be allowed as governed by
other statutes.
Finally, compliance must be reviewable. A contact person must be designated to respond to people
trying to use the data. A contact person must be designated to respond to complaints about violations
of the principles. An administrative or judicial court must have the jurisdiction to review whether the
agency has applied these principles appropriately. For any further information cfr. OpenGovData.org.
19The European thresholds diﬀer on the basis of the object of the contract (work, service or supply
of product) and on the basis of the type of entity which awards the contract. European law, indeed,
distinguishes between entities operating in ordinaries sectors (e.g. general public services, education, en-
vironment, health, etc.) and entities operating in utilities sectors (water, gas, energy, transport services,
etc.). I will discuss in more detail this important distinction in the rest of the thesis. My intention,
here, is to provide an overview on the main features of public contracts of European relevance, according
to the European Directive 2004/18/EC (concerning public contracts awarded by entities operating in
ordinaries sectors, namely contracting authorities, and the European Directive 2004/17/EC, concerning
public contracts awarded by entities operating in utilities sectors, namely contracting entities).
Public contracts with European relevance are public contracts “which have a value exclusive of value-
added tax (VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater than the following thresholds:
(a) EUR 162000 for public supply and service contracts others than those covered by point (b), third
indent, awarded by contracting authorities which are listed as central government authorities which are
listed as central government authorities in Annex IV [...];
(b) EUR 249000 - for public supply and service contracts awarded by contracting authorities other
than those listed in Annex IV, - for public supply contracts awarded by contracting authorities which
are listed in Annex IV and operate in the field of defence, where these contracts involve products not
covered by Annex V, - for public service contracts awarded by any contracting authority in respect of
the services listed in Category 8 of Annex IIA, Category 5 telecommunications services the positions of
which in the CPV are equivalent to CPC reference Nos 7524, 7525 and 7526 and/or the services listed
in Annex II B;
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Daily) website 20.
The TED system is the online version of the “Supplement to the Oﬃcial Journal of the
European Union” dedicated to European public procurement. It is updated five times a
week with approximately 1500 public procurement notices from the European Union, the
European Economic Area (EEA) and beyond, providing free access to business opportu-
nities for economic operators interested in participating to European tenders. Moreover,
information about every procurement document is published in the 23 oﬃcial EU lan-
guages, in that way guaranteeing the respect of the non-discrimination principle on the
basis of nationality, which is one of the pillars of the procurement domain, according to
the European Treaties vision.
The TED system is certainly the main source of information concerning European pro-
curement notices for every business entity across the European Union. At the same
time it is also one of the most impressive source of governments open data since it
is continuously updated with procurement notices issued by several public institutions,
authorities, public bodies, etc. from all the European and the EEA countries; it is main-
tained by an European Institution (the European Commission) which must guarantee
the reliability of information, ensuring also the availability of ‘data’ 24/24h; indirectly
the procurement notices provide also many information concerning the public institu-
tions, authorities, etc. that have issued the contract notice and even more (e.g. where
contracting authorities are located, in which sector they carry out their main activ-
ity, how many EU public contracts they award in a year, how much money a regional
authority, a council, or even a country, spend on education, health, environment, etc.).
4.2.2 Why an ontology of European public procurement notices?
Procurement notices are published according to standard forms (Fig. 4.4(a)) defined by
the European Commission. 21 On the TED system it is available a full version of each
(c) EUR 6242000 for public works contracts.” (Art. 7 Directive 2004/18/EC).
Public contracts with European relevance are also those awarded by contracting entities “which have
a value excluding value-added tax (VAT) estimated to be no less than the following thresholds:
(a) EUR 499000 in the case of supply and service contracts;
(b) EUR 6242000 in the case of works contracts” (Art. 16 Directive 2004/17/EC).
Please note that thresholds are revised every two years. So, the above quoted
text has been amended by the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011 of 30
November 2011. Therefore, for the current values of the thresholds, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:319:0043:01:EN:HTML.
Clearly, public contracts under the EU threshold are all those public contracts which do not meet these
standards. This type of public contracts is basically not covered by the EU Directives (with some limited
exceptions). So, they are covered only by the national laws of each Member state. Since public contract
under the EU threshold are not covered by the European Directives, their advertising at European level
is not required.
20http://ted.europa.eu/
21These forms are available at http://simap.europa.eu/buyer/forms-standard/index en.htm
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(a) An example of a standard form for a contract notice !(b) An example of data summary for a contract notice
Figure 4.4: Summary of the figures: 4.4(a) An example of a standard form for a
contract notice and 4.4(b) an example of data summary for a contract notice
tender document in the original language and a compact view in the language selected
by the user. From the notices available in these formats, semi-structured data can be
extracted in the form of a tabular summary, as shown in Fig. 4.4(b).
The HTML versions of both the full contract notices, published according to the standard
forms, and their related data summaries can be accessed in two ways, from the main
page, or through a faceted search system (see Fig. 4.5).
From the main page, procurement notices can be accessed:
• by searching all the types of current procurement notices (business opportunities);
• by searching the procurement notices related to a particular business sector;
• by searching the place of delivery or, more generally, of the execution of the next
contracts to be awarded (i.e. where works have to be carried out; where services
have to be executed, where products must be delivered).
The faceted search system, instead, supports:
• answers to natural language queries by returning a set of documents intended to
match the search terms;
79
Chapter 4. LOTED2: an Ontology of European Public Procurement Notices
Figure 4.5: Site map of Tenders Electronic Daily (Source: TED site map)
• a search through a set of facets, which give to the user directions for query refine-
ment (e.g. by specifying the type of procurement or tender document; the type
of contract to be awarded –service contract, works contract or supply contract–
; the type of procedure regulating the conduct of the tender – open, restricted,
negotiated, etc.–; the awarding authority name and so on).
Finally, another window can be opened for advanced searches through CCL queries22,
allowing the selection of the scope of the documents to be searched for, such as last
edition, last 5 editions, all current notices and archives, providing also a statistics mode
search.
Hence, there are various ways to access at the procurement notices. However, on my
opinion, the TED website, by many points of view, misses its main purpose: ensure its
users have a positive experience when performing searches on opportunities to tendering,
particularly considering users who are not experts in the public procurement domain,
which are after all the majority.
I will try to motivate these claims by means of a real case, as example. Giovanni is a
young electronic engineer; he lives in Caserta, in the Campania region of Italy.23 He
22Basically, Continuous Computation Language (CCL) is a language based on the Structured Query
Language (SQL) Standard, but is not identical to SQL. Whereas SQL is designed to query data from
static tables, CCL is adapted to the needs of processing and analyzing dynamic data.
23According to Wikipedia, the city is best known for the Palace of Caserta.
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has a very brilliant curriculum vitae, nevertheless, because of the economic crisis, he has
not been able to find a job during the last year. So, some months ago, he has decided,
with a couple of friends, to open a small factory producing sort of e-books readers,
equipped with the latest technology and the innovative features of tablet computers,
suitably designed by him. Even though the product is really interesting, Giovanni and
his friends have a lot of diﬃculties in advertising and in selling their e-book reader/tablet
computers. Anyone of us can imagine how may be diﬃcult the competition with the
majors of the e-readers/tablet computers’ market, such as Amazon, Apple, Samsung,
etc. for a small factory, as that of Giovanni. Indeed, people usually looks at the brand,
more than at the functionalities of the product. However, Giovanni knows that public
administrations should be not swayed by the brand in their purchases, because they must
aim to get “value for money”, taking into account only the functionalities of a product
plus its aﬀordability. So, he decides to try at selling his product into the public sector.
After getting some information, he tries to use the TED website to search procurement
opportunities to sell his new product.
First, Giovanni tries with a natural language query by typing the words “e-book reader”,
but apparently there are no records matching his query. So, Giovanni tries to search by
clicking on the “business opportunities” box. In addition to the record “contract
notice”, he finds some strange voices, such as “periodic indicative notice” or
“prior information notice” (he is wondering “what are they?”). By clicking on the
“contract notice” box, the TED website returns a list of records, but Giovanni dis-
covers that this list shows all the current contract notices and it seems that no awarding
authority is searching for e-book readers or tablet computers. He thinks that this type of
search is not the right one for his purposes and then, he tries to search the procurement
opportunities which are relevant for his business sector. He notes that there is a strange
code near the string “business sector”... CPV (he is wondering “what is this?”).
Giovanni finds the string “Computer and Related Services” that seems to be the
right one. He discovers that business sectors are organized in a hierarchical structure,
which looks like a taxonomy, but this is not really helpful. Indeed, he finds the “tablet
computer” string, but only after clicking its four super-categories, namely “Office and
computing machinery, equipment and supplies except
furniture and software packages”, “Computer equipment and supplies”,
“Data-processing machines (hardware)” and “Personal computers”.
In any case, now Giovanni has found the category that seems to match his business sector.
It probably does not include also the e-book readers category, but it is a significant step
forward in his search. At this point, the TED system shows three records to Giovanni.
Unfortunately the first three are not contract notices, but other kinds of documents
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entitled “Contract award notice”, while the third is a “Prior Information Notice” (again
he is wondering “what is this?”).
Giovanni tries also searching for the place of delivery, but when he opens the windows it
appears a warning message: “If the awarding authority has not specified a NUTS code
indicating the place of delivery of the contract, the notice is listed either under the entry
of its country if the notice comes from a country belonging to the European Union, or
under Other countries else”.
The sense of frustration that is overcoming Giovanni does not disappear when he tries
also through the faceted search system. He can easily combine the search criteria, but
he does not know exactly how to combine them all together, and even if he knows how
to formulate CCL queries, he is not an expert of the public procurement domain. So he
does not know how to search.
At the end, after twenty minutes of search, Giovanni is definitely discouraged. He
thinks that is too diﬃcult understand how the public procurement market works. So,
he forsakes the idea of selling his innovative product (which is also very cheap) to public
administrations.
I think that this happens very frequently: every day a lot of citizens and many small and
medium enterprises feel discouraged in their relationships with public administrations,
not only when they try to enter in the procurement market.
In his interesting work on Enterprise Ontology [42], Dietz highlights precisely the kind
of frustration I am referring to. He writes:
“have you ever phoned the help desk of a company or a government agency
in order to get the service they claim you will get in their advertisements?
Mostly you end up not by having what you were looking for, but by being
frustrated, maybe to the extent that you think of giving up. Why? Because
the operation of these institutions is completely opaque to you. You do not
know what to believe and what not to believe [...].
And, in case you have succeeded in penetrating to the right place, there is a
chance that the responsible person does not take on his or her responsibility
and concludes your case by blaming the computer or any other thing that
he or she uses as an aid. Most probably, he or she acts in this way not to
hamper or frustrate you, but because the institution is also opaque to him
or her.” 24 (ivi, p. 11).
24My emphasis.
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Now, [Dietz continues]
“imagine that it is possible for you to acquire the right amount of the right
kind of knowledge of the government agency from which you are trying to
get a license but have not succeeded yet.”25 (ivi, p. 12).
The goal is, then,
“to oﬀer a new understanding of [...] public administrations such that one is
able to look through the distracting and confusing appearance [of them] right
into their deep kernel. Its like an X-ray machine can let you look through
the skin and the tissues of the body right into the skeleton. As a user of
systems, this understanding lets you become master again of your activities.
As a designer, it lets you design systems in such a way that the resulting
design, in particular, the user dialogue and interface, reflects the essence of
the system.” 26 (ibid.).
And now, going back to the procurement system, imagine that is possible to design an
ontology which (like an X-ray machine) enables Francesco to acquire the right amount
of the right kind of knowledge he needs, namely which awarding authority is seeking for
the product he sells. Imagine that Francesco will be able to look through the distracting,
confusing and also complex appearance of the public procurement system right into its
deep kernel.
In other words, imagine an ontology at the heart of an application that would allow the
matching between demand and oﬀer in the public sector market.
Certainly, that ontology would be a legal ontology, but the legal concepts described
through it should serve the ultimate goal of enabling the understanding and the access
into the ‘kernel’ of the world of procurement by its ultimate users, namely economic
operators interested in participating to tenders. Furthermore, the ontology would be
connected to other semantic resources in order to provide a nice interface and an useful
search experience to its users, for example, showing the place of the delivery of a contract
on a map, or providing additional information about the awarding authority, e.g. by
looking up at its institutional website.
At the same time, the ontology may (or should) allow the linkage of the procurement
‘dataset’ with other relevant datasets, in order to discover new perspectives in investi-
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Consistently with these needs, in the rest of this Chapter I will describe a new ontology
for the Semantic Web, called LOTED227.
LOTED2 is a legal ontology supporting the modeling of European procurement notices
and the description of the data extracted from the TED system with the ultimate purpose
to enable the match between demand and supply in the public procurement context. The
name derives from LOTED28 ‘Linked Open Tenders Electronic Daily’[155], a project
that pioneered the use of Linked Data to enrich the data about public procurement
notices contained in RSS feeds of the TED system (Tenders Electronic Daily)29. The
new ontology is called LOTED2 because it can be considered as an evolution of the
LOTED1 ontology developed under the eponymous project.
Compared to the original LOTED ontology, LOTED2 aims to describe in a more expres-
sive way the domain of procurement and, since LOTED2 is a legal ontology, it aims to
provide also a representation of legal concepts related to the public procurement domain.
Such an expressive modeling of the domain allows the discovering of connections with
other domains, e.g., business domain, and the integration with other relevant ontolo-
gies, specifically GoodRelations[69]. As a consequence, the LOTED2 work investigates
a novel path in designing legal ontologies, trying to combine the representation of legal
concepts with the usability required for the description of the data, while also taking into
account the issues arising from the integration of legal ontologies with other vocabularies
and ontologies in the Semantic Web world at large.
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows: in Section 4.3 I outline related work
on reusing linked open data associated with the European public procurement notices
and on other existing ontologies on public contracts; then, in Section 4.4, I present the
LOTED2 ontology, discussing its design, its modules and the inferences it supports.
Furthermore, in Section 4.6 and in Section 4.5, I describe the integration of LOTED2-
core with the most widely used ontology for describing e-commerce scenarios, namely
GoodRelations ontology[69]. The resulting ontology is called LOTED2-extended. Fi-
nally, in Section 4.7 I evaluate the main results from the work on LOTED2 ontologies,
while outlining, at the same time, some future directions of the work.
27LOTED2 ontology has been described also in the paper authored with M. d’Aquin and E. Motta,
LOTED2: An Ontology of European Public Procurement Notices, to be appear in a Special Issue of
the Semantic Web Journal entitled “The Semantic Web for the Legal Domain”. The LOTED2 on-
tology has been developed during my four months stage, supported by the “Marco Polo” grant of
the University of Bologna, as visiting research student under the supervision of Prof. Enrico Motta
and Dr. Mathieu d’Aquin, at the Knowledge Media Institute (KMi), The Open University, UK.
I would like to thank Enrico Motta and Mathieu d’Aquin for their valuable inputs during the de-
velopment of the ontology. Furthermore, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Prof. Monica Palmirani,
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4.3 Related work
4.3.1 LOTED project and LOTED(I) ontology
The LOTED ontology30 was developed inside the eponymous project, in order to intro-
duce an additional level of structure on top of the data extracted from the RSS feeds
of the TED system. It has been conceived for the need of the platform and structured
to enrich procurement notices data with automatically discovered links to GeoNames31
and DBpedia32. So, it is a lightweight ontology, realized to match the semi-structured
representation (namely the tabular summary of data) of tender notices as published by
the TED website. The LOTED ontology satisfies the requirement of usability and is very
suited to the purpose for which it has been designed, but it does not actually represent
knowledge about the domain, as it merely defines the structure of data objects in the
domain. A more expressive representation of the domain of procurement was planned
as part of future work on the LOTED project, and in fact, now, it has been done.
Nevertheless, the very interesting part of the LOTED work was the way in which linked
data were exploited, obtaining (and visualizing) useful statistic information and, at
the same time, exploring new viewpoints in the analysis of the procurement data. First,
LOTED’s authors define an interesting notion of tender profile. They argue that a tender
profile “corresponds to the proportion of each sector in terms of the number of tenders
being published in a particular place or by a particular group of organizations” 33. In that
way, they were able to discover, for example, that the “financial and related services”
sector was the one with of the greatest discrepancies between countries. In particular,
Belgium was the country with the larger proportion in this area, while countries such
as Malta and Slovakia were almost absent from such a market. Then, they applied the
same approach in analyzing tender profiles of the twenty Italian Regions, discovering
that Calabria was the most active Italian region in the “Construction and Real Estate”






34I find particularly interesting these results. In fact, one may wondering why Calabria region was the
most active in the construction sector. A possible answer can be that Calabria is an Italian region which
historically suﬀers a lack of infrastructures (see the ‘Salerno-Reggio Calabria highway long story’ for
example), so it is obvious that public bodies try to fill this gap by tendering public works. However, it is
also necessary to emphasize that, unfortunately, public works contracts are the type of public contracts
which is more aﬀected by corruption phenomenas and by criminal organization’s interference. Hence,
as a research matter, it may be useful to compare data on public works contracts with statistical data
pro-regions about convictions by final judgments for corruption, fraud damaging the State, bid rigging,
money laundering and so on.
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However, the most interesting result of LOTED work was, on my opinion, the enrichment
of the initial dataset with additional information obtained from DBpedia about the
political aﬃliations of cities (under the property party), in that way showing the chart
of the tender profile in a given country (namely France, see fig. 4.6) by relating with its
political parties.
Figure 4.6: Chart representing the tender profiles of political parties in France in
LOTED
4.3.2 The Public Contracts Ontology (PCO) developed under the LOD2
project
LOD235 is a large-scale Integrated Project co-funded by the European Commission
within the FP7 Information and Communication Technologies Work Program, with
the overall aim to creating knowledge out of interlinked data and to develop tools and
methodologies for exposing and managing very large amounts of structured information
on the Data Web and to test and bootstrap a network of high-quality domains, also
based on multi-lingual ontologies, from sources such as Wikipedia and OpenStreetMap.
A work package of this project, the WP9A (“LOD2 for a Distributed Marketplace for
Public Sector Contracts”) is dedicated to exploring and demonstrating how the appli-
cation of linked data principles for procuring contracts in the public sector may help to
bridge the gap between advanced countries and countries with low online participation
35http://lod2.eu
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of enterprises in public tenders. So, the main purpose of this work package is to build
a linked data infrastructure in order to produce a “business impact and achieve an ef-
fective resource allocation through emulating the market process of meeting supply and
demand”36.
At the heart of this infrastructure there is the Public Contracts Ontology (PCO)37. The
authors state they are not interested in modeling every aspect related to a contract, but
only “information which is available in existing systems on the Web” and “which will
be usable for matching public contracts with potential suppliers”[75]. In other words,
the goal of this ontology is to model a public contract as a whole, but without going
into details of the domain. PCO is more articulated than LOTED ontology: it is not
built to model the data structures of a particular system (such as the TED), but rather
tries to represent a variety of aspects of the domain, taking into account the integration
with other ontologies (GoodRelations, Call for Anything, VCard, Payments Ontology
and also LOTED). It therefore provides a broader vision of the domain compared to
LOTED: some relevant aspects of the domain, such as lots, are represented in this
ontology. Furthermore, it has been built with the specific purpose of integrating as
much as possible all the ontologies relevant for the domain, following a pure Linked
Data approach.
Nevertheless, the Public Contracts Ontology shows some weaknesses that cannot be
ignored, even while keeping in mind that it is not a legal ontology. It seems to me that
the aim of linking together all the ontologies listed above takes the upper hand on the
aim to represent in a correct way the domain.
For example, the ontology describes both the tendering phase and the phase of the ex-
ecution of the contract.38 However, there is not a clear conceptual distinction between
these diﬀerent scenarios in the Public Contracts Ontology. Indeed, in the ontology the
diﬀerent concepts of call (call for tenders, such as contract notice) and contract (public
contract) are often confused, if not totally merged. First of all, the class pc:Contract
is modeled as SubClass of c4n:Call, namely of the class ‘Call’ of the Call for Anything39
RDF vocabulary, developed by the DERIs Linked Data Research Centre for expressing
demand, such as calls for tenders or calls for papers. In some sense, a contract notice
can be considered as a ‘call’, a call through which it is announced a competitive bidding
for the award of a public procurement contract, but I wonder how it is possible that
a contract can be considered as a call... I totally disagree. In other words, a contract
36http://lod2.eu/WorkPackage/wp9a.html
37http://purl.org/procurement/public-contracts#
38Please note that this is my impression looking at the ontology. Instead PCO authors state in the
cited Deliverable that “Public Contracts Ontology provides a guidance on modeling the domain covering
the pre-realization stage of public procurement.”
39http://vocab.deri.ie/c4n
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notice is a call-for-tenders, which may be submitted for the award of a public procure-
ment contract. The (public) contract, instead, is ‘the stakes’ of the competitive bidding
announced through a notice (i.e. a call), not the call itself!
Secondly, the Contract so modeled in the Public Contracts Ontology has both an es-
timated and actual price, at the same time. When the notice is published the price is
only an estimated one. The final price will be set only at the end of the competitive
bidding, on the basis of the award criterion (for an example the lowest price) and of the
tender bids submitted. So, it would be appropriate to keep strictly separate the diﬀerent
phases of contract notice publication from the tendering phase, from the award phase of
the contract and then from its execution, preferably by representing also the diﬀerent
time intervals in which each single phase takes place.
Conceptual confusion increases by defining the Class pc:Contract as equivalent to
the Class loted:Tender.40 Why the Contract should be equivalent to the Tender? I
definitely can not agree on this point. The declared aim of the ontology is to match
awarding authorities’ demand and traders’ oﬀering; in my vision, this aim cannot be
achieved simply declaring that a (proposed) contract - demand - is equivalent to the
tender bid - oﬀering. It is not correct, from a conceptual point of view, as well as
potentially harmful.
In the Public Contracts Ontology, there is not a specific definition of the class of awarding
entities; they are just identified as business entities. From the point of view of the
market, this is true and also useful in order to achieve integration with the GoodRelations
ontology. However, forgetting the ontological definition of this important aspect of the
domain entails also forgetting that the procurement domain concerns the PA2B (Public
Authorities to Business Entities) scenario and not the B2B (Business to Business) one.
Summarizing, this ontology seems to tackle complex subjects through a too simplistic
approach. Observing this ontology, I realized that legal knowledge is often simplified to
such an extent as to be distorted.
4.3.3 The 10ders Information Services Project
‘10ders Information Services’41 is a Project co-financed by the Spanish Ministry of In-
dustry, Commerce and Tourism and by the European Regional Development Found. It
is led by Gateway Strategic Consultancy Services42 and is developed in collaboration
40Within the Public Contract Ontology this term denotes the tender bid submitted by the economic
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with ExisTI43 (both commercial companies) and the Web Semantica Oviedo (WESO)
Research Group44.
The aim of this project is to exploit information about public procurement notices
using Semantic Web technologies and Linked Open Data approach, in order to build
many services, especially targeted to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The set of
services produced by the research group is currently available on a proprietary platform,
Euroalert.net45[92], a brand owned by Gateway SCS.
Basically, the commercial services oﬀered to small and medium enterprises span from
tenders alerting systems on the basis of the subscriber profile model, to the oﬀer of
reports on the major public buyers for their products and services. It also provides a
customized data mining analysis of public procurement tailored to the interest of each
client. Aside from the commendable purpose to provide an unique access point (‘a
pan-European platform’) both for EU relevant tender notices published on TED, and
for notices below EU threshold published on a wide range of buyer profiles of national,
regional and local levels, it should be considered that there are many services providing
mail alerts about tenders, on the basis of the subscribed profile, and other mechanisms
of this kind. However, the novel approach of this project is that the platform system is
built using structured open data instead of screen-scraping’s techniques.
From the same research academic group (WESO) comes also the MOLDEAS (’Methods
on Linked Data for E-procurement Applying Semantics’) work [3]. This project can
be considered as a broader framework, which includes also the experience gained in
developing Euroalert.net. Indeed, MOLDEAS aims to apply the semantic web and
Linked Open Data approaches to public procurement notices, defining a set of goals.
The first goal is to transform government controlled vocabularies such as CPV46, CPC47
and Eurovoc48 (now available in SKOS49) into RDF, SKOS or OWL.
The second one is to enrich and model information inside public procurement notices
with these controlled vocabularies but also with geographical information available in
the Linked Data cloud. Then, procurements information is published in a SPARQL
endpoint providing a node for the linked data cloud and enhanced services (search and
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The main advantages claimed by authors of Euro-alert and MOLDEAS are essentially
the decreasing of information’s dispersion (arising from the diﬀerent sources where con-
tract notice above and under EU threshold are published); the unification of data models
and formats and the support to multilingual issues (through EUROVOC resources used
for the enrichment of public procurement notices). An ontology about public contracts
is still in development, as part of WESO group’s future work.
4.4 LOTED2-core: design decisions
In the previous part of this Chapter, I have asserted that both LOTED and PCO are
not legal ontologies. I support my assertion with the observation of their features.
Both LOTED and PCO do not represent legal knowledge of the procurement domain, or
part of it (e.g. the procurement notices), as such. Rather, the two ontologies’ authors
provide us conceptual models on the public procurement matter, by relying mostly on
their intuitions on what legal terms, within the domain, mean. In regards to LOTED,
this approach does not lead to conceptual misunderstandings or inaccuracies in the
representation of the domain knowledge. Being its design very minimal, the LOTED
ontology manages knowledge about the domain, without producing blatant errors, or
mismatches between the ontological representation of the domain and the content of
norms which define it.
Contrarily, on my opinion, the Public Contract Ontology (PCO) contains a skewed
description of many key aspects of the domain. Why does this happen?
For many reasons. Last but not least, this happens because of the widespread Linked
Data’s practice “of forcing” (more or less implicit) equivalence assertions among classes
or properties belonging to diﬀerent ontologies, which carry radical diﬀerent meanings.
The resulting mappings between data, along with their ontological schemas, produces
factual information useless (because not really informative), or unusable (because incor-
rect). If the main (and commendable) purpose of PCO was the integration of diﬀerent
ontologies relevant for the procurement domain, why not use a foundational approach,
by composing the disparate conceptual schemas under the framework of a foundational
ontology, such as DOLCE?
The second reason concerns me, as a jurist, more closely. You may certainly build an
ontology about a legal domain (namely about a domain whose definitions are contained
in legal norms), by relying on your intuition to derive the semantics of legal terms.
Unfortunately, in many cases, those intuitions will be wrong. Why?
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Because the legal knowledge is normatively qualified, the definitions of legal terms are
contained in legal sources, as well as the descriptions of legal domain’s conceptual struc-
tures, which, as a consequence, are imposed by law. So, the analysis of legal texts (in
particular, of the sources of law) is mandatory for building formal legal ontologies. As
well emphasized by Fernandez-Barrera & Sartor, the challenges in building legal ontolo-
gies are related to “the dependency of legal concepts on legal norms [...]; the dependency
of legal norms on (the interpretation of) terms in authoritative documents [and] the de-
pendency of interpretations of legal norms on the pragmatics of the diﬀerent situations
in which norms have to be applied”[48]. Because of this dependence, the legal discourse
can never escape from its own textuality [108]. We do not have the permission to modify
the way in which norms impose us to conceptualize statutory legal knowledge.
4.4.1 A backward path : exploring a novel approach in re-constructing
semantics of the procurement data
In regards to the European public procurement domain, its description, as well as the
definitions of its relevant terms’ meaning, are contained in two European Directives,
namely: the Directive 2004/18/EC50 and the Directive 2004/17/EC51. The first reg-
ulates the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public
supply contracts and public service contracts by contracting authorities (i.e. authorities
operating in the so-called ‘ordinary sectors’); the second one regulates the procurement
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sec-
tors (i.e. ‘utilities sectors’).
Hence, these two legal sources represent the reference point to derive the exact meaning
of terms used to describe the procurement domain, and to extract information needed to
build any logical theory which would formalize the domain knowledge. Besides this, al-
most obvious, consideration, another aspect concerning specifically the European tender
notices deserves attention. As we have seen, tender notices are sent by contracting au-
thorities/entities to the Commission, and then published, according to standard forms.52
Since the Directives prescribe which information must be included in each kind of notice,
the standard forms approved by the EU Commission are the result of a standardization
50http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:en:HTML
51http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0017:en:HTML
52According to the Directives, notices sent by contracting authorities to the Commission shall be sent
either by electronic means in accordance with the format and procedures for transmission indicated in
specific Annexes. Just to give you an idea, the art. 36 of the Directive 2004/18/CE refers to the Annex
VIII (of the same Directive, namely the 2004/18/CE), whose art. 1 states that notices [...] are sent
by the contracting authorities to the Oﬃce for Oﬃcial Publications of the European Communities in
the format required by Commission Directive 2001/78/EC of 13 September 2001 on the use of standard
forms in the publication of public contract notices.
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process of all the procurement notices, according to the requirements imposed by the
Directives.53Then, the TED semi-structured data are extracted from each notice, which
is compiled according to those standard-forms.
When there are standard forms for drafting a certain type of document, these can be
used as starting point for the analysis of each individual document drafted according
to the established format. In a certain sense, model forms are descriptions of classes
of documents and, each new document drafted, is an instance of one of these classes.
The analysis of these model forms may tell us information about the terms identifying
constitutive part of the document and the interrelationships among each other. In many
cases those terms identify ontological classes and the structural relationships between
terms can be considered as object properties or data-type properties. Thus, filling out
a new document means the creation of new instances for each class.
On the other side, we can derive the exact meaning of terms contained in standard
forms only through the analysis of the authoritative sources: the sources of law, indeed,
contain the definitions of the relevant terms pertaining to the domain they cover (explicit
knowledge), and at the same time, they provide us many information about the nature
of legal concepts: what are their features (or properties) and their relations with other
concepts, in the whole context of the domain (implicit knowledge). The first is a plain
literal analysis, the latter, instead, is the result of the domain-expert’s interpretation.
As discussed in the Chapter I, various approach and methodologies have been adopted
in legal ontology engineering. In general, core legal ontologies are mostly made from
scratch following a top-down approach and ontological patterns are typically grounded
in legal theory. Instead linguistic ontologies are normally built following a bottom-up
approach, enhanced by terminology extractors and others NLP tools.
However, both the two approaches show some weaknesses, as well as points of strengths.
Ontologies built following a top-down approach, may be reused across diﬀerent ap-
plication scenarios, because they provide sorts of conceptual frameworks, as well as
fundamental legal ontological patterns, suitable for being specialized by other ontolo-
gies (especially domain ontologies), enhancing at the same time interoperability issues.
However, core legal ontologies are not always suitable for real knowledge management
applications, since they contain many theoretical definitions, whose reuse in practical
53The Annex VII of the Directive 2004/18/EC determines the information which must be included
in public contract notices; the Annex VII B of the same Directive determines the information which
must appear in public works concession notices; the Annex VII C of the same Directive determines the
information which must appear in works contract notices of concessionaires who are not contracting
authorities and so forth.
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scenarios is quite diﬃcult; in addition they are not adequately linked to the textual infor-
mation and, as a consequence, a lot of eﬀorts is needed to refine the ontology, according
to definitions contained in the legal texts.
Instead, following a bottom-up approach (e.g. by means of NLP techniques), it is possi-
ble to discover useful terminological information at a larger scale and a faster price, and
this feature makes this approach particularly useful when you have to update existing
ontologies with new knowledge, because it can be automatically parsed and extracted
from texts. However, most of the times, following a bottom-up approach, the obtained
result is a too much detailed knowledge. As a consequence, it becomes extremely dif-
ficult to find commonalities between related concepts, and, at the same time, the risk
of inconsistency dramatically increases[49]. (for a comprehensive overview of the two
diﬀerent ontological approaches, see the seminal work of Uschold & Gruninger[151]).
All things considered, LOTED2-core ontology has been designed following another ap-
proach, which, in some sense, capitalizes on past experiences in legal ontology engineer-
ing, trying to combine their best insights.
The LOTED2 approach follows a sort of backward path, by combining an analysis of the
approved standard-forms of notices and of the data structure of the tabular summaries
(bottom-up), with an analysis of the legal sources covering the domain (top-down ap-
proach). The first parsing has been conducted manually, and, obviously, also the latter
(by me, as domain expert). On my opinion, in this way, it is possible to achieve a better
match between language and conceptualization and then, a good level of correspondence
between terms, which identify data, and ontological classes.
The approach is almost intuitive for a legal scholar, who uses continuously legal sources
as references for extracting the legal knowledge, so it is quite diﬃcult for me to describe
explicitly the methodology. However, I will try to explain it, as much as possible.
Firstly: the raw data structure, as shown in the tabular summaries, is re-placed in
its context. More precisely, data are matched with their corresponding entries in the
(standard-forms) notices, from which they are extracted.
Secondly: the entries contained in the standardized notices are interpreted according to
the articles of the Directives, where they are described in detail (explicit knowledge),
and also, through a comprehensive analysis of the domain, as it emerges from the inter-
pretation of the whole legal sources covering the domain (implicit knowledge).
Thirdly: the resulting re-composed “puzzle” is formalized as much as possible through
the language used for coding the ontology.
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I make here an example of such an approach. Consider for example, this excerpt of the
tabular summary related to the contract notice n. 382532-2011:
Figure 4.7: Excerpt of the tabular summary related to the contract notice n. 382532-
2011
The data ‘AA’, labeled “Type of Authority”, is extracted from the entries of this form
(which is an excerpt of a standard form for contract notices):
Figure 4.8: Excerpt of a standard form for contract notices
Then, an analysis of the Directives is conducted in order to search definitions or other
kind of information pertaining to the “Type of Authority” record (or ontological class),
especially by analyzing why this kind information is relevant and why it must be included
in contract notices. In this specific case, a definition of types of authorities empowered to
issue contract notices is contained in the the Article 1 no. 9 of the Directive 2004/18/CE.
This specification is relevant because these types of authorities, by issuing a contract
notice, play the role of “contract authorities”; they can issue also other types of notices
(aside from contract notices). Finally, all those notices, the awarding procedures con-
tracting authorities have to follow and the public contract they award are covered by
the Directive 2004/18/EC. 54
54The Article 9 no. 9 of the Directive 2004/18/EC states that “Contracting authorities means the
State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations formed by one or several
of such authorities or one or several of such bodies governed by public law. A ”body governed by public
law” means any body: (a) established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest,
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The resulting ontological representation is described in the following sections.
Such an adopted approach (analysis of data⇒ analysis of standard-forms⇒ analysis of
legal sources) is, in some way, documented inside the LOTED2-core ontology, through
the annotation properties. In fact, a comment (redfs:comment) is attached to the ma-
jority of classes, object and data properties, in order to provide the legislative reference
which has been used to derive the ontological (interpretation) and definition of that
class, object property and data property.
Then, other two annotation properties have been created specifically for the needs of
providing a guideline to match the classes and the properties of the ontology with the
corresponding entries in the full text of notices (which are the same of those encoded in
the TED faceted search system) and also with the data identifiers. The first annotation
is available through the Loted2:tedLabel, which allows to attach in the ontology a
reference to the corresponding HTML labels of classes (e.g. 6 - Body governed by
public law or 3 - Contract notice), properties and in certain cases, and also of
specific typologies of instances (fixed individuals). The second annotation, instead, is
available through the Loted2:dataID. In this case the annotation refers to the “short”
identifier of data (e.g. AA, AU, TI and so on).
It is necessary to emphasize that the semi-structured data rendered by the TED system
represent only the essential part of all the information contained in the full versions of
tender documents. Other relevant information is lost. This is the case, for example,
when a proposal for the acquisition of similar or related supplies/works/services may
result in contracts being awarded at the same time in the form of separate lots. Since in
some cases, economic operators may submit an oﬀer for a single lot only (in those cases
in which it is admitted a partial type of bid, for example) this type of information may
be very helpful for participation in tenders of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An
XML standard for legal documents, which allows also RDFa assertions in order to link
the structural part of the text with ontological classes, such as Akoma Ntoso[9, 164],
may be used in order to tag the full content of tender documents.
not having an industrial or commercial character; (b) having legal personality; and (c) financed, for the
most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law; or subject
to management supervision by those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory
board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by
other bodies governed by public law. Non-exhaustive lists of bodies and categories of bodies governed
by public law which fulfill the criteria referred to in (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph are set
out in Annex III. Member States shall periodically notify the Commission of any changes to their lists
of bodies and categories of bodies. 10. A ”central purchasing body” is a contracting authority which:
- acquires supplies and/or services intended for contracting authorities, or - awards public contracts or
concludes framework agreements for works, supplies or services intended for contracting authorities.”
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4.4.2 LOTED2-core and LOTED2-extended modularization
LOTED2-core is a large ontology, up to now it represents 180 classes related to the
public procurement domain.55 In order to facilitate maintenance, LOTED2 has been
designed with a modular approach. Modules have been conceived to be ‘self-containing’,
‘independent’ and ‘reusable’[40].
Ten modules (fig. 4.9) compose LOTED2-core ontology. An extended version of LOTED2
ontology is composed by LOTED2-core ontology, GoodRelations4Tenders and VCard56.
GoodRelations4Tenders is a version of the GoodRelations ontology compliant with the
public procurement domain, while, as well known, VCard describes a mapping of the
VCard specification to RDF/OWL. The goal of the integration of LOTED2-core on-
tology with VCard is to promote the use of vCard for the description the description
of ‘points of contacts’ and addresses of awarding authorities. GoodRelations4Tenders,
instead, represents the key link between demand and supply side of public procurement.
It will be described in details in the Section 4.6. Both LOTED2-core ontology and its
extended version (called LOTED2-extended) are available at http://loted.eu/ontology2
and at http://codex.cirsfid.unibo.it/ontologies/.
!
Figure 4.9: Dependencies between LOTED2-core modules and external ontologies
(GoodRelations4Tenders and VCard) in LOTED2-extended
55I have used both TopBraid Composer (http://www.topbraidcomposer.com) and Prote´ge´ 4.1
(http://protege.stanford.edu) to build LOTED2-core and its extended version. The ontology has been
written in OWL DL 2.0.
56http://www.w3.org/TR/vcard-rdf/
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Such a modularization of LOTED2 ontologies, at the same time oﬀers the possibility
to reuse the ontologies (or pieces of them) for other purposes, by extending or reducing
their scope. LOTED2 indeed, besides its ultimate goal of supporting Legal Semantic
Web applications for improving the meeting of demand and oﬀer in public procurement,
potentially may serve also other tasks, for example:
• to express the (main) legal concepts of the domain of public contracts notices as
defined in legal sources (European Directives on public contracts);
• to serve as a framework for representing public contracts, as defined in the legal
codes or laws, implementing the Directives at national levels in the diﬀerent EU
countries;
• to support rich semantic annotation, indexing, search and retrieval of tenders
documents, such as contract notices;
• to make possible the reuse of semi-structured data extracted from the TED system,
by linking data about procurement to other relevant/pertaining open data;
4.5 LOTED2-core modules description
In this Section I describe the LOTED2-core modules.
4.5.1 LOTED2-core and LOTED2-extended modules
Loted2-core is a framework module (as well as Loted2-extended module). Its function
is to hold together the modules by which is composed LOTED2-core ontology.
4.5.2 Procurements Subjective Scope
Procurements Subjective Scope module describes the classes of legal persons who are
empowered to issue a tender notice (generally called ‘call for tenders’) and to award
a public procurement contract, i.e. to play the role of awarding legal entities. An
enumeration of these entities is contained in art. 1 (9) Directive 2004/18/EC and in art.
2 of Directive 2004/17/EC (fig. 4.10).
The first type of entities may play the role of contracting authorities; the second type
of entities may play the role of contracting entities. Although both the Directives (as
well as the standard forms) refer to ‘contracting authorities’ and ‘contracting entities’
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Figure 4.10: A taxonomy of the types of entities empowered to issue tender notices
as two diﬀerent types of entities, these terms denote, from an ontological point of view,
rather a role than a type of entities.
Consider for an example the case of a body governed by public law57, that, on one hand,
issues a notice for the award of a public contract and, one the other, may submit a
tender bid in a tender announced by another entity.58
Furthermore, any public authority or public body cannot be considered per se a con-
tracting authority or entity. It assumes this feature only when it issues contracts notice
57“A ‘body governed by public law means any body:
(a) established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial
or commercial character;
(b) having legal personality; and
(c) financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed
by public law; or subject to management super vision by those bodies; or having an administrative,
managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional
or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law.” (second subparagraph of Art. 1 (9)
Directive 2004/18/EC).
58The forth whereas of Directive 2004/18/EC and the eleventh of Directive 2004/17/CE, in this regard,
state that Member States should ensure that the participation of a body governed by public law as a
tenderer in a procedure for the award of a public contract does not cause any distortion of competition
in relation to private tenderers. Thus, implicitly, the Directives admit bodies governed by public law in
participating to tenders, as tenderer.
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or another type of call for tenders. In other words, this is an anti-rigid property[66],
since every instance of a public authority, body governed by public law, ministry, etc.
is not essentially a contracting authority or entity.
However, for the purposes of the European legislator, the distinction between types
of entities, which may play the role of contracting authority, and entities, which may
play the role of contracting entities, is very relevant. From this distinction, in fact,
depends the application of Directive 2004/18/EC (on ordinary sectors) or of Directive
2004/17/EC (on utilities sectors). Hence, LOTED2 includes two classes that refer to
meta-legal concepts, namely ‘entity operating in ordinary sectors’ and ‘entity operating
in utilities sectors’.
Figure 4.11: An example showing the graph representation of “entity operating in
utilities sectors” class in LOTED2-core ontology
I call these types of concepts meta-concepts, according to the Van Kralingen’s[79] ter-
minology59, because by the recognition of those concepts, recursively, depends also the
recognition of the legal rules which are applicable to them, and then, these two concepts
determine the applicability of other concepts. If an entity falls in the class of the first
59As far as I know, a definition of meta-concepts is provided only by the work of Van Kralingen.
In his work on the Frame-based conceptual models of statute law he distinguishes seven items which
specify the (ontological) nature of legal concepts, namely the name of the concept, its type, its priority,
its promulgation, the scope of application, its conditions, and some instances of the concept. I find
this distinction really useful and I agree with Van Kralingen on that distinction. I, indeed, tried to
represent the majority of these features of legal concepts in the LOTED2 ontology. However, the
very interesting aspect of Van Kralingen’s work, on my opinion, is the distinction of four types of
legal concepts: definitions, deeming provisions, factors, and meta-concepts. This interesting distinction
was emphasized also by Mommers[100], who took, as a starting-point for his work, these definitions
provided by Van Kralingen. Mommers summarizes in this way Van Kralingen’s types of legal concepts:
“definitions contain the conditions for a legal concept to apply (possibly deviating from the normal –
ndr. or intuitive – meaning of that concept), deeming provisions introduce legal fictions (e.g., a bike is
deemed a motor-vehicle), a factor determines the applicability of a concept statistically, and thus it is
in fact one of the application conditions of a concept, not a concept itself, and meta-concepts determine
the applicability of other concepts”.
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type of entity, then it may play the role of contracting authority. Instead, if an entity
falls in the second type, then it may play the role of contracting entity.
The definition of these classes is based on the main activity carried out by an entity. A
detailed list of ordinary sector activities and utilities activities is obtained by standard
forms, but should not be considered as a numerus clausus. For each type of these activi-
ties and for each type of legal person which issues a notice, is provided the corresponding
label of TED data through an annotation property (Loted2:tedLabel). This annota-
tion property is provided with the purpose to drive the user in the implementation of
the ontology by using the TED data as instances.
4.5.3 Tender Documents
The Procurement Subjective Scope module is connected to the Tender Document module
through the object property Loted2:issues. In this module are described the majority
of tender documents available on the TED system, issued by the entities defined in the
Directives. The aim of this module is to provide a full description of tender documents,
which represent notices.
A set of class restrictions is defined to specify which kinds of entities are empowered to
issue a certain type of tender document (e.g. a contract notice-utilities may be issued
only by an entity operating in utilities sectors).
Other types of tender documents, such as specification and descriptive documents, are
described because they are strictly related to the tender notices. Indeed, these documents
are attached to a contract notice, in order to describe in details the type of services,
goods or works which the awarding entity is seeking, and the manner in which the
competitive bidding will be conducted.
You may argue that the terms attached tender document may denote a role, rather
than a substantial category. However I disagree on this point, because the existence
of these documents depends on the existence of a contract notice (or of another type
of notice through which is announced a competitive procurement process). In other
words, the identity criterion of these documents is, precisely, their being attached to a
contract notice; they cannot exist without the contract notice to which they are attached.
Moreover, a contract notice, together with its attached documents, constitutes the so
called lex specialis of the tender, i.e. the set of rules governing the conduct of the
tender.60
60To be honest, I was not able to find a good English translation of the Italian definition documenti
a corredo del bando. On my opinion, the expression a corredo means something more than attached ; in
some sense, it means that they complement each other.
100
Chapter 4. LOTED2: an Ontology of European Public Procurement Notices
Figure 4.12: The contract notice class and its attached documents in LOTED2-core
Data contained in the tabular summaries of TED are basically related to tender notices.
So, this module, more than others, has been built emphasizing the bottom-up approach.
As in the Procurement Subjective Scope module, also in the Tender Document mod-
ule the annotation property Loted2:tedLabel is used. Another annotation property,
Loted2:tedDataID is used for providing a reference to the ID of the data to which a
data-type property refers.
4.5.4 Procurement Regulation
In this module are described the legislative sources regulating public procurement do-
main. Apart from the Directives, many other legislative sources regulate the European
procurements domain. The most important is the Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA), a pluryilateral treaty signed by a number of WTO (World Trade Organization)
parties (fig. 4.13), with the purpose to open up as much as possible public procure-
ment business to international competition[25, 41]. The scope and coverage of GPA is
based on the type of procurement, the type of entity and the monetary threshold defined
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Figure 4.13: WTO Members and observers in Government Procurement Agreement
(source: Wikipedia)
in Appendix I of the Agreement. It is worthwhile to emphasize that signatories may
negotiate the coverage of GPA with other parties, on the basis of reciprocity.
For example, the utilities sector is not covered by GPA with respect to Canada and
there are many limitations with respect to USA and Japan too, just to name the most
relevant.
This means that we cannot consider the GPA as a unique treaty for each signatory,
since there are rather many bilateral agreements (Canada-EU, USA-EU, et.) negotiated
by parties under the GPA framework. Thus, simply saying that a tender is within the
coverage of the GPA is not enough to clarify the geographical scope of the application
of each single bilateral agreement to the single contract notice.
These significant divergences in the application of GPA entail a considerable complexity
in defining which specific regulation covers a tender document. I am convinced that is
almost impossible to represent such a complex scenario, determining which legal source
covers a specific notice, through OWL, or in general, through Description Logic. Maybe,
neither First Order Logic alone would be suﬃcient. In this case, it is necessary to use
also Defeasible Logic, for representing this intricate legal matter.
Unfortunately, the TED system’s data do not provide an eﬀective help in this direction
since they are articulated in an incoherent manner. In fact the field of ‘Regulation’ data
is referred once to the political geographical area of the country in which is based the en-
tity that issued the tender notice (European Union, European Economic Area); once
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to the type of authority that issued the notice (European Investment Bank, European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Monetary Institute,
European Institution/Agency or International Organization); once to the rea-
son for which the notice is issued (External aid and European Development Fund) and
finally once to the actual regulation, although not always identified with the exact word-
ing (Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation,
GPA, etc.).
Procurement Regulation module of LOTED2-core ontology aims to provide the exact
wording of all the procurement regulations, i.e. standardizing the labels of the legal
sources which typically cover the single tender documents (e.g. Directive 2004/18/EC
instead of European Union). This type of information is necessary to define the juris-
diction of the regulation, namely the geo-political reference within the norm is applied
and its eﬀects are binding[31, 60]. However, no inferences are supported by means of the
very basic knowledge represented in this module. Further work is needed, by combining
the use of OWL and a rule interchange language supporting defeasibility reasoning, such
as LegalRuleML, for trying to represent better this part of the procurement domain.
4.5.5 Procurement Competitive Process
A notice is issued by an entity acting as contracting authority or contracting entity in
order to announce a competition. There are many types of competitions, based on the
type of notice. The most relevant type of competition is the tender (i.e. the competitive
bidding) that is announced through a contract notice (but not only).
Figure 4.14: The relationship between a contract notice and the tender in LOTED2-
core
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Instead, a design contest is announced through a design contest notice. A qualification
system is announced through a notice on the existence of this type of system, that we
can consider as a competitive procurement process. This system, in fact, is used by
only entity operating in utilities, for seeking qualified economic operators, which meet
predefined qualification criteria that must be satisfied by potential providers of specific
types of works, services and supplies. An applicant of this type of notice, which satisfies
these criteria, is registered in the system as potential candidate or contractor for the
particular type of contract. A notice on the existence of a qualification system with call
for competition is a notice through which is announced both a qualification system and
a tender, in which may participate only operators recognized as qualified according to
the system.
A procurement competitive process takes place with an established administrative pro-
cedure, the award procedure that can be of diﬀerent types (open, restricted, negotiated,
etc.). LOTED2-core ontology does not describe award procedures.
4.5.6 Subjective Legal Situations
This module describes roles played by agents in procurements competitive processes and
in organizations. As highlighted describing the Procurements Subjective Scope, terms
such as Contracting Authority or Contracting Entity denote roles rather than types
of entities. In particular they denote roles than only certain entities may play: only
entities operating in ordinary sectors may play the role of contracting authority, while
only entities operating in utilities sectors may play the role of contracting entities.61 The
two terms indicate basically the same concepts, namely a property that an entity assumes
when awards a public contract and when carries out all the set of actions required for the
61One may argue that also entity operating in ordinaries sector and entity operating in utilities sectors
are roles. However, once again, I disagree. Why? Here the argument is more tricky, but I think
that it worth to spend a few words about it. I do not reject the argument in abstract: those terms,
certainly, denote roles, under a foundational perspective. However, from a strictly legal point of view,
the classification of an entity on the basis of the activity it carries out, is so relevant that, in some sense,
it transforms this role in a category (or class). As a meta-concept, indeed, its function is precisely to
recognize what are the norms which are applied to that entity and this function makes it, in some way,
‘atypical’. I limit myself to the analysis of “legal person”, I wan’t consider here “natural person”.
I think that the (main) activity of an institutional (and recognized) legal entity is a fundamental
feature which characterizes that legal entity. The institutional activity, indeed, is the reason why that
entity has been created, established and legitimated by the legal system.
Consider the following example: the Italian National Council of Research (CNR) has been established
exactly for carrying out research studies in Italy. If, strangely enough, tomorrow, the CNR stops to carry
out research and starts to sell pizza, it will be no more the same CNR, legitimately created according to
the law. Firstly, it must change its name; secondly, it will become another type of entity, maybe a (...
private?) business entity, but certainly its new activity will be not justified according to the public law,
neither to its constitutive act. In other words, in this case (and in all the others), the activity carried
out by a legal entity denotes a rigid property, since when it ceases, the entity will be no longer the same,
or it will cease to exist as well.
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awarding process of a contract. The first action is to issue a notice.62 So, by issuing a
contract notice certainly an entity starts to play the role of awarding legal entity. Apart
from the role of awarding legal entity, this module of LOTED2 enables us to describe
also roles played by ‘business entities’ in procurement processes. For example, a natural
or legal person (operating on the market as ‘economic operator’) who has submitted a
tender bid for the award of a proposed public contract is a natural or legal person who
plays the role of tenderer. And if this agent has submitted the best tender bid, then
assumes the role of successful tenderer.
!
Figure 4.15: Subjective Legal Situations and Roles in LOTED2-core
Another important aspect in procurements’ role modeling deserves to be emphasized.
Just as a body governed by public law may play the role of both awarding legal entity
and tenderer (of course, in diverse tenders), so business entities may play many roles in
diﬀerent procurements competitive processes.
Consider that the eligible customers of many business entities are public authorities and
so their core activity is precisely the participation in tenders, even more than one at the
same time. Then, this matter is not trivial.
62Please note that in some specific cases public authorities may award a contract without issuing a
notice: this is the case in which a tender takes place with a negotiated procedure without contract notice.
Of course, this case is not examined in this paper, since LOTED2 is an ontology for describing tenders
notices published on TED.
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In order to represent also these cases, the LOTED2 module described in this section
represents (legal) situations more than simply roles. An agent may have more than one
subjective legal situation that is related to a role played in a context. In the case of
procurement, the context is the procurement competitive bidding. These concepts and
relationships have been modeled reusing and adapting the “Social Reality pattern”[70,
71], one of the proposed content patterns available from the catalogue of Ontology Design
Patterns initiative[51, 53, 112]. Such an ontological representation is shown in the Fig.
4.15 (the dashed lines represent the inferred axioms).
4.5.7 Proposed Contract
Since LOTED2 is an ontology of public procurement notices, it does not represent public
contract per se. LOTED2 aims to describe semantics of notices concerning the award
of public contracts. A contract notice is the means whereby is announced a competitive
bidding for the award of a public contract. So, the commitment of the ontology is to
capture the information of public contract to be awarded (or proposed contract) not of
the public contract awarded or in its execution.
For this reason in the ontology is specified the class of Loted2: ProposedContract rather
than of Contract. The exact term should be proposal for a public procurement contract
to be awarded, however it would have been too long and too verbose for the needs of the
LOTED2 ontology.
Consider the case in which the tender has been declared unsuccessful: can we speak
about a contract or not? Of course not, because the contract has not been awarded and
then has not been signed by parties. So, in the stage of notice publication there is not a
contract, but a contract to be awarded. This is also clear if we consider that a contract
notice is also known in legal doctrine as invitatio ad oﬀerendum, namely an invitation
to make oﬀer for a proposal of contract. And only the successful bidder will be party of
the contract. The connection between the contract notice (the invitatio ad oﬀerendum)
and the proposed public procurement contract module is via a property chain:
Loted2:throughWhichIsAnnounced o Loted2:forAwardOf SubPropertyOf
Loted2:throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward.63
Every contract or proposed contract has an object, namely the subject matter of the
contract. A law-full object is an essential of a contract, or proposed contract. According
to legal doctrine, object of contract can be intended either as the commitment that
parties agree to assume (and the consequently transfer or creation of rights and/or
63See the Appendix ?? for the axiomatization in DL
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modification or settlement of existing bonds) or as the description of the real object (good
or service) to which relates the contract (i.e. the substantial content of the contract)[18].
The analysis of standard forms for contract notices and of the other tender documents
shows that the object of contract is intended in the second sense, i.e. as a description
of the type of good, service or work that the entity issuing the notice seeks.
Figure 4.16: UML representation of the proposed contract in LOTED2
The object property hasObject connects the public procurement contract to its subject
(Work, Supply, or Service) - i.e. connects the Loted2:ProposedPublicProcurementContract
with Loted2:ObjectOfTheContract, as shown in the fig. 4.16.64 Then every object of
contract concerns (or, speaking with the words of GoodRelations, ‘includes’) a Product
or a Service or a Work.
An example may be helpful to clarify. Take for instance a proposed contract which has as
object the supply of laser printers and A4 paper for the Ministry of Health. This means
that the Ministry of Health is searching for a Supply of printing products which includes
64Please, note that the correct namespaces of the LOTED2 ontology should be loted2 and not ted.
This is a typo.
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the Loted2:Product printers and printing paper (instances). The products which are
included in the object of the contract are known thanks to the CPV (Common Procure-
ment Vocabulary) nomenclature, which is indicated in the tender document (contract
notice, periodic indicative notice, etc.). The Common Procurement Vocabulary identi-
fies more than 9400 products with a code composed of 8 numbers. The aim of the CPV
is to standardize, by means of a single classification system for public procurement, the
terms used by contracting authorities and entities, describing the object of contracts
through an uniform nomenclature. The CPV is translated into 22 oﬃcial languages of
the European Communities. It simplify the task of drafting notices, since it describes
the subject matter of contracts, and helps also the drafting of statistics on public pro-
curement, since the CPV is compatible with trade monitors used throughout the world
(especially those used by the United Nations).65.
Coming back to our example, the CPV codes of the two products are:
• Cpv code of Laser printers is 30232110
• Cpv code of printing paper is 30197630.
and the object of the proposed contract (Supply of printing products) concerns both the
first and the second product.
Each proposed contract will be executed in a main place. Every location is defined
through the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) established by
Eurostat in order to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the
production of regional statistics for the European Union.
A rather significant aspect of procurement domain is the division of proposed public
contract in lots. In some cases and under certain conditions, entities issuing a contract
notice for the acquisition of similar or related supplies/works/services may decide to
split the proposal into separate single proposed contracts to be awarded with the same
tender. These single proposals that are also parts of a general proposal are called lots.
Since in some cases, economic operators may submit an oﬀer for a single lot only (namely
in all the cases in which is admitted a partial type of bid) this type of information may
be very helpful for participation in tenders of SMEs. In fact, usually a small enterprise is
specialized in one particular sector with one main oﬀering and so it might be interested
in bidding for the single lot rather than for the global proposal. Therefore, one of the
commitments of LOTED2 ontology is to accurately model this particular aspect of the
65See Guide to Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) available at: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-
and-nomenclatures/codes-cpv/cpv2008guideen.pdf
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domain, namely lots, even by ensuring that through ontology were made possible certain
inferences.
Given these premises, in LOTED2-core ontology this aspect has been modeled in this
way. First of all, proposed public contracts may be of three types: proposed contracts
divided into lots, proposed contract not divided into lots and lots. A lot is a proposed
contract that is also part of a proposed contract divided into lots. When a proposed
contract is divided into lots through the contract notice is announced a tender for award
also single lots. Through LOTED2, it is possible to infer that through the same contract
notice is announced a tender for award each single lot. This result has been achieved
through the use of General Class Axioms, combined with property chains.!
Figure 4.17: General Class Axioms declared in Proposed Contract module of
LOTED2-core ontology
In fact, two object properties are inferred in order to show which lots will be awarded
through the same tender:
Loted2: forAwardOf o Loted2:isDividedInto
SubPropertyOf Loted2:forAwardLot
and which lots to be awarded are announced through the same contract notice:
Loted2:throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward o Loted2:isDividedInto
SubPropertyOf Loted2:throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardLot
An example in the published version of LOTED2 ontology shows the inference so de-
scribed (see individual Loted2:Notice1).
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4.5.8 Tender Bid
This module describes the tender bid, namely the oﬀer that may be submitted by the
economic operator in the competitive bidding for awarding a public contract. Note that,
in english, the same word ‘tender’ denotes the ‘race’, i.e. the ‘competition’ for the public
contract, and also the meaning of the oﬀer for a public contract. It is an ambiguous
term and I think that precisely this ambiguity has led PCO developers to confuse the
‘race’ with the ‘oﬀer’. For this reason, I have decided to call the oﬀer tender bid, because
it is a bid made in the context of a tender. So, the tender bid class aims to describe the
oﬀers submitted by economic operators in a tender for the award of public contracts.
An important aspect is about the type of bid, namely, if an oﬀer may be submitted for
exactly one lot, for one or more than one lot, or necessarily for all lots. A tender bid,
indeed, may be either a partial tender bid, a global or partial tender bid, or a global
tender bid. This is a sort of quality that a tender bid has in a single tender, and it has
only one of these quality in each tender.
The type of tender bid is, then, strictly related to the lots’ issue, because both a partial
tender bid type and a global or partial type imply the existence of a proposed contract
divided into lots; instead the global tender bid type may be admitted both in tenders
through which are awarded contracts not divided into lots and in tenders through which
are awarded contracts divided into lots. I again decided to use General Class Axioms to
design these features of tender bids, but in this case I think that the a more powerful
language is needed to represent these aspects. OWL DL is not enough. However,
a failure in the ontological representation of this aspect does not aﬀect the utility of
the expressivity of the rest of the ontology. Simply, there is a small gap in the full
representation of the domain.
A tender bid is evaluated on the basis of an award criterion: the lowest price or the most
economically advantageous oﬀer. The first is based only on the criterion of price; the
second one is based on a set of combined criteria defined by the authority issuing the
contract notice. Furthermore a tender bid will be opened in a certain place (defined into
the contract notice) and at a certain date-time; and it may be drawn up in a specific
EU language or not.
4.5.9 Business Entity
This module describes the class of the entities playing the role of economic operators (to
simplify hereinafter called ‘economic operators’). Economic operators are the subjects
to whom is addressed the invitation to submit an oﬀer for a proposed public contract. In
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Figure 4.18: UML representation of the tender oﬀer in LOTED2-core ontology
other words, an economic operator is the potential counterpart of the awarded contract.
However, not every economic operator can sign a public contract. There are several
eligibility requirements, based on certain criteria that must be fulfilled by an economic
operator in order to participate in a competitive bidding.
This module describes private legal persons who are business entities, since they assume
the legal form of ‘incorporates’, ‘society’, ‘cooperative’, etc. These classes are modeled
following the taxonomy of LKIF-core ontology.
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4.5.10 The upper module: LOTED2-Top
This is a sort of upper module in which are contained abstract classes, even useful
to match the LOTED2 ontology with core ontologies and in particular with core legal
ontologies, in order to foster interoperability. In particular, many classes of Procurement
Top Classes module are modeled following the LKIF-core ontology schema.
This relationship between LOTED2-core ontology and LKIF-core is what I call a compro-
mise accepted in designing LOTED2-core ontology. Indeed the initial aim of LOTED2
project was to build an ontology of European public procurement notices integrated
with both GoodRelations and LKIF-core ontology. However, there is one main problem
that has prevented us from integrating the two ontologies together with LOTED2: the
time representation.
Given the importance of time factor in legal domain, LKIF-core represents time (such
as ‘date of publication’) as classes, while GoodRelations represents time through data
type properties such as xsd:dateTime.
Another problem was that LKIF-core ontology has been mostly conceived for represent-
ing legislative documents and not also administrative documents, such as tender notices.
Furthermore, every legal document is also a legal source and there is not a clear distinc-
tion between legislative sources (which are sources of law in the proper sense) and legal
sources, such as a contract (or a proposal of contract), which are sources of law only
inter partes, i.e. only among the contractual parties. The point was emphasized also by
Casellas in her PhD thesis[34].
Moreover, in GoodRelations, a business entity is a “legal agent making a particular
oﬀering” and it can be “a legal body or a person”([69], p. 332). This natural language
statement is translated in the GoodRelations ontology by representing Organization and
Person as SubClasses of BusinessEntity. I understand that for the purposes of the e-
commerce scenario, this ontological representation is not entirely wrong because it is
tailored to the needs of e-commerce Semantic Web applications.
However, this ontological representation implies also that all the persons and all the
organizations are also intrinsically business entities, and it is obvious that, from the
point of view of the legal domain, this ontological representation is not acceptable,
neither for LKIF-core, nor for LOTED2-core, because a legal body in the legal domain
is not a business entity. Certainly, a legal body can act also as a business entity, but
there is something more to it than its buying activity.
First: a business entity in the legal domain is only that particular type of organization
which is recognized by the law as a business entity, according to well defined criteria.
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Second: it is hard to accept the idea that a Parliament, a Ministry or an European
Institution are primarily business entities. It is true that they buy products and services
in the market, but their buying activity is not the main activity they carry out, it is only
an instrumental activity, functional to the achievement of their institutional goals. This
is precisely the point I wanted to highlight since the introduction of this thesis: public
procurement is instrumental to the institutional activities of public bodies. An hospital
buys drugs and machinery for diagnostic, because it needs them to serve its institutional
function, namely to provide health care to citizens; an university buys books or desks
only because it needs to ensure access to education. I can make hundreds of these
examples. This is the purpose, the aim, the goal of the public procurement system. The
fact that a legal body is the agent of this system does not change its essence and does
not transform it in a business entity. Absolutely not.
Third: in general, natural persons are not primarily business entities.
All things considered, a full integration of LOTED2 with the two ontologies (LKIF-
core and GoodRelations) together, was not possible, and because of that my accepted
compromise was to define in the top module classes represented in LKIF-core ontology.
In that way, I used LKIF-core ontology as a source of patterns for modeling legal content
of procurements domain.
4.6 LOTED2-extended: the integration of LOTED2-core
with GoodRelations4Tenders
Works carried out until now[4, 75], bring up the integration of ontologies about public
procurements with GoodRelations ontology. In particular, as we have seen in Section 4.3,
LOD2 ontology reuses some classes of GoodRelations (Oﬀering, Business Entity, etc.)
and also WESO Research group pays attention to an integration with GoodRelations, as
part of its future works. Even the creator of GoodRelations, Martin Hepp often makes
reference to procurements as an interesting application domain for his ontology.66
It is generally agreed that the object property gr:seeks could play a key role in
in encouraging the opening up of procurements domain to large scale Semantic Web
applications. However, the matter, in our opinion, deserves more attention for many
reasons. Good Relation is, currently, the best candidate ontology to complement an
ontology of public procurement notices because it represents a strategic domain, such
as the e-commerce in a non trivial way, addressing a complex domain and covering “the
66See for example Martin Hepp’s keynote Ontology Engineering for Linked Data. What makes for a
Good Ontology?, KIELD 2010, Lisbon, Portugal.
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many intricate situation that this domain requires”, “it is widely used currently in the
e-commerce and linked data communities”, “it is easily applicable, actually applied and
recommended by the stakeholders from the targeted domain”[38].
This is certainly true and in addition, we think that GoodRelations ontology inspires
also the recognition of some isomorphic patterns between legal and economic concepts,
namely between the market and its legal superstructure. Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that GoodRelations is an ontology built with the purpose to meet the needs
of B2C (Business to Consumer) or B2B (Business to Business) scenarios. In other words,
GoodRelations has been developed bearing in mind only the private sector. Therefore, is
not fully adaptable to the PA2B (Public Administration to Business) scenario, because
public procurement domain has its own peculiarities that cannot be ignored, if you want
to build a Semantic Web that doesn’t distort principles of EC law.
Take for instance the principle of equality of treatment on which is inspired the Art. 23
of Directive 2004/18/EC. This article states that, unless justified by the subject-matter
of the contract, technical specifications shall not refer to a specific make or source, or a
particular process, or to trade marks, patents, types or a specific origin or production
with the eﬀect of favoring or eliminating certain undertakings or certain products. Such
reference shall be permitted only on an exceptional basis, where a suﬃciently precise and
intelligible description of the object of the contract is not possible; such reference shall
be accompanied by the words “or equivalent”. So, on my opinion, the integration of an
ontology about public procurements like LOTED2 with GoodRelations could result in
potentially law distorting eﬀects. Why?
Because GoodRelations, according to its purposes, describes brands, types of products
(such as models), and obviously also the origin of products. These aspects come overtly
into conflict with EC procurement principle of equality of treatment, but there are also
other aspects whose incompatibility with the principles of the law is less clear, even
though equally harmful.
For example, GoodRelations defines the object property ‘image≡depiction’, through
which it is possible to link a product to its image available on the web. This is a very
useful class in the private market scenario. In the PA2B context, instead, the use of this
class may create problems. Indeed, with an extensive interpretation of the Article 23
one may argue that a link to a certain image could be used in order to indicate exactly
one specific type of product. This can be a sort of trap that may lead into a conflict
with principles of the European procurement law.
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Figure 4.19: Inferences supported through the integration between LOTED2-core
and GoodRelations4Tenders in LOTED2-extended
Given these remarks, I decided to amend GoodRelations ontology, removing all parts
non compliant with EC procurement principles. I have called this version ‘GoodRela-
tions 4 Tenders’. Apart from EC Directives-non compliant classes like gr:Brand,
gr:ProductOrServiceModel, etc. and related properties like gr:hasBrand,
gr:hasMakeAndModel, gr:hasManufacturer, etc., I have removed also other classes
and properties not required by the procurement domain such as gr:acceptedPaymentMethods,
gr:OpeningHoursSpecification, etc. Changes in this release compared to the original
GoodRelations ontology consist of just the elimination of certain classes and properties.
The original structure of GoodRelations has been preserved.
Another point on which is worth dwelling is about how should be understood an integra-
tion between an ontology of public contracts and GoodRelations. For example, Public
Contracts Ontology (PCO) developed by LOD2 group adheres completely to conceptual
model of GoodRelations, detrimental to the particular (and diﬀerent) domain of public
contracts. Instead the aim of LOTED2 ontology is to represent as closely as possible
legal concepts pertaining procurements domain. Such a conceptual analysis allows the
discovering of the possible connections with concepts of other domains. So, by explicitly
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specifying concepts of proposed contract and of invitatio ad oﬀerendum (namely call for
tenders or contract notice, etc.), the connection between GoodRelations ontology and an
ontology of procurement becomes clear... so clear that this connection can be inferred.
Consider the use of propertygr:seeks in the procurements domain. When an entity
issues a contract notice through which announces a tender for the award of a proposed
contract, actually is seeking the object of the contract. So the object of the contract
is the Oﬀering that this entity invites to oﬀer. In LOTED2-extended this aspect is
automatically inferred using a reasoner such as Pellet[133], through a property chain (as
shown in the fig. 4.19). Given that the class object the contract in LOTED2-extended
is SubClass of gr:Offering, the use of the property ‘seeks’ is perfectly compatible with
GoodRelations4Tenders.
In LOTED2-core ontology, also the subject matter of lots is inferred as object of contract
(precisely of those contracts which are part of the main proposed contracts), so, through
LOTED2-extended it is possible to produce automatically the same inference also for
objects of lots. For instance, if a contracting authority issues a contract notice through
which is announced a tender for the award of a public supply contract divided into lots,
then through the ontology it is possible to show all the supplies the contracting authority
is seeking.
Finally, in LOTED2-extended, business entities and all the entities empowered to issue
contract notices are kept separate.
4.7 Evaluation of LOTED2 ontology
LOTED2-core ontology, as well as its extended version, captures in an eﬀective way
the domain of European public procurement notices. Its representation of the domain,
indeed, provides useful inferences which are the result of some basic legal reasoning
applied to its classes and properties.
LOTED2 ontology has been under development for more than eight months and, during
that time, several versions (up to ten) of it has been tested in order to achieve this result.
It has been tested with real instances extracted from the TED system and, during these
tests, a lot of attention has been given to the supported inferences. LOTED2 ontology
has been designed using all the functionalities of OWL2.0 ontology language (property
chains, keys, definition of object properties through transitive and functional axioms,
etc.). Because of those features, at the state of the art, LOTED2 is one of the most
powerful existing legal ontologies, in terms of the inferences it supports.
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The design choice to split into modules LOTED2 ontology make it easier to maintain,
in spite of its size. The large size of the ontology, however, depends on the purpose
of the ontology to cover all the key aspect required by a complex domain, as is the
public procurement domain. Furthermore, besides the ultimate purpose of building an
ontology for Semantic Web applications, it has been developed looking also at its possible
extensions for several uses (data retrieval, linkage between open government data, basic
check compliance applications and so on). The representation of the Services which are
defined in the Annex A and in the Annex B has been provided exactly considering its
extensions in modeling also contract notices which are not fully covered by European
Directives, namely contract notices under the EU threshold.
LOTED2 ontology is also full annotated. The majority of classes, object properties
and data-type properties are annotated with explanations and examples of their use.
Furthermore, the annotations inside LOTED2 serve many purposes at the same time.
Firstly, they provide a reference for the expert users, by making an explicit reference
to the legal text (European Directives) from which have been extracted the definitions
of the classes of the ontology. The same has been made also for object properties (e.g.
how has been interpreted the action of ‘issuing a notice’) and data-type properties (e.g.
why the date of publication of the contract notice is important), which are described in
the law.
Secondly, they provide a guidance also for the non-expert users through two specific
annotation properties, namely Loted2:tedLabel, which provides a reference of classes
or properties of the ontologies to the corresponding HTML labels of the TED system
and of the full text of notices, and Loted2:dataID, which provides a reference to the
“short” identifier of data (e.g. AA, AU, TI and so on).
However, up to now, LOTED2 ontologies have not yet been fully tested in a real appli-
cation. The use of the ontology in a Semantic Web application, indeed, will be part of
LOTED2 project’s future work.
4.8 Now, what we can do with LOTED2 ontology?
Through the integration of LOTED2-core ontology with GoodRelations4Tenders ontol-
ogy, it would be possible to build a Semantic Web Legal application for matching public
demand side with the oﬀerings side of the market, i.e. the X-ray machine needed by
people like Giovanni for accessing the kernel of public procurement notices. Recently has
been released the ‘Open Database of the Corporate World’ (OpenCorporates)67. This
67http://OpenCorporates.com/
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Figure 4.20: The picture describes a possible use of the LOTED2-extended ontology
in a Semantic Web application
database contains data about more than 44 millions of companies around the world. To
each registered company is associated the corresponding Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (SIC) code, even useful for define the type of ‘oﬀering’ that a company oﬀers.
However, it must be emphasized that, at the state of the art, the information about
jurisdiction is essential for such kind of application if you want avoid the semantic noise
that can be generated by linking data of companies from states not involved within
the scope of application of regulation that covers the contract notice. Nevertheless,
LOTED2 can be surely used within the context of the European Union, excluding then
its use in extra-EU jurisdictions.
Linking procurements data with the OpenCorporates data should allow the matching
between demand and supply side, by alerting every company, which oﬀers the same
type of product or service sought by an entity issuing a public procurement contract
notice. Furthermore, resources such as WordNet, DBpedia and GeoNames may provide
an enrichment of the procurement dataset, in order to show additional information to
the user of a Semantic Web application, as well as a nice web interface. A sketch of a
Semantic Web applications is outlined in the fig. 4.20.
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4.9 LOTED2 ontology: lesson learnt
A fairly unexplored field concerns the integration of legal ontologies with ontological
resources related to diﬀerent domains. A sort of rigidity, which derives from the fact
that authoritative sources drive the conceptual model, characterizes ontologies about
legal contents.
It is no accident that legal ontologies are mostly conceived in closed systems rather
than in open ones. In open systems the heterogeneity, the scale, the data quality,
the reliability of information raise significant problems to control the legal eﬀects of
heterogeneous linked data, or smart data. And because of this, building Legal Semantic
Web applications will require the ability to foresee and to cope with all kinds of risks
that may emerge, in order to avoid that the challenge will turn into a danger.
Re-thinking legal ontologies in the Semantic Web is a challenging task, not at all simple.
In the legal domain, an exciting research field is emerging on the use of ontologies for
checking compliance of legal documents or processes with norms regulating them[36],
even by combining ontologies with rules formalized through interchange standards spe-
cific for the legal domain. Nevertheless, at the same time, it should be more emphasized
in legal ontology engineering the aspect of compliance by design.
Ontologies for compliance and ontologies in compliance might be considered as two sides
of the same coin. The attempt in integrating LOTED2-core and GoodRelations shows,
indeed, many things.
First, through the property seeks and the mirror inverted oﬀers, GoodRelations repre-
sents in an intuitive way the intents of parties when they issue an invitation to treat or
a proposal for the conclusion of a contract (an ‘oﬀer’ in legal terms). In a certain sense,
GoodRelations shows the final part of the legal superstructure behind the terms seeks
and oﬀers.
Second, the integration of LOTED2 ontology with GoodRelations shows that also in the
legal domain “a little semantics goes a long way”.68 However, we must keep in mind
that in the legal domain this little semantics is just the superficial layer of the whole of
legal knowledge upstream.
The variety of related works about procurements (up to now there are three ontologies of
public contracts, including LOTED2, and another is in development) reveals the strong
interest of the Semantic Web community in representing legal knowledge. Furthermore,
68J. Hendler, Keynote at International Semantic Web Conference, Sanibel Island, Florida, USA, 2003.
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the Semantic Web community should consider the matter more carefully and the Legal
Informatics community should try to take up the challenge.
It can be done more starting from the lesson learnt in building LOTED2. It can be done
more, by using legal ontologies to promote the access of people to the kernel of the legal
knowledge they need.
Up to now, many initiatives have been started by the European Commission in order
to improve the access of traders (in particular of SMEs) to public procurement mar-
ket in EU. Indeed, this kind of vision is now inspiring the Peppol EU Project69, which
aims to make possible electronic communication between any companies in the Euro-
pean Union with any governmental institutions for all procurement processes. Another
initiative is e-certis70, namely a system that helps authorities and economic operators
in identifying the diﬀerent certificates and attestations (that are evidences for require-
ments) frequently requested in procurement procedures across the 27 Member States,
two Candidate Countries (Turkey and Croatia) and the three EEA countries (Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway).
These two initiatives provide us many useful non-semantic resources for modeling re-
quirements. In addition, further research in investigating how Regulations, such as
Government Procurement Agreement, can be adequately represented in the Semantic
Web will be particularly useful. These two aspects combined together may allow us to
cover in an eﬀective way the procurement domain.
Take for instance the contract notice 2011/S n. 236-38253271 issued by ‘The Open
University’ (that is a body governed by public law) for the award of a public contract
concerning cleaning services. There are two key questions related to this contract notice,
with not easy solutions for traders who are interested in the application for this notice.
First: I am a company from Canada, can I apply for this notice issued by The Open
University (UK)? Second: I am a company from Italy: what types of documents should
I submit to The Open University for participating in the tender n. 236-382532? The
answer to the first question depends on the type of ‘Regulation’ that covers the contract
notice. In this specific case, the contract notice states that the Government Procurement
Agreement covers this particular type of contract, but this is not enough to give an
answer to the first question. It is necessary to consider all the exceptions agreed by




71available from TED system at http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:382532-
2011:TEXT:EN:HTML
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The answer to the second question, instead, depends on the criteria that must be met by
business entities that want to participate in EU tenders. This example shows that in the
law, question answering is not only information retrieval. Information retrieval is not
enough, since “question requires some deduction or inference before an appropriate an-
swer can be given” and “regulations may contain many diﬀerent articles about the same
topic and one can only assess whether something is permitted or not by understanding
the full documentation”. “A rather detailed understanding is required, in particular,
because regulations generally contain complex structures of exceptions”[14]. In other
words, question answering in the legal domain is not a trivial matter.





5.1 Imagining the future of legal ontologies in the Seman-
tic Web ages
When I started working on my PhD research, I enjoyed it and I did not minded too much
the public procurement domain. However, to be honest, I was rather worried. I thought
it was impossible to make an interesting research on a so specific and technical subject
matter: legal ontologies for public procurement management. I have always thought
that public procurement are an important topic but, for a long time, I was basically in
agreement with the complaints of Thai[145], Callender and Matthews[29], Twyford[150]
and Stewart[139] about the lack of regard in public procurement domain, as research
field.
I do not know if it happened to these scholars too, but while I was complaining as them,
in truth, I was also thinking that public procurement was really “reactive, clerical,
unimaginative”, a boring procedure conducted by “unglamorous individuals” and just
a complex accountability process of government. Sometimes I have not at all believed
in the goodness of my PhD research topic. Sometimes I was thinking that a research
on the fundamental legal categories or on legal argumentation theory, for example, was
certainly much more interesting than mine.
But after this initial discouragement, I have started to consider this reactive adminis-
trative field as one of the most active, dynamic and innovative laboratory you can find,
for testing legal applied ontology and legal informatics science at large; I discovered that
rather than being clerical, public procurement world is asking more and more for in-
novative and not-dogmatic solutions to improve the eﬃciency of public administrations
and to satisfy in a better way citizens’ needs. In that way, I began to think at this (only
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at a first glance) unimaginative topic, imagining the future of legal ontologies in the
ages of the Semantic Web.
In fact, the public procurement domain reveals all the major need and challenges that
legal ontologies have to face in the Semantic Web ages. The relevant questions are:
how legal ontologies can provide a contribution to help public administrations in com-
municating with each other; how legal ontologies may help public administrations in
interoperability issues; how legal ontologies may provide the right semantics in discov-
ering information about Open Government Data... and many many others.
These questions, indeed, hide also some pitfalls and, the jurist of this century should be
aware of them. This thesis in nothing but an attempt to give an answer to this question.
Today, technology has not only invaded the world of legal information. Technology is
putting more and more under pressure the Law. The legal knowledge has been almost
entirely outsourced on the web, while it was remaining apparently the same. The textual
information of the legal sources is becoming more and more a ‘legal data’; the messy
amount of authoritative and not-authoritative legal information’s sources is determining
information overload and reliability’s issues; the real, democratic opening of the Law to
all the (non-lawyers) citizens has been not yet achieved. We can not delude ourselves
thinking that these major changes do not require solutions to re-invent once again the
Law.
At the end, I do not know if I have succeeded in providing my contribution to re-invent
the Law.





























LOTED2 Core DL Axioms
A.1 Formal description of LOTED2-Core most relevant
axioms in Description Logic
Classes
Candidate
Candidate≡ RoleInProcurement ￿ ∀ rolePlayedBy (LegalPerson ￿NaturalPerson ￿ ∃ has-
Sought InvitationToSubmitATender)
ContractNotice
ContractNotice ≡ ContractNotice-PublicSectors ￿ ContractNotice-Utilities
ContractNotice ￿ TenderDocument
ContractNotice ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnounced Tender
ContractNotice ￿ ∀ hasAttachedDocument (AdditionalTenderDocument ￿ Specifica-
tionsDocument)
ContractNotice-PublicSectors
ContractNotice-PublicSectors ￿ ∀ issuedBy EntityOperatingInOrdinarySectors
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ContractNotice-Utilities
ContractNotice-Utilities ￿ ∀ issuedBy EntityOperatingInUtilities
ContractingAuthority
ContractingAuthority ￿ AwardingLegalEntity




ContractingEntity ≡ RoleInProcurement ￿ ∀ rolePlayedBy EntityOperatingInUtilities
DesignContestNotice
DesignContestNotice ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnounced (DesignContest ￿ ∀ takesPlace-
With (AwardProcedure ￿ {RestrictedProcedure} ￿ {OpenProcedure}))
DesignContestNotice ￿ ∀ hasAttachedDocument (AdditionalTenderDocument ￿ Speci-
ficationsDocument)
DesignContestNotice ￿ TenderDocument
DesignContestNotice ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnounced DesignContest
EntityOperatingInOrdinarySectors
EntityOperatingInOrdinarySectors ≡ AuthoritiesAssociation ￿ BodiesGovernedByPub-
licLawAssociation ￿ BodyGovernedByPublicLaw ￿ CentralPurchasingBody ￿ Euro-
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EntityOperatingInUtilities
EntityOperatingInUtilities≡AuthoritiesAssociation ￿ BodiesGovernedByPublicLawAs-
sociation ￿ BodyGovernedByPublicLaw ￿ CentralPurchasingBody ￿ EntityOperatin-
gOnTheBasisOfSpecialOrExclusiveRights ￿ EuropeanInstitutionOrInternationalOrgan-










Organisation ￿ ∀ member (NaturalPerson ￿ Organisation)
PeriodicIndicativeNotice
PeriodicIndicativeNotice ￿ ∀ issuedBy EntityOperatingInUtilities
ProposedContract
ProposedContract ￿ LegalDocument
ProposedContract ￿ ∃ hasObject ObjectOfContract
ProposedContract ￿ ∀ hasObject ObjectOfContract
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ProposedContractType
ProposedContractType≡ ProposedContractType ￿ {ProposedContractNotDividedIntoLots} ￿ {Lot} ￿ {ProposedContractDividedIntoLots}
ProposedContractType ￿ ∀ isTypeOfProposal ProposedPublicProcurementContract
ProposedPublicProcurementContract
ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ProposedContract
ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ∀ typeOfProposal ProposedContractType
ProposedPublicWorksContract
ProposedPublicWorksContract ≡ ProposedPublicContract ￿ ∃ hasObject Work
ProposedPublicWorksContract ￿ ProposedPublicContract
ProposedPublicServiceContract
ProposedPublicServiceContract ≡ ProposedPublicContract ￿ ∃ hasObject Service
ProposedPublicServiceContract ￿ ProposedPublicContract
ProposedPublicSupplyContract
ProposedPublicSupplyContract ≡ ProposedPublicContract ￿ ∃ hasObject Supply
ProposedPublicSupplyContract ￿ ProposedPublicContract
QualificationSystemNotice
QualificationSystemNotice ￿ ∀ issuedBy EntityOperatingInUtilities
RoleInProcurement
RoleInProcurement ≡ LegalRole ￿ ∀ context ProcurementCompetitiveProcess
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TenderBid
TenderBid ￿ LegalDocument
TenderBid ￿ = typeOfTenderBid TypeOfTenderBid
Tenderer




￿ ￿ ≤ 1 atMainPlace Thing
∃ atMainPlace Thing ￿ ObjectOfContract
￿ ￿ ∀ atMainPlace MainPlaceOfPerformanceOfContract
basedOn
∃ basedOn Thing ￿ AwardCriterion
￿ ￿ ∀ basedOn Criterion
concerns
∃ concerns Thing ￿ ObjectOfContract
￿ ￿ ∀ concerns ProductOrServiceOrWork
contactPoint
∃ contactPoint Thing ￿ OrganisationalUnit ￿ NaturalPerson ￿ Organisation
￿ ￿ ∀ contactPoint VCard
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context
∃ context Thing ￿ Role
￿ ￿ ∀ context (Process ￿ Organisation)
covers
∃ covers Thing ￿ LegalDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ covers LegalDocument
evaluatedOnTheBasis
∃ evaluatedOnTheBasis Thing ￿ TenderBid
￿ ￿ ∀ evaluatedOnTheBasis AwardCriterion
evaluatedOnTheBasisOfCriterion
Property chain axiom: evaluatedOnTheBasis o basedOn ￿ evaluatedOnTheBasisOfCri-
terion
forAwardLot
￿ ￿ ∀ forAwardLot (ProposedPublicContract ￿ ∃ typeOfProposal {Lot})
Property chain axiom: forAwardOf o isDividedInto ￿ forAwardLot
forAwardOf
￿ ￿ ∀ forAwardOf ProposedPublicProcurementContract
forWhichMayBeSubmitted
∃ forWhichMayBeSubmitted Thing ￿ ProposedPublicProcurementContract
￿ ￿ ∀ forWhichMayBeSubmitted TenderBid
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hasActivity
∃ hasActivity Thing ￿ Agent
￿ ￿ ∀ hasActivity Activity
hasAdditionalDocument
hasAdditionalDocument ￿ hasAttachedDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ hasAdditionalDocument AdditionalTenderDocument
hasAttachedDocument
∃ hasAttachedDocument Thing ￿ ContractNotice ￿ DesignContestNotice ￿ Period-
icIndicativeNoticeWithCallForCompetition ￿ PublicWorkConcessionNotice ￿ Qualifica-
tionSystemWithCallForCompetitionNotice ￿ QualificationSystemWithoutCallForCom-
petitionNotice ￿ SimplifiedContractNoticeOnADynamicPurchasingSystem ￿WorksCon-
tractAwardedByTheConcessionaireNotice
￿ ￿ ∀ hasAttachedDocument AttachedTenderDocument
hasAuthor
∃ hasAuthor Thing ￿ Document
￿ ￿ ∀ hasAuthor Agent
hasCauseOfContract
∃ hasCauseOfContract Thing ￿ ProposedContract
￿ ￿ ∀ hasCauseOfContract CauseOfContract
hasCountry
∃ hasCountry Thing ￿ Agent
￿ ￿ ∀ hasCountry Country
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hasEstimatedValueExcludingVAT
∃ hasEstimatedValueExcludingVAT Thing ￿ ProposedFrameworkAgreement ￿ Pro-
posedPublicProcurementContract
￿ ￿ ∀ hasEstimatedValueExcludingVAT EstimatedValueOfContract
hasLegalSituation
∃ hasLegalSituation Thing ￿ LegalPerson ￿ NaturalPerson





￿ ￿ ≤ 1 hasMainPlaceOfDelivery Thing
∃ hasMainPlaceOfDelivery Thing ￿ Supply
￿ ￿ ∀ hasMainPlaceOfDelivery MainPlaceOfDelivery
hasMainPlaceOfPerformance
hasMainPlaceOfPerformance ￿ atMainPlace
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 hasMainPlaceOfPerformance Thing
∃ hasMainPlaceOfPerformance Thing ￿ Service
￿ ￿ ∀ hasMainPlaceOfPerformance MainPlaceOfPerformance
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hasMainPlaceOfWorks
hasMainPlaceOfWorks ￿ atMainPlace
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 hasMainPlaceOfWorks Thing
∃ hasMainPlaceOfWorks Thing ￿ Work
￿ ￿ ∀ hasMainPlaceOfWorks MainPlaceOrSiteOfWorks
hasObject
∃ hasObject Thing ￿ ProposedContract
￿ ￿ ∀ hasObject ObjectOfContract
hasOpeningPlace
∃ hasOpeningPlace Thing ￿ TenderBid
￿ ￿ ∀ hasOpeningPlace Location
hasPlaceOfExecution
∃ hasPlaceOfExecution Thing ￿ ProposedContract
￿ ￿ ∀ hasPlaceOfExecution MainPlaceOfPerformanceOfContract
Property chain axiom: hasObject o atMainPlace ￿ hasPlaceOfExecution
hasSought
∃ hasSought Thing ￿ LegalPerson ￿ NaturalPerson
￿ ￿ ∀ hasSought InvitationToSubmitATender
hasSpecificationsDocument
hasSpecificationsDocument ￿ hasAttachedDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ hasSpecificationsDocument SpecificationsDocument
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hasSubmitted
∃ hasSubmitted Thing ￿ LegalPerson ￿ NaturalPerson
￿ ￿ ∀ hasSubmitted TenderBid
inOrFor
∃ inOrFor Thing ￿ SubjectiveLegalSituation
￿ ￿ ∀ inOrFor Process
involvesTheEstabilishmentOf
￿ ￿ ∀ involvesTheEstabilishmentOf ProposedFrameworkAgreement
isActivityOf
∃ isActivityOf Thing ￿ Activity
￿ ￿ ∀ isActivityOf Agent
isAdditionalDocumentOf
isAdditionalDocumentOf ￿ isAttachedDocumentOf
∃ isAdditionalDocumentOf Thing ￿ AdditionalTenderDocument
isAttachedDocumentOf
isAttachedDocumentOf∃ isAttachedDocumentOf Thing ￿ AttachedTenderDocument
isBasisOfEvaluationOf
∃ isBasisOfEvaluationOf Thing ￿ AwardCriterion
￿ ￿ ∀ isBasisOfEvaluationOf TenderBid
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isDividedInto
∃ isDividedInto Thing￿ ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ∃ typeOfProposal {ProposedContractDividedIntoLots}
￿ ￿ ∀ isDividedInto (ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ∃ typeOfProposal {Lot})
isFollowingPublicationOf
∃ isFollowingPublicationOf Thing ￿ TenderDocument




￿ ￿ ≤ 1 isMainPlaceOf− Thing
isMainPlaceOfDeliveryOf
isMainPlaceOfDeliveryOf ￿ isMainPlaceOf
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 isMainPlaceOfDeliveryOf− Thing
isMainPlaceOfPerformanceOf
isMainPlaceOfPerformanceOf￿ isMainPlaceOf￿￿≤ 1 isMainPlaceOfPerformanceOf− Thing
isMainPlaceOfWorks
isMainPlaceOfWorks ￿ isMainPlaceOf
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 isMainPlaceOfWorks− Thing
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isObjectOf
∃ isObjectOf Thing ￿ ObjectOfContract
￿ ￿ ∀ isObjectOf ProposedContract
isPlaceOfExecutionOf
Property chain axiom: isMainPlaceOf o isObjectOf ￿ isPlaceOfExecutionOf
isPurchasingJointlyWith
∃ isPurchasingJointlyWith Thing ￿ BodyGovernedByPublicLaw ￿ PublicAuthority
￿ ￿ ∀ isPurchasingJointlyWith (BodyGovernedByPublicLaw ￿ PublicAuthority)
isPurchasingOnBehalfOf
∃ isPurchasingOnBehalfOf Thing ￿ AuthoritiesAssociation ￿ BodiesGovernedByPub-
licLawAssociation ￿ BodyGovernedByPublicLaw ￿ CentralPurchasingBody ￿ Euro-
peanInstitutionOrInternationalOrganisation ￿ PublicAuthority
￿￿ ∀ isPurchasingOnBehalfOf (AuthoritiesAssociation ￿ BodiesGovernedByPublicLawAs-




∃ isSpecificationsDocumentOf Thing ￿ SpecificationsDocument
isTypeOfProposal
∃ isTypeOfProposal Thing ￿ ProposedContractType
￿ ￿ ∀ isTypeOfProposal ProposedPublicProcurementContract
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isTypeOfTenderBid
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 isTypeOfTenderBid− Thing
issuedBy
issuedBy ￿ hasAuthor
∃ issuedBy Thing ￿ TenderDocument
issues
issues ￿ isAuthorOf
￿ ￿ ∀ issues TenderDocument
laysDownTermsAndConditionFor
∃ laysDownTermsAndConditionFor Thing ￿ ProposedFrameworkAgreement
￿ ￿ ∀ laysDownTermsAndConditionFor ProposedPublicContract
legalContext
legalContext ￿ context
∃ legalContext Thing ￿ LegalRole
mayBeDrawnUpInLanguage
∃ mayBeDrawnUpInLanguage Thing ￿ TenderBid
￿ ￿ ∀ mayBeDrawnUpInLanguage Language
mayBeSubmittedForAward
∃ mayBeSubmittedForAward Thing ￿ TenderBid
￿ ￿ ∀ mayBeSubmittedForAward ProposedPublicProcurementContract
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member
∃ member Thing ￿ Organisation
￿ ￿ ∀ member (NaturalPerson ￿ Organisation)
partOf
∃ partOf Thing ￿ ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ∃ typeOfProposal {Lot}
￿￿ ∀ partOf (ProposedPublicProcurementContract ￿ ∃ typeOfProposal {ProposedContractDividedIntoLots})
playsLegalRoleIn
playsLegalRoleIn ￿ playsRoleIn
∃ playsLegalRoleIn Thing ￿ LegalPerson ￿ NaturalPerson
￿ ￿ ∀ playsLegalRoleIn (Process ￿ Organisation)
Property chain axiom: playsRole o legalContext ￿ playsLegalRoleIn
playsRole
∃ playsRole Thing ￿ Agent
￿ ￿ ∀ playsRole Role
Property chain axiom: hasLegalSituation o role ￿ playsRole
playsRoleIn
∃ playsRoleIn Thing ￿ Agent
￿ ￿ ∀ playsRoleIn (Process ￿ Organisation)
Property chain axiom: playsRole o context ￿ playsRoleIn
publishedIn
∃ publishedIn Thing ￿ TenderDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ publishedIn OJEU-SeriesS
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relatesToThePublicationOf
∃ relatesToThePublicationOf Thing ￿ NoticeOnBuyerProfile
￿ ￿ ∀ relatesToThePublicationOf (PeriodicIndicativeNoticeWithoutCallForCompeti-
tion ￿ PriorInformationNotice)
role
∃ role Thing ￿ SubjectiveLegalSituation
￿ ￿ ∀ role LegalRole
rolePlayedBy
∃ rolePlayedBy Thing ￿ Role
￿ ￿ ∀ rolePlayedBy Agent
subjectToTermsAndConditionsLaidDownWith
∃ subjectToTermsAndConditionsLaidDownWith Thing ￿ ProposedPublicContract
￿ ￿ ∀ subjectToTermsAndConditionsLaidDownWith ProposedFrameworkAgreement
throughWhichIsAnnounced
∃ throughWhichIsAnnounced Thing ￿ ContractNotice ￿ DesignContestNotice ￿ Period-
icIndicativeNoticeWithCallForCompetition ￿ PublicWorkConcessionNotice ￿ Qualifica-
tionSystemWithCallForCompetitionNotice ￿ QualificationSystemWithoutCallForCom-
petitionNotice ￿ SimplifiedContractNoticeOnADynamicPurchasingSystem
￿ ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnounced ProcurementCompetitiveProcess
throughWhichIsAnnouncedForthcoming
throughWhichIsAnnouncedForthcoming
∃ throughWhichIsAnnouncedForthcoming Thing ￿ PeriodicIndicativeNoticeWithout-
CallForCompetition ￿ PriorInformationNotice
￿ ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnouncedForthcoming Tender
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throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward
∃ throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward Thing ￿ TenderDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward ProposedPublicProcurementCon-
tract
Property chain axiom: throughWhichIsAnnouncedTender o forAwardOf￿ throughWhichIsAn-
nouncedTenderForAward
throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardLot
∃ throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardLot Thing ￿ TenderDocument
￿￿ ∀ throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardLot (ProposedPublicContract ￿ ∃ type-
OfProposal {Lot})
Property chain axiom: throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward o isDividedInto￿ through-
WhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAwardLot
typeOfProposal
∃ typeOfProposal Thing ￿ ProposedPublicProcurementContract
￿ ￿ ∀ typeOfProposal ProposedContractType
typeOfTenderBid
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 typeOfTenderBid Thing
∃ typeOfTenderBid Thing ￿ TenderBid
￿ ￿ ∀ typeOfTenderBid TypeOfTenderBid
Data properties
CPVcode
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 CPVcode
∃ CPVcode Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ ProductOrSer-
viceOrWork
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￿ ￿ ≤ 1 NUTScode




￿ ￿ ∀ OJEUnumber Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
admitsVariants
admitsVariants
∃ admitsVariants Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ Proposed-
Contract
￿ ￿ ∀ admitsVariants Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaboolean
categoryNumber
categoryNumber
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 categoryNumber
∃ categoryNumber Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ Service
￿ ￿ ∀ categoryNumber Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
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deadline
deadline
￿ ￿ ∀ deadline Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemadateTime
description
description
￿ ￿ ∀ description Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral
documentTitle
documentTitle
￿ ￿ ∀ documentTitle Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral
durationOfContractInDays
durationOfContractInDays
∃ durationOfContractInDays Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Pro-
posedContract
￿￿ ∀ durationOfContractInDays Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
durationOfContractInMonths
durationOfContractInMonths
∃ durationOfContractInMonths Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Pro-
posedContract
￿￿ ∀ durationOfContractInMonths Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
hasCurrency
hasCurrency
￿ ￿ ∀ hasCurrency Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemastring
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∃ hasCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Es-
timatedValueOfContract
￿￿ ∀ hasCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemafloat
hasMaxCurrencyEstimatedValue
hasMaxCurrencyEstimatedValue
∃ hasMaxCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Es-
timatedValueOfContract
￿￿ ∀ hasMaxCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemafloat
hasMinCurrencyEstimatedValue
hasMinCurrencyEstimatedValue
∃ hasMinCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Es-
timatedValueOfContract
￿￿ ∀ hasMinCurrencyEstimatedValue Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemafloat
hasOpeningDateTime
hasOpeningDateTime
∃ hasOpeningDateTime Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Ten-
derBid
￿ ￿ ∀ hasOpeningDateTime Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemadateTime
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hasStartingDate
hasStartingDate
∃ hasStartingDate Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Proposed-
Contract
￿ ￿ ∀ hasStartingDate Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemadateTime
hasTimeLimitForCompletion
hasTimeLimitForCompletion
∃ hasTimeLimitForCompletion Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Pro-
posedContract
￿￿ ∀ hasTimeLimitForCompletion Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemadateTime
hasWeighting
hasWeighting
∃ hasWeighting Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ Criterion
￿ ￿ ∀ hasWeighting Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
heading
heading
∃ heading Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ TenderDocument
￿ ￿ ∀ heading Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemastring
isDividedIntoLots
isDividedIntoLots
∃ isDividedIntoLots Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Proposed-
PublicProcurementContract
￿ ￿ ∀ isDividedIntoLots Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaboolean
144








∃ option Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ ProposedContract
￿ ￿ ∀ option Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral
originalCPVcode
originalCPVcode
￿ ￿ ≤ 1 originalCPVcode
∃ originalCPVcode Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ Produc-
tOrServiceOrWork
￿ ￿ ∀ originalCPVcode Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainteger
publicationDate
publicationDate
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sendingDate
sendingDate
∃ sendingDate Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral ￿ TenderDoc-
ument





￿ ￿ ∀ subjectToPayment Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaboolean
subjectToRenewal
subjectToRenewal
∃ subjectToRenewal Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Proposed-
Contract
￿ ￿ ∀ subjectToRenewal Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaboolean
tenderDocumentNumber
tenderDocumentNumber
∃ tenderDocumentNumber Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Ten-
derDocument
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∃ valueAddedTaxIncluded Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schemaLiteral￿ Es-
timatedValueOfContract
￿ ￿ ∀ valueAddedTaxIncluded Datatypehttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaboolean
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B.1 LOTED2-Core ontology coding in OWL Manchester
Syntax
1
2 Prefix: owl: <http :// www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#>
3 Prefix: rdf: <http :// www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#>
4 Prefix: xml: <http :// www.w3.org/XML /1998/ namespace >
5 Prefix: xsd: <http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#>




10 Ontology: <http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/ LOTED2 -core.owl >
11
12 Import: <http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/6/ LOTED2 -core/
ProcurementsSubjectiveScope.owl >
13 Import: <http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
SubjectiveLegalSituationsInProcurements.owl >
14 Import: <http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl >
15 Import: <http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ProposedContract.owl >
16
17 Annotations:
18 rdfs:label "LOTED2 -core"@en ,
19 owl:versionInfo "1.0"@en ,
20 rdfs:comment "LOTED2 is a legal ontology of European procurement notices and




























43 rdfs:label "through which is announced tender for award lot (0..*)"@en
44
45 SubPropertyChain:
46 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/ LOTED2 -core.owl#
throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward > o <http ://www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#isDividedInto >
47
48 Domain:




52 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#
ProposedPublicContract >
53 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#
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95 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
ProcurementCompetitiveProcess.owl#forAwardOf > o <http :// www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#isDividedInto >
96
97 Range:
98 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#
ProposedPublicContract >
99 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#
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107 Annotations:
108 rdfs:comment "This property is a shortcut to express for the award of
which contract is issued the notice."@en ,
109 rdfs:label "through which is announced tender for award (1..*)"@en
110
111 SubPropertyChain:
112 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#




















127 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
SubjectiveLegalSituationsInProcurements.owl#RoleInProcurement >
128 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/
ProcurementsTopClasses.owl#rolePlayedBy > only
129 ((<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ted -top.owl#
LegalPerson >
130 or <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ted -top.owl#
NaturalPerson >)
131 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/ BusinessEntity.








137 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ ProcurementsTopClasses.owl#
LegalRole >
138 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/
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143 SubClassOf:
144 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#








150 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#








156 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
SubjectiveLegalSituationsInProcurements.owl#RoleInProcurement >
157 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/
ProcurementsTopClasses.owl#rolePlayedBy > only <http ://www.semanticweb.org/
















169 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#








175 Class: <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ted -top.owl#LegalPerson >
176
177
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190 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#
























208 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
SubjectiveLegalSituationsInProcurements.owl#RoleInProcurement >
209 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/
ProcurementsTopClasses.owl#rolePlayedBy > only <http ://www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/6/ Loted2 -AwardingLegalEntity.owl#EntityOperatingInUtilities >)
210
211
212 Class: <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/0/ ted.owl#ProposedContract >
213
214




218 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
SubjectiveLegalSituationsInProcurements.owl#RoleInProcurement >
219 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/
ProcurementsTopClasses.owl#rolePlayedBy > only
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220 ((<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ted -top.owl#
LegalPerson >
221 or <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ted -top.owl#
NaturalPerson >)
222 and (<http ://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/4/ Loted2 -
EconomicOperator.owl#hasSubmitted > some <http :// www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/3/ Loted2 -TenderOffer.owl#TenderBid >)))
223
224








231 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/
ProcurementCompetitiveProcess.owl#forAwardOf > <http :// www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/0/ Loted2 -contract.owl#ProposedContract1 >
232
233 Types:




237 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/ ProcurementCompetitiveProcess.




















252 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/7/ LOTED2 -core.owl#
throughWhichIsAnnouncedTenderForAward > <http :// www.semanticweb.org/
ontologies /2012/0/ Loted2 -contract.owl#ProposedContract1 >,
253 <http :// www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2012/3/ Tender_documents.owl#
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